The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Fall, 1994 Vol. 19, No. 3

US Environmental NGOs: New Strategies?
Per Ove Eikeland

A Closer Look at the IRA
Robin Currie

Minorities and Anxiety in the Arab Fertile Crescent
Michel G. Nehme

Group Membership and Personnel Selection: A Demonstration Using Bayes' Theorem
Edward M. Miller

Congress, the Presidency, and World Order: Interplay of International and Domestic Affairs
Anthony Eksterowicz and Glenn Hastedt

Council for Social and Economic Studies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copyright ® 1994, The Council for Social and Economic Studies

The Journal for Social, Political and Economic Studies is published quarterly by the Council for Social and Economic Studies. All correspondence should be addressed to The Editor, P.O. Box 34070, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20034, U.S.A. [Telephone (202) 371-2700; Fax (202) 371-1523]. Formerly known as The Journal of Social and Political Affairs, the subscription rate is $70 per annum for libraries and institutions, although scholars and private individuals are entitled to subscribe at a privileged rate of $32.50 per annum. Overseas subscribers pay an additional $5.00 per annum for postage. Reduced three year subscriptions are available at a cost of $180 for libraries and institutions and $90.00 for private individuals. Students may subscribe for $25.00 per year. The attention of readers is drawn to the *JSPES Monograph Series* (ISSN 0895-724X) published in association with the Journal and advertised elsewhere in this issue. Members of the academic community and other qualified individuals are invited to consult the General Editor at the above address concerning articles which they may wish to submit for possible publication. ISSN 0193-5941

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Journal of SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Roger Pearson
General Editor

Fall, 1994 Vol. 19, No. 3

CONTENTS

US Environmental NGOs: New Strategies for New Environmental Problems
By Per Ove Eikeland 259

The Irish Republican Army: A Closer Look
By Robin Currie 287

Minorities and Anxieties: Empirical Evidence from the Arab Fertile Crescent
By Michel G. Nehme 299

The Relevance of Group Membership for Personnel Selection: A Demonstration Using Bayes' Theorem
By Edward M. Miller 323

Congress, The Presidency and World Order: The Interplay of International and Domestic Politics
By Anthony Eksterowicz and Glenn Hastedt 359

Book Reviews 380

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL BOARD

General Editor

Roger Pearson
Council for Social and Economic Studies
Washington, D.C.

Associate Editor

Dwight D. Murphey
The Wichita State University

Advisory Committee

James T. Bennett
George Mason University

Stephen R. Bowers
James Madison University

Gary Bullert
University of Seattle

F. McA. Clifford-Vaughn
University of Natal

Sam. S. Crutchfield, Jr.
Washington, D.C.

Daniel Ellegiers
University of Brussels

Julien Freund
University of Strasbourg

Robert E. Gilbert
Northeastern University, Boston

Garrett Hardin
University of California, Santa Barbara

George A. Kourvetaris
Northern Illinois University

James Mayall
London School of Economics

Maxwell A. Miller
Mountain States Legal Foundation

Robert C. Richardson, III
Washington, D.C.

R. J. Rummel
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Alan Ned Sabrosky
Rhodes College, Memphis

Helmut Schelsky
University of Westfalia

Robert Schuettinger
Yale University

Oleg Zinam
University of Cincinnati

The editors wish to recognize the contribution of the late Russell Kirk, who honorerd this journal with distinguished service on the advisory committee from 1981 to 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

US Environmental NGOs
New Strategies for New Environmental Problems?

Per Ove Eikeland
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute

This article focuses on how US environmental NGOs have approached environmental problems. More specifically, what are their strategies when approaching environmental problems? Have strategies changed with a new generation of emerging problems, such as the global climate change issue?

Introduction

Finding an exact measure of NGO influence in policy-making is impossible. Nevertheless, it commonly held that NGOs have come to play an increasingly important role in policy-formation processes, at least in the Western world. In the USA, the environmental movement has become a major force in the political system, often capable of altering the political agenda and winning significant victories against dominant industrial and commercial interests. US NGOs have never had larger constituencies or received more funding than now, despite the current slowdown in the US economy. Whereas many social movements tend to lose momentum during periods of economic recession, this does not seem the case with the environmental movement. As environmental NGOs exert an undeniable influence, it is relevant to study whether their mode of working has changed in response to a new generation of environmental problems.

An Analytical Framework

Issue orientation – or the problems *targeted* by NGOs – is but one among several factors which may influence the choice of strategies. In this article, we develop a framework for understanding NGOs' use and change of strategies. Important elements are *goals* and *values* – by which we mean the overriding philosophy held regarding mankind's relationship with nature.

The value system, i.e., the man-nature-relationship, may change over time. Man could be seen as merely one among the equal creatures in the ecosystem, or as *the* creature – a superior species with special rights to change nature in the best interests of mankind

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as well as special obligations to manage nature to the benefit of mankind. Throughout history, different views on values have had an impact on what kind of social organization is preferred – which role markets should play and how much state intervention is considered necessary for a certain value system to be achieved. The market-economy has traditionally been regarded as a system allowing man to pursue his own selfish interests, whereas state intervention has been seen as allowing a more holistic approach in which the interests of humankind and nature itself can more properly be taken care of. A consequence of this approach is that the market economy will clash with a value system in which man and nature are regarded of equal value, whereas the state has more resources to ascertain a societal order compatible with such a value system.

That goals regarding societal order influence the use of strategies might seem self-evident, even tautological. If the market economy is accepted, one should also expect the simultaneous acceptance of so-called economic instruments. The relationship may be regarded as tautological if the empirical question of whether NGOs accept economic instruments is also an indicator that NGOs accept the market economy as a societal goal. The two variables are strongly related. We choose to distinguish between them, however, in order to maintain the indirect link between values and strategies.

'Targets' refer to specific problems to which NGOs devote time and effort. Examples include 'wilderness' and 'wildlife' (first generation of environmental problems), 'pollution' (second generation) or 'global climate change' (third generation).

That the issues themselves, the targets, have an impact on the use of strategies, is scarcely controversial either. That the target may have a feedback impact on goals is, however, less straightforward. Here the reasoning would be that, since an issue (a problem) has certain distinctive features (such as scope, complexity), solving it demands particular strategies and thus a particular kind of societal order. Since some of the new environmental problems (like global climate change) are so broad in scope and complexity, an effective solution will require a complex set of strategies. With the greenhouse effect, both causes and consequences are uncertain. So far, fossil fuel combustion has been assumed to be the single most important cause. Since nearly all human beings consume fossil fuels, whether directly or indirectly, solutions to the problem would thus affect almost every aspect of human life, with a possibility of major redistributions of income and wealth. Directly influencing the dispositions of actors on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the energy market by showing them alternatives may therefore be regarded as a strategy that will yield the most 'fair', the most rapid and enduring results, compared to merely awaiting new legislation which is unlikely to have significant short-term effects. However, such a strategy (utilizing the power of consumers and producers) at the same time means an indirect acceptance of the market system as a feasible form of societal organization.

That different branches of the environmental movement tend to target different problems may be explained by differing values and goals having evolved. Such a link is not easy to establish, however, and will not be further discussed here. Rather, we hypothesize that differences in values/goals and problems targeted may explain why NGOs have chosen different *strategies*.

By 'strategies' we mean the choice of the mix of instruments applied in targeting specific problems. In the environmental literature, 'strategies' are sometimes separated from 'tactics', with 'strategies' referring to overriding measures such as whether or not to cooperate with the government, whereas 'tactics' refer more specifically to the use of instruments. For the sake of simplicity we shall refer to 'strategy' as encompassing also the terms 'tactics' and 'tools'. We categorize strategies which NGOs may undertake along four different dimensions.

One dimension is *conflict vs cooperation*. NGOs may cooperate with or have a conflicting attitude towards industry. In the former alternative, coalition-building can be an important strategy, whereas litigation is more appropriate in the latter. NGOs may or may not choose the same strategies with respect to government.

Another dimension concerns the *role of government*. NGOs may try to influence the market actors' dispositions directly, through strategies for exerting influence on consumer choices (utilizing the consumer power). NGOs can even act as producers of environmentally benign goods and engage in direct market transactions. Alternatively, NGOs may choose to work on market dispositions indirectly, influencing government policies through traditional strategies such as lobbying and electioneering.

A related dimension concerns the *government's choice of instruments*. NGOs may accept and advocate the use of market-economic instruments or rather traditional command-and-control policies. Economic instruments take various forms – environmental taxes, competitive bidding practices that take into account environmental externalities, trading of emission allowances, joint implemen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation for cost-effective solutions to regional or global environmental problems, liberalization of trade, privatization of utilities, etc. Command-and-control instruments, on the other hand, include various laws, regulations, standards, licenses etc.

Finally, NGOs may take different stances towards *science and technological solutions*. Participation and cooperation in research, think-tanking and knowledge dissemination all indicate a positive attitude towards science.

The US Environmental Movement: Historical Survey

The First Generation of Environmental Problems – The Wilderness

European immigrants first settled in the New England area but soon expanded their occupation of new lands westwards into the wilderness. The pioneers' cultivation practices led to soil erosion, clear-cutting of forests and widespread extinction of species. When occupied land lost productivity, the pioneers simply expanded their frontier over the next ridge. In 1832, George Catlin recognized that without formal preservation, the remaining American wilderness would vanish. He launched the idea of establishing a national park. His idea was embraced in 1858 by the more renowned Henry David Thoreau and later by John Muir. Finally, in 1872, Congress established Yellowstone National Park.

Thoreau attempted to convince his contemporaries that the environment had other potentials than mere material values. His philosophy survived to become the intellectual foundation of the wilderness preservation/aesthetic conservation movement. Others, such as Frederick Law Olmsted and later John Muir, translated the preservationist philosophy into practice in arguing for the establishment of natural parks – first and foremost in California's Yosemite Valley.

By the turn of the century Muir had become the nation's foremost publicizer of the value of wilderness and, as founder and first president of the *Sierra Club* in 1892, a strong force for its protection (Nash 1990:94).

Opposed to the preservationist movement were more pragmatic conservationists who argued chiefly for controlled *use* of natural resources. During the latter half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, the two approaches had several clashes, in which conservationists tended to prevail. A driving force behind the 'progressive' conservation movement was Gifford Pinchot, then Chief

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Federal Forestry Division (later renamed the US Forest Service and given control of national forests). His philosophy of resource management was characterized by utilitarianism and a democratic orientation. For him, the conservation idea involving government control meant the greatest good to the greatest number for the longest time. Progressive conservationists dreamed of controlling rivers with dams and contemplated 'reclaiming' land for civilized purposes by draining swamps and irrigating deserts. The Reclamation Act of 1902 created a mechanism for putting the proceeds from the sale of western lands to use in federal irrigation projects.

Between the preservationists, who held that nature had aesthetic values to humans, and progressive conservationists, who accepted lumbering, grazing and mining, there was a basic discord which brought forth the first major schism in American conservation history, one that persists to this day. The former emphasized the importance of establishing national parks, whereas core instruments to the latter were the sound management of forests and nature.

After World War I, public opinion was aroused and the movement revived. Several new organizations came into being during this period. The *National Audubon Society* had been formed as early as 1905. In 1919 the *National Parks and Conservation Association* was formed, followed by the *Izaak Walton League* in 1922. Like the Sierra Club, all emphasized land resources, protection of specific sites against despoliation, and particular species of wildlife.

New approaches emerged after 1920. Whereas progressive conservationists earlier had scoffed at the preservationists' glorification of the recreational values of national forests, the next generation of foresters recognized the dual importance of woodland for lumber and for pleasure. Both progressives and preservationists gained strength during the 1920s, though Republican presidents favoured national reconstruction rather than conservation. Despite this, Hoover prepared the way for some of the conservation successes of Franklin D. Roosevelt, not least by initiating many federally supported scientific and technological projects. By 1933, the federal conservation bureaus had collected the body of data which was to serve as the scientific basis for New Deal resource planning.

In that year, President Roosevelt established the Tennessee Valley Authority, and over the next decade New Deal planners and engineers constructed in the valley the kind of project of which progressive conservationists had dreamed. The environment of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entire region was reconstructed as a unit in the public interest, and throughout the world, TVA became a byword for regional planning (Nash, 1990:126). This event marked the creation of a new national policy. The various problems of an area were to be integrated into a unified whole represented by a single planning agency. The river was to yield hydro-electric power, promoting prosperity on farms and fostering the development of industry. Dams could provide a channel for navigation. The river could also be made to provide recreation for fishermen and fish for food, pleasure from boating and swimming, a water supply for homes and factories.

In contrast to the New Deal planners, the wildlife movement emphasized the conflict between wildlife protection and the use of wildlife habitats. Rather than seeing wildlife as a commodity, the new wildlife enthusiasts emphasized appreciation of wildlife through activities other than hunting and fishing. Two central organizations saw the light in this period, the *Wilderness Society* in 1935 and the *National Wildlife Federation* the following year. Another organization, *Defenders of Wildlife*, came into being in 1947, when the conservation era had begun to wane. Although initially focusing on the welfare of individual species of animals, it was gradually broadened to include wildlife habitat and endangered species.

The Second Generation of Environmental Problems – Pollution

In the decades after World War II the environmental movement, as we know it today, took shape. In contrast to the conservation movement, the environmental movement was far more widespread and popular. Along with increased material welfare, deep-seated changes in preferences and values began to emerge. Smaller family-units developed, allowing parents to invest more time and income in creative arts instruction, summer camps, and family vacations so as to foster self-development. In this context, the phrase 'environmental quality' gained considerable meaning to the individual. Many of the early conservation objectives came into sharp conflict with newer environmental objectives. The former had emphasized development of natural resources. It had generated the first stages in shaping a 'commons', a public domain of public ownership for public use. The latter added air and water, as well as land, to what constituted a valuable human environment. *Environmental pollution* became the central point of attention. This transformation led to a second generation of environmental groups entering the scene in the 1960s and 1970s, more correctly termed environmentalist rather than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conservationist.

At the same time, the traditional groups expanded their vision of the environment to adopt an 'ecological' approach to the natural environment – recognizing the complex integrated interrelationships of living things, and using science as a tool for understanding and protecting the environment. The ecological perspective expanded the frontier of environmental problems from local or national to the regional and global levels. Ecological ideals confronted traditional Americanism that had stressed growth, competition and affluence, replacing them with stability, community and simplicity. The fear spread that technological civilization could impact catastrophically on the health of the entire ecosystem. The central problem was perceived as being the contamination of the total environment with substances of incredible potential for harm – substances that accumulate in the tissues of plants and animals and even penetrate the germ plasm to shatter or alter the very material of heredity upon which the shape of the future depends. Sparked by the writings of Rachel Carson (*Silent Spring*, 1962), the environmental movement grew rapidly. Her writings on the widely used pesticide DDT and its potential accumulation in the food chain were probably the first broadly read indictment of an institution that was sowing the seeds of environmental destruction. Also nourishing the movement was the general social unrest then prevalent in US society, with its main base in the universities. In a 10 May 1968 essay titled "An Age of Effluence", *Time* magazine, one of the barometers of trends in US society, took note that "scholars of the biosphere are seriously concerned that human pollution may trigger some ecological disaster." The environmentalism of the 1960s must be seen as drawing part of its force from a cultural climate of more general questioning.

In the wake of this issue-reorientation, new organizations were established, committed to combating pollution. In 1965, lawyer Ralph Nader began his crusade against the human and environmental irresponsibility of big business – the automobile industry in particular – with the publication of 'Unsafe at Any Speed'. He captured the interest and admiration of millions of US citizens who saw him as a countervailing force to "profit at any price". In 1974, Nader established the *Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project*, an organization specially devoted to opposing nuclear power.

The *Environmental Defense Fund* was established in 1967 during the battle to have DDT banned. EDF was a membership organization dominated by scientists and engaged in litigation. In 1970 came

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the *National Resources Defense Council* (NRDC), originally an environmental law firm run by lawyers. However, the two organizations soon became very similar in their mix of scientists and lawyers (Mitchell et al. 1992:14).

In the late 1960s Sierra Club leader David R. Brower was ousted from his position in the Sierra Club for having pushed environmentalism too far, too fast and without the proper approvals. Others, however, felt he had not gone far enough, and formed a new organization, the *Friends of the Earth* (FOE), in 1969. The dismissal of Brower from Sierra Club is one indication that a schism had occurred from conservation-based to environmentalism-based ideas. In 1970, *Environmental Action* was founded by the student organizers of Earth Day. FOE and Environmental Action were regarded as much more radical than the other major organizations because of FOE's uncompromising opposition to most forms of development, big business and big energy, and because of the 'new Left' brand of environmentalism espoused by Environmental Action (Mitchell et al., 1992:14). *Greenpeace US*, established in 1971, has since become one of the major non-lobbying national organizations. Its major strategy has been to raise public awareness of environmental issues. *The Environmental Policy Institute* was founded in 1972 by a group of FOE's Washington lobbyists tired of what they felt were inefficiencies of the FOE leadership and organization. As wealthy patrons supported them they could, unlike many other groups, avoid having to serve a membership and concentrate instead on lobbying. The Environmental Policy Institute recently merged with FOE again.

Environmentalism was to transform the fabric of American life and policy, spawning cabinet-level agencies and whole new industries devoted to mitigation, cleanup, and study. Antipollution and environmental protection legislation flourished. There can be no doubt that the new, powerful environmental lobby flexing its muscles in Washington, D.C., was a major factor in this development.

The intensity of environmental concern cooled, however, by the late 1970s and early 1980s. The appearance of James G. Watt as President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of the Interior turned back the conservation clock at least a century. Ironically, Watt's tenure planted the first real seed for the renaissance of the environmental lobby from the late 1980s. The environmental lobby mounted in 1981-82 a systematic campaign aimed at undermining and later seeking the ouster of Watt. The support in response to that effort was overwhelming. The Sierra Club saw its membership rolls jump

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by more than 25%, to over 245,000 in the first nine months of 1981. Between 1980 and 1983, the Wilderness Society grew by 144%, the Sierra Club by 90%, and Defenders of Wildlife and Friends of the Earth by about 40% each.

Up to the early 1960s, US conservation organizations had been relatively small, only occasionally engaging in lobbying. The number of paid staff was small, and many organizations were dominated by leaders who possessed charismatic qualities and exerted strong personal leadership. Second-generation environmental issues were far more diverse and complex; dealing with them required a high level of legal and scientific expertise. Environmental groups began organizing political action committees (PACs) to drum up support for tougher environmental policies. These PACs worked hand-in-hand with the League of Conservation Voters – founded initially as part of Friends of the Earth – to implement electoral strategies. By 1982, there were 14 states with environmental PACs actively working to oust or elect state and congressional candidates.

The Third Generation of Environmental Problems: Globalization of Pollution from Energy Use

The growth in NGO membership surged at the turn of the 1980s, stimulated by the visibility of ecological problems such as toxic wastes, beach contamination and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In addition came awareness of less visible threats, such as ozone layer destruction and the greenhouse effect.

Although the ecological perspective expanded the scope of environmental problems from a national to a global level as early as the 1960s, it was not until the mid-1980s that the global scale of major environmental problems received significant attention. The discovery of a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica coupled to emission of chlorofluorocarbons and the threat of global warming associated with emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases served to globalize environmental problems, indeed.

These new problems did not spark a host of new organizations, as had been the case with the appearance of the second-generation issues. The exception was one issue: protection of the world's genetic resources – particularly protection of the remaining rainforests. Rainforest Action Network was established in 1985, succeeded by Rainforest Alliance in 1986 and Conservation International the year after. Most of the existing organizations reacted by changing their agenda significantly to take account of the global scope of pollution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems.

Energy consumption was the major source said to cause the problems now placed on the agenda. Some organizations had targeted energy as early as the late 1960s, with emphasis on spills from oil production and national/regional acid rain problems. Few of the mainstream organizations had gathered much competence in energy questions, however, perhaps with the exception of Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resources Defense Council. Another branch of non-profit organizations did have the experience: the energy-efficiency advocacy groups which emerged in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The *Alliance to Save Energy (ASE)* was established in 1977, the *American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)* 1980, the *Rocky Mountain Institute*, a research-oriented non-profit organization, was founded in 1982 by Amory Lovins, and the *International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC)* was established two years later. All advocate increased efforts for conserving energy (the Rocky Mountain Institute also engages in other issues), and all emphasize how energy demand may be reduced by focusing on energy needs for providing specific services. Their rationale has come from empirical studies of the technical and economic potential for improving energy-efficiency.

Gradually, a high degree of professionalism developed within the major environmental NGOs during the 1980s. This was increasingly criticized by the more radical branch of the movement. It was not the first time pragmatic reformers had been challenged, however. Back in the 1960s pragmatists had been criticized by the 'lifestyle' camp which had little confidence in government and looked mostly to what individuals could do in their own lives to protect the environment. This split waned with the quick fading of the lifestyle camp. Many of its adherents moved into rural communes, while others went on to other things as the youth rebellion of the 1960s died. Like the lifestyle camp, these radical environmentalists of the 1980s criticized the pragmatic reformers for believing that progress toward environmental protection could best be achieved through exerting influence on governmental action. Borrowing some of their ideas from deep ecology, they challenged mainstream environmentalists on reasons that may be clustered in four themes:

1. Mainstream environmentalists are *reformist*, working within 'the system' in ways that ultimately reinforce it instead of seeking the social and political changes necessary to halt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

massive assaults on the natural world.

2. Mainstream environmentalists are basically *anthropocentric*, believing that the proper purpose of mankind is to control and consume the resources of nature as wisely and safely – but as fully – as possible. They have yet to learn the ecocentric truth that nature and all its species have an intrinsic worth apart from any human designs.
3. Mainstream environmentalists have become *co-opted* into the world of Washington politics, playing the bureaucratic game like any other lobby, turning their backs on the grassroots support and idealism that gave the movement its initial momentum.
4. Mainstream environmentalists, finally, are *not successful* even on their own terms in protecting the wilderness, in stopping the onrush of industrial devastation. They are so caught up in compromise that they are actually going backward.

The emergence of radical environmentalism took place during the Reagan era. Under the Reagan Administration, NGOs lost much of the clout they had gained in governmental circuits when Carter was in the White House. The radicalization also coincided with the decline of anti-Establishment groups within the mainstream pragmatic camp – groups such as Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Policy Institute and Environmental Action. David Brower, who had opposed the environmentalist mentality in the Sierra Club and founded Friends of the Earth, was in 1990 again ousted from his organization when he repeated the charges against the latter that he in 1977 had held against Sierra Club. Dave Foreman, who fought battles for the Wilderness Society, turned his back on the group and helped founding Earth First! together with dissidents from other conservationist organizations.

Some of the new radicals were radical in demands, whereas others were only radical in their preferred means. The 'Deep ecologists' wanted sweeping changes in society and living patterns but did not put much effort into organized political work. Other groups such as Earth First! and Greenpeace became less radical, but used direct-action techniques of protest that seemed radical in their confrontational style. Earth First! became renowned for its active confrontation against both private and governmental projects that were seen as threatening wilderness and its species. Another group,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sea Shepherd Society, applied radical illegal means such as sabotage to ram and sink whaling vessels of several nations.

The most radical of the radicals are found not within the established national organizations, however, but rather within a faction of the movement known as the 'Greens'. The 'Greens' consist of smaller groups and pro-environmental political parties working at the local level, and can hardly be regarded as influential at the national level. The 'Greens' strongly oppose the US political system which obstructs representation by other parties than the Democratic or the Republican in Congress. Both these established parties are regarded as obstacles to necessary social reforms. The 'Greens' claim that without such social change, the boundless destruction of Earth's life will continue.

Summing up then, three separate factions of the environmental movement can be discerned at the national level in the USA today: The mainstream reformist group, basically pursuing their cause by seeking to influence the government; a heterogeneous radical group, in which those radical in ends have minimal influence on national policy whereas those less radical in ends seek to apply radical, confrontational means; and finally, a cooperation-minded group, eager to cooperate with industry, less eager to look to heavy-handed governmental regulation than the mainstream group, but more apt to favour market-like mechanisms to achieve their ends.

Explaining Different Strategies

Only to a limited extent do the schisms which have occurred in the US environmental movement reflect changing values in terms of how the NGOs regard the relationship between man and nature. True, the conservationists had a utilitarian view of nature, whereas the preservationists regarded nature in less narrow terms also encompassing aesthetic values. But in both cases these values were still justified as a property for the benefit of the human race. Only with the introduction of the ecological perspective did the idea of nature having a value of its own penetrate most of the environmental movement. Man's role was reduced to being only one part of a greater whole, and human survival was seen as contingent on a healthy balance between the various components of the ecosystem. This ecological perspective has since dominated the environmental movement. Different attitudes towards the role of man have evolved within this perspective. Obviously, perspectives other than purely ecological ones are sometimes present.[1] The four points of criticism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from groups influenced by deep ecology to the mainstream part of the movement, outlined above, also illustrate that the debate is less about values and more about societal goals and working methods.

Nor does the third schism, which recently split the movement into three camps, basically reflect competing values, but rather disagreement as to societal goals and strategies. The mainstream groups in the middle tend to concentrate on influencing governmental decisions – an indirect method of influencing the public. Such a strategy may be regarded as a legacy from the conservationist period. For Gifford Pinchot, the conservation idea involved government control as a means for providing the greatest good to the greatest number of people for the longest time. The more radical groups, on the other hand, fear that working too closely with the administration entails that certain points of view will no longer be expressed, or will not be voiced as often or as forcefully as they might otherwise be. This issue recently became pertinent when Bill Clinton was elected president and opened the doors of the White House for NGOs far more extensively than had his predecessors Bush and Reagan. The radical groups have felt less comfortable about the invitation from the President, choosing to pursue other strategies, less compromising towards the administration and industry. They tend to put considerable effort into influencing market actors directly, reaching out to the general public by taking more aggressive positions guaranteed to prompt media attention. Also the groups on the other side of the mainstream camp have paid more attention to influencing market actors directly, even though these groups also actively visit the White House. Unlike the radical groups they have taken a more cooperative-minded attitude towards traditional adversaries, actively building coalitions with industry.

(cont'd over page)

Educators, policy-makers and others interested in copying articles from the *Journal* for classroom, workshop, conference and other use are requested to obtain prior approval from the Editor (telephone 202-371-2700, fax 202-371-1523).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The lack of fundamental differences in values makes it futile to seek to trace values as a factor that can explain differences in strategies. Other factors may have stronger explanatory power. One such factor might be differing goals about how to organize society, i.e., whether the present market-economic system or other forms of societal organization is best suited for solving environmental problems.

Although today's debate between NGOs in the USA may now and then seem heated, it is seldom a true ideological debate – at least not in the sense experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. Twenty years ago the ideological undertone was far more prominent, probably reflecting the more general trend of societal critique sweeping most of the Western world at that time. Life-style environmentalists constituted a real alternative, refusing to adopt the organizing principles of the present society. The life-style camp was not revolutionary, however. Nor are any of today's major groups, who accept the basic system, more or less. On the other hand, opinion does seem to differ on the degree of state intervention needed. This disagreement, however, resembles more that found for instance in economics, between Keynesian and neo-liberal thought, though it also reflects the economic notion about externalities in production and consumption, i.e., how much state intervention is necessary to correct for market externalities.

In one respect the difference is more fundamental: whether 'free market' principles are detrimental to the promotion of economic growth and consequently, whether economic growth is good or bad for the environment. The 'accommodating' groups are more apt to conclude that growth is compatible with environmental concerns, indeed, even fundamental for rapid environmental improvement. The reason cited is that economic growth increases capital-stock turnover in the economy, which in turn will increase the prospect of developing and disseminating a new generation of more 'benign' environmental technology. Cooperation and coalition-building are therefore strategies to ensure that the content of growth will be compatible with environmental improvement. The radical groups and parts of the mainstream camp are less optimistic about economic growth, perhaps reflecting a fundamental mistrust that industry holds environmental concern as a priority. In one respect, they are right. Environmental concerns cannot be granted priority before profits for industry. However, this notion has increasingly been circumvented within parts of industry. Today, there is considerable acceptance of the idea that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

you cannot make profits without being environmentally concerned.[2]

An issue related to growth is trade – whether or not liberalization of trade, assumed to spur economic growth, is detrimental to the environment. The issue has long been debated in the USA, and continues to be, now that Congress recently signed the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada. The debate prior to the signing of NAFTA caused a major split in the US environmental movement, exposing a rift over whether some large national environmental organizations have become too friendly with the Clinton White House. Not surprisingly, we find the accommodating groups among those approving NAFTA, and the radical groups among its opponents.

At a news conference on 15 September 1993 on Capitol Hill, the leaders of six of the national groups promised to help the White House fight for Congressional approval of the NAFTA trade pact. The six groups were the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International.[3]

Groups opposing NAFTA immediately responded in terms which environmentalists normally reserve for polluters. The opponents include both mainstream and more radical groups: the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, Rainforest Action Network as well as other national groups and nearly 300 state, regional and community groups. Together they have formed a new coalition, the Citizens Trade Campaign, asking whether the six pro-NAFTA groups have become too close to big business. The group is united in the conviction that NAFTA must either be rejected or fundamentally recast. As the executive of one of the opposing groups said: "Environmentalists who are in support of this agreement are a sponge. They don't know what they want. They are not sure how to get it, and they can be squeezed any time. Industry is absolutely clear about what it wants, and they are absolutely ruthless in doing anything to get it."[4] The accommodating attitude of pro-NAFTA groups both towards government and industry is an important part of the critique delivered from the anti-NAFTA groups.

A supporter of the agreement, John H. Adams, executive director of the Natural Resources Defense Council, said he had anticipated such criticism: "I recognize that this is a complex and difficult issue on which reasonable people with the same values and objectives can differ". This is an interesting statement. Adams actually claims that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are no basic differences in values and goals among the groups debating NAFTA, but that the discussion about strategies can rather be attributed to the complexity of the issue. This is in line with the third factor hypothesized at the outset as influencing the choice of strategies. Is it because NGOs have targeted different environmental issues that they also tend to have different opinions about the relevance of particular strategies?

We have earlier classified environmental issues in first, second and third generation issues. First-generation issues were less complex than their successors. Nature conservation and wildlife protection were site-specific and reasonably tangible problems. Often, sufficient remedies for action were to set aside public lands for national parks and protection areas, as well as to impose restrictions on public access to hunting and logging.

Second-generation issues were considerably more complex. The environmental problems caused by toxic pollution are less tangible than loss of habitat, and causes as well as effects are more numerous. The use of chemicals enhanced mass-production of amenities which made easier the physical every-day life of human beings. The new production and consumption patterns have had unknown and adverse environmental effects, however, with the accumulation of chemicals in plant, animal and human tissue threatening to change the very genetic material of life. The scope and complexity of environmental problems were enormous compared to the first-generation problems. This made short-term solutions hard to find, as no technical solutions were readily available and restriction on pollution emissions would affect the majority of people, at least in the developed countries where 'modern' consumption pattern had reached a high degree of maturity.

The scope and complexity have increased even further with the awareness of third-generation issues. In fact, the problems have become more or less all-encompassing with respect to causes and effects, and their uncertainty, most notably with the global climate change problem. Emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is assumed to form a shield trapping excess radiation (heat) from the sun. This in turn is assumed to cause a global rise in temperature at the earth's surface and ensuing climatic and weather changes. The single most important greenhouse gas is CO_2, basically emitted when fossil fuels are combusted. Fossil fuels – coal, oil and natural gas – are currently the main energy sources on which human activities rely. Energy in the form of fossil fuels is embedded in all the manufac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tured goods we consume. Fossil fuels are also used for providing human beings with necessary services, either directly (heating, transportation, etc.) or indirectly, in the form of electricity (lighting, heating, etc.) and district heating.[5]

Against this background, it may be fruitful to ask whether issue orientation is a major factor explaining why NGOs have adopted various attitudes towards the use of specific strategies. Although all the major national NGOs are concerned with third-generation problems, such as climate change, for most of them this is not the major issue targeted. World Wildlife Fund and National Wildlife Federation work, as indicated by their names, first and foremost with first-generation issues: wildlife, wetlands, habitat, forests. WWF is highly internationally oriented. Also the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club have traditionally paid most attention to first-generation issues, which is understandable in view of their long history. Both have moved beyond wildlife to a broader agenda, however, in which also second- and third-generation issues have been targeted. Greenpeace has been internationally oriented from the start, focusing chiefly on whaling, and toxic wastes in the oceans, a blend of first- and second-generation issues being targeted. In addition to the groups mentioned above, the Defenders of Wildlife, the Wilderness Society, the Nature Conservancy and Earth First! concentrate mainly on first-generation issues. However, like global climate change problems, wildlife and forest preservation have increasingly become global issues, and the forest question is made functionally related to the climate issue. Hence, the scope and complexity of first-generation issues have become more similar to third-generation problems. Almost all the NGOs have therefore adopted an international perspective on much of their work. The groups above are scattered along the strategy dimensions. A cooperative strategy has been pursued by the Defenders of Wildlife in paying compensation to ranchers for livestock killed by wolves. Otherwise, coalition-building with industry is not a prominent strategy of the groups. The Defenders of Wildlife accepted also, with their acceptance of the NAFTA agreement, the invitation to cooperate with the Clinton Administration. In this question, they were joined by the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation and the World Wildlife Fund. On the opposing side were the Sierra Club and Greenpeace. The latter is also well known for its fierce opposition to big business. All in all, within the 'wilderness conservation' groups, coalition-building with industry is not common. On

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the contrary, when some of the groups are in contact with industry, it tends to be in situations of conflict. Some of the organizations adopt a cooperative stance towards government, however. On the other hand, there are also groups that engage more actively in litigation with government as the counterpart.

Most of the groups put considerable effort into lobbying government, probably reflecting a view that government should have a prominent role in environmental affairs. Exceptions are Earth First! and Greenpeace, who both use strategies directed more at arousing public opinion. The reason why lobbying government is such a prominent strategy for groups targeting wilderness issues may be that state preservation of public lands has traditionally been the solution to the problems of saving endangered fauna and flora and of preserving pristine areas. On the other hand, some NGOs have begun to operate directly in various markets. The Nature Conservancy, for instance, buys threatened lands and resells these to government, which they can do thanks to their position as one of the wealthiest US conservation organizations. When the Defenders of Wildlife pays ranchers for livestock killed by wolves, this is also a kind of market transaction.

Most of the groups have a pragmatic attitude towards whether government applies market-economic or traditional command-and-control policies. This pragmatism is expressed through most of the groups supporting instruments which work. Some, such as the Sierra Club, are more skeptical than others towards economic instruments, the reason being a lack of empirical evidence that environmental improvement is easily obtained when such instruments are applied. Against these are traditional regulation and enforcement measures which, despite various inadequacies, have historically improved environmental quality. The use of economic instruments is relatively new; despite their apparent cost-efficiency advantages, little is known about their impact on the total level of pollution. Furthermore, some economic instruments, such as taxes, are highly unpopular among the public, so that command-and-control measures may be the only true alternative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contrary to the groups which have traditionally focused on the first generation of environmental issues, we find those which have been established primarily for promoting solutions to the second- and third-generation of issues. Reflecting this, most of the groups have a shorter history than many of those occupied with the first-generation issues. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), both established for combating environmental hazards, have developed a high degree of professionalism by engaging scientists and economists. This foundation left the groups better equipped to respond promptly when energy-related environmental issues entered the agenda in the mid-80s.

Some of the groups were established with the specific aim of addressing energy-related environmental problems and of promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy. Two of the groups, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) and the Alliance to Save Energy, operate as consultants for industry which delivers energy-efficient equipment, and act as lobbyists with a high degree of competence in energy issues. The International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC) is more internationally oriented and emphasises energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy in developing countries.

Among the groups mainly concerned with second- and third-generation environmental issues, there are some which pay attention to wildlife and wilderness as well. Often this is done within an international perspective and explicitly linked to other third-generation issues, however. The World Resources Institute is a good example. WRI staff members span science, economics, and policy to provide information on global resources and develop policy options. The WRI focuses on forests and biological diversity, energy, climate and pollution.

The groups mentioned above tend to cluster differently from the mainstream and radical groups on the various dimensions of strategies. Whereas there are great differences between the mainstream groups, the 'accommodating' groups are more homogeneous.

First of all, all the groups tend to choose cooperation rather than conflict in their relations with industry and government. Most clearly, this has been worded by the EDF, which has announced that a new era is on the brink, in which industry and environmentalists will work together harmoniously. The EDF was joined by the NRDC in approving the NAFTA agreement. This cooperative stance has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expressed by the EDF in many occasions. The EDF writes in its 1991-92 Annual Report that "When conventional approaches are slow to produce solutions, the Environmental Defense Fund is quick to find new methods and forge new partnerships"... "Sound science and ambitious environmental goals underlie all of EDF's efforts."..."we work to achieve mutually beneficial solutions that haven't been tried before".

The partnerships referred to are various. For instance, the EDF has joined McDonald's in a task force working out recommendations for how the company can reduce its wastes. The EDF and the NRDC are both representatives on an Environmental Advisory Committee for a recently established forum, the Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future, formed in 1992 by business leaders from the renewable energy, natural gas and efficiency industries in the USA. Also the ACEEE, the Energy Conservation Coalition, the Environmental and Energy Study Institute, the National Audubon Society, the World Resources Institute, the Worldwatch Institute and the Union of Concerned Scientists are members of the Advisory Committee. The Business Council strategy is designed to, as stated by the Council: "realize the nation's economic, environmental and national security goals through the rapid deployment of more efficient and less-polluting energy technologies".

This is to be done by promoting market-based mechanisms as opposed to command-and-control regulations. The Business Council states that over-reliance on command-and-control regulation can be counterproductive, leading to increased consumer costs and fewer jobs, and unnecessarily hurting the US economy.

This NGO-industry partnership and its stated strategy also indicate that economic growth is regarded as mutually achievable with environmental improvement, and that rapid deployment of technology is regarded as the instrument for obtaining both. This position may also explain why the groups are in favour of NAFTA. Enhanced trade is expected to spur growth and technological development. According to the Solar Energy Industries Assn. and the American Wind Energy Assn., "Mexico represents a promising and growing market for alternative energy technologies, in both grid and non-grid applications." A study prepared for the US Export Council for Renewable Energy concludes that NAFTA "creates conditions that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are highly conducive to achieving environmental goals while creating economic growth and US jobs".[6]

IIEC is another NGO actively forging industry partnerships through its Private Sector Initiatives Program. The Program works to spur development of a market-based infrastructure within the economies of developing countries to deliver energy-efficient products and services. In Thailand, for instance, IIEC is working to develop Thai market capability to deliver energy-efficient products and services that bring together US and Thai industries in order to initiate joint ventures. Another IIEC initiative aims to increase industry capacity to recognize and develop new markets.[7]

The Alliance to Save Energy is in itself a partnership, a coalition of sometimes unlikely partners – business, government, environmental and consumer leaders – brought together with the aim of promoting the efficient use of energy through educating decision makers, formulating policies and conducting research and field tests to help identify the uses and benefits of new programmes and technologies. Also having a highly cooperative attitude is the ACEEE, which works in collaboration with private companies and other organizations to advance energy-conserving technologies and policies.

Second, the accommodating groups are not only forging new alliances, but also seeking new solutions to environmental problems by promoting market-based mechanisms as opposed to command-and-control regulations. The 'emissions trading' section of the 1990 Clean Air Act was developed by the EDF, and was said to produce larger cuts in pollution than conventional methods at an estimated savings of $1 billion per year. The EDF pays a lot of attention to detecting what are called 'win-win' solutions in order to convince leaders in government and industry that a strong economy and a healthy environment can go hand in hand.

This is also why the EDF promotes the principle of joint implementation to assist the Climate Convention in combating the greenhouse effect. EDF states that joint implementation can more rapidly reduce the use of, and pollution from, fossil fuels; can lead to sustainable economic growth in developing countries; bring new and private funds and resources from North to South; expand the menu of reduction investments; protect forest resources and the bio-diversity; and enhance penetration of innovative technologies.[8] It is urging countries to engage the private sector, and is formulating incentives to reward responsible investments in overseas emissions-reducing or sink-protecting projects. Some of the other environ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mental groups, basically the mainstream and radical ones, have been more reluctant to embrace the principle of joint implementation. Not that they oppose it *as such*, but they claim that various qualifications are necessary for them to accept the principle. The most frequently cited qualification is that joint implementation must be an additional measure to national commitments for stabilizing emissions of greenhouse gases. It must not merely be a loophole in order to avoid national measures. Furthermore, joint implementation is not recommended unless a cap is set on total emissions worldwide.

The Sierra Club has shown a rather chilly response, and will not accept the principle unless implemented under strict control. Under no circumstance should trees as 'sinks' be included in future projects. The Sierra Club fears that energy efficiency and technological development within the USA can be neglected as a consequence of focusing on projects in developing countries alone. A narrow focus on projects in developing countries could lead to a 'carbon-colonization' in which companies from the North reap investment benefits in the South while avoiding action at home. Since the industrialized world is regarded as having major responsibility for emissions of greenhouse gases, a narrow focus on projects in developing countries is not seen as acceptable.

Third, the accommodating groups position themselves in favour of private-sector action rather than government control. This does not mean that they see no role for the government, but that significant improvement of the environment cannot be accomplished without private initiatives. The EDF also looks more to market-like mechanisms to achieve its ends rather than heavy-handed governmental regulation favoured by most of the mainstream groups. Although the EDF has most prominently promoted such a view, it is basically shared by the other accommodating groups as well, including also the Conservation Foundation, Resources for the Future, the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, and the World Resources Institute.[9] Moreover, the Rocky Mountain Institute states in its promotional material that "the RMI's Energy Program works to speed the free-market adoption of a 'soft energy path,' a blend of efficient energy use with appropriate renewable sources". Further, "RMI's Energy Program is helping to abate global warming, acid rain, nuclear proliferation, and Persian Gulf imports, while saving hundreds of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

billions of dollars each year and laying the foundation for a revitalized economy."

Along the final dimension, the stance taken towards science, the accommodating groups prefer to play ball with the scientists. All of these groups spend considerable resources to establish expertise on the issues they target. Some of the groups are important in generating new knowledge, and applying this new information for purposes of finding feasible solutions to environmental problems. One example is EDF scientists who have developed a computer model to investigate how the atmosphere and the oceans interact in absorbing and releasing carbon dioxide. The EDF has also developed an electric utility planning software, Elfin, used to protect wilderness areas.[10] Another example is NRDC's concept for transforming the appliance market. In 1992, several utilities took the first step in applying the concept by offering $30 million for the first mass-produced refrigerator that meets NRDC energy and environmental standards. The Executive Director of NRDC states in the 1992 Annual Report: "Each day advances the technologies that make these kinds of solutions possible: energy efficiency, recycling, low-input farming, and many others. For the first time, the scientific capacity for an ecologically sustainable society is coming within reach" (p. 3).

Conclusion

We asked at the outset whether differences in the problems targeted by NGOs could explain the differences in strategies applied, and whether the 'new' environmental problems are so different in scope and complexity from former problems that a change in strategies is also regarded necessary. Apart from type of issues targeted, we have examined whether different values and goals about societal organization can explain the variation in strategies applied.

There are indeed differences in values among the US environmental NGOs, though they are minor among the largest national organizations. An ecological perspective on the man-nature relationship predominates. The small amount of variation makes it futile to trace values as a major factor explaining differences in strategies applied.

There are also differences in goals, i.e., what form of societal organization is seen as the most feasible to ensure that stated values will be taken care of. However, the debate fails to reflect a fundamental ideological cleavage. All the major groups today seem quite comfortable with a kind of capitalist society. It is at the local level

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that truly critically oriented factions of the environmental movement are found. These have, however, minimal access to the fora in where important decisions are made. Among the large national organizations there are certain differences in views on the kind of role the government should play in order to secure vital environmental quality. There are also differences with respect to the role economic growth should play. These factors do have an impact on the NGOs' choice of strategies.

It seems, however, as if these differences largely reflect differences as to which issues are of major concern for the various NGOs. The mainstream camp of environmental NGOs have traditionally paid considerable attention to what we have termed the first generation of environmental issues, 'wilderness' and 'wildlife'. In their work with these issues they may have specialized in applying certain strategies, such as lobbying and litigation, typical conflict-oriented strategies. These groups seem, with some exceptions, to be more skeptical towards the use of economic instruments. Such instruments may be less suitable for dealing with wilderness and wildlife issues. Habitat protection has traditionally involved a great deal of governmental action in the form of establishing national parks and nature protection areas. In order to secure that wilderness areas are preserved in their original form, access has to be regulated, which might necessitate the use of less flexible instruments than economic ones. The fact that preserving an area in its original form involves exclusion of certain commercial activities is an important reason for conflict between NGOs and commercial interests: the more compromise, the less the area remains untouched.

On the other hand, most of the groups which basically have targeted what we have called the third generation of environmental issues, such as the global warming problem, tend to accept and promote the use of other strategies, more oriented towards cooperation with industry. The building of coalitions in which NGOs, industry (and sometimes the government) work together to find feasible solutions has become an important strategy for these latter groups. There are indications that NGOs basically targeting the complex third-generation environmental issues cluster differently along several of the strategy dimensions compared to NGOs that focus heavily on first-generation issues. Among the latter group the spread is much more extensive than is the case for the former group. The spread also indicates that many typical first-generation issue-NGOs have stuck to cooperation rather than conflict, and this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weakens the hypothesis of targets explaining why NGOs use different strategies.

One significant pattern remains: the NGOs which have spent most effort in combating third-generation environmental issues tend to choose cooperating strategies and to be more open to the use of economic instruments and private sector initiatives. The reasons for this are less obvious. It is tempting to conclude that because issues targeted are so extensive in scope and complexity, the groups are more open to the use of other types of strategies than normally associated with the role of NGOs.

Today's NGOs are no longer mere watchdogs, with the relatively 'comfortable' role of criticizing government and industry. Increasingly, they have become advisors, with highly competent staff aiming to work out practicable solutions. It may be that environmental problems are currently so broadly acknowledged that the relatively easy task of putting the issues on the agenda is no longer the most important question. Instead it is the more difficult task of working out solutions which is the greatest challenge. Solutions need to be legitimate in order to be sustainable, and this requires a high level of consensus in society. It may very well be that such a view has increasingly permeated the environmental movement. It may also be a kind of learning from the past that conflict and traditional policy instruments will not do, particularly when issues of great complexity are at stake. Cooperation rather than conflict is not a strategy devoid of risks. NGOs can be co-opted by government and industry and lose their role of correcting decisions to the benefit of the environment. On the other hand, conflict involves many risks as well. People may grow tired of 'screaming and shouting' without seeing any tangible results tied to the work of NGOs. In the long run, this may be dangerous to the environment as well. Today, the only feasible solution to the comprehensive global climate change problem seems to be a change in the way energy is used. This cannot be achieved overnight. But the sooner those wishing to see such a change manage to join forces for a common cause, the sooner may such a change be expected. In the USA, the number of possible partners for such a task seem to be increasing, along with the growth in awareness that in the long run, such complex problems will have to be dealt with in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

order to sustain both the economy and the environment, and the very quality of life itself.

Notes

1. In the question of whaling for instance, animal rights arguments can be found which do not seem to correspond fully with the ecological perspective. Whales, or the group of species, *cetacea*, tend to be classified as a single endangered species, a "super-whale" threatened by hunting. In fact, there are as many as 80 different species of cetacea, ranging from 30 kilos to 150 tonnes in weight and with vastly differing characteristics and ways of living. Some species are heavily depleted while others are numerous, such as the minke whale, estimated at 700,000 individuals in the Antarctic and 60-70,000 in the North Atlantic.

2.Behind such an assertion are expectations about future consumer choices. Environmentally aware consumers will increasingly demand more environmentally 'benign' products. Those industries not able to meet customer demand will not survive. A similar assertion is also claimed at the aggregate level: efforts at improving the environment will spur economic growth. The underlying assumption here is that rapid capital-stock turnover towards more environmentally 'benign' technologies, will spur demand among environmentally conscious customers, which in turn will spur economic growth.

]3.Schneider, Keith. Environmentalists fight each other over trade accord, *New York Times*, 16 September 1993:A10.

4.Ibid.

5.Added to this comes methane as an assumedly potent greenhouse gas. Methane is released from rice fields and ruminant livestock, etc. Hence, the need for increased food production for a rising world population is considered a source of the global warming problem. In order to increase food production, new tracts of land are needed, which often means cutting down forests. As trees are assumed to be a sink for CO_2- emissions, cutting down forests without replacing them is in itself seen as increasing the trapping of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

6.*Inside Energy/with Federal Lands*, 15 November 1993, p. 6.

7.In January 1993, the IIEC completed an assessment of the US energy-efficiency industry. The resulting report, *Seizing the Moment: Global Opportunities for the U.S. Energy-Efficiency Industry*, characterizes and assesses the global market potential of this industry. Another private sector support activity is technical support for energy-efficiency companies interested in entering new international markets. In collaboration with the Alliance to Save Energy, a guide for this purpose has been created.

8.Transmission on ECONET, EDF Paper on Joint Implementation Criteria, written 12:02 pm Aug 24, 1993 by igc:edfclimate in pns:en.climate.

9.McCloskey (1992), p. 79.

10.Elfin shows how water from hydroelectric dams can be released on a schedule that would reduce downstream erosion and harm to wildlife, at modest cost. Elfin is also used to demonstrate that energy efficiency can meet power needs more cheaply than other projects.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

References

Arrandale, T. 'The Mid-Life Crisis of the Environmental Lobby', *Governing*, April 1992, pp. 32-36.

Caldwell, L. K. 'Globalizing Environmentalism: Threshold of a New Phase in International Relations', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 63-76.

Caulfield, H. P. 'The Conservation and Environmental Movements: An Historical Analysis', in Lester (ed.) 1989, pp. 13-56.

Devall, B. 'Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 51-62.

Dunlap, R. E. and Mertig A. G. (eds.) 1992. *American Environmentalism – The U.S. Environmental Movement 1970-1990*, Taylor & Francis New York Inc.

Dunlap, R. E. and Mertig A. G. 'The Evolution of the U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 1-10.

Dunlap, R. E. 'Trends in Public Opinion Toward Environmental Issues: 1965-1990', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 89-116.

Energy, Economics and Climate Change, 'Environmental Groups and the Clinton Administration: Too Cute a Game?, Arlington MA: Cutter Information Corp., May 1993, pp. 11-14.

Freundenberg, N. and Steinsapir, C. 'Not in Our Backyards: The Grassroots Environmental Movement', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 27-38.

Ingram, H. M. and Mann, D. E. 'Interest Groups and Environmental Policy', in Lester (ed.) 1989, pp. 135-157.

Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., various issues.

Lester, J. P. (ed.) 1989. *Environmental Politics and Policy – Theories and Evidence*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

McCloskey, M. 'Twenty Years of Change in the Environmental Movement: An Insider's View', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 77-88.

Milbrath, L. W. 1984. *Environmentalists – Vanguard for a New Society*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Mitchell, R. C., Mertig, A. G. and Dunlap, R. E. 'Twenty Years of Environmental Mobilization: Trends Among National Environmental Organizations', in Dunlap and Mertig (eds.) 1992, pp. 11-26.

Nash, R. F. 1990 (ed.) *American Environmentalism – Readings in Conservation History*. 3rd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.

Williams, B. 1991. *U.S. Petroleum Strategies in the Decade of the Environment*. Tulsa, Oklahoma: PennWell Publishing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Great Sex Divide

Glenn Wilson

Institute of Psychiatry, University of London

CONTENTS

Sex and Evolution
Evidence from Human Biology
Evidence from Animal and Other Cultures
Can the Differences be Suppressed?
Sexual Anomalies and Difficulties
Talent and Achievement
Aggression and Crime
Social Forces and the Sex War

The author, an eminent psychologist, examines the accumulated evidence for innate psychological differences between men and women which reveal the false assumptions on which much feminist literature is based.

ISBN 1-878465-04-X
Paperback, 160 pages
Bibliographical References and Index
Price: $20.00
VISA AND MASTERCARD ACCEPTED

Scott-Townsend Publishers
P.O. Box 34070
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20043
Tel: (703) 442-8010 Fax: (703) 847-9524

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Irish Republican Army: A Closer Look

Robin Currie
Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia

The declaration of a ceasefire by the Irish Republican army on August 31, 1994, has raised hopes that peace may at last be at hand for the troubled province of Northern Ireland. But caution is still required. While the IRA has announced a complete cessation of violence – a tautology since there is no such thing as an incomplete cessation – opinion is sharply divided as to whether yesterday's gunmen have whole-heartedly embraced the democratic process, or whether the ceasefire is merely a tactical move. Only time will tell. Some fear that the IRA is merely testing the political waters and could return to violence if negotiations do not go its way. As one British official has said, without a permanent peace, the implied threat of violence would hang over any all-party talks set up to discuss the future of Ulster.[1] That the threat of terror remains is beyond dispute: one-time IRA chief of staff Gerry Adams, now head of the organization's political wing, Sinn Fein, recently told the *Boston Herald* that a resumption of the military campaign was still possible under a new Irish Republican leadership.[2]

Such menacing ambiguity is a favorite ploy of a group that has long bragged of seizing power with "a ballot box in one hand and an armalite rifle in the other." Although President Clinton declined to meet with the 45-year-old Adams during the Sinn Fein leader's September trip to Washington – saying that the organization had not gone far enough by declaring the ceasefire permanent – other U.S. politicians with large Irish constituencies have fallen over themselves to meet with a man that Irish historian Conor Cruise O'Brien calls "the principal apologist for political violence for the last 15 years."[3] Few have paused to look closely at IRA methods or motives, to consider whether it has plans beyond painting Northern Ireland's red mailboxes green.[4]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beginnings

"They blow up policemen, or so I have heard, and blame it on Cromwell and William the Third." So runs the words of one satirical song about the motivations of the Irish Republican Army. But while it still cloaks itself in the traditional mantle of Irish nationalism, the IRA has always found other threads to weave into the garment, other justifications for its actions, other reasons to kill. For much of its history, the IRA has emphasized two different ideologies, one socialist, the other nationalist – the so-called Red and Green. While sometimes Karl Marx seems to be its inspiration, at other times it has resorted to an exclusive rhetoric that extols the mystical virtues of blood, soil, and nation – the Volk – that is as narrow as it is deadly.

Early on in the present "Troubles," which is the name that the Irish use for the civil strife that broke out in 1969, the Official IRA renounced violence as a means of achieving an Irish Marxist republic. A breakaway group called the Provisionals promptly split with the main body. Like the leftist Irish National Liberation Army, which also broke away, the Provisional IRA – the Provos – embraced the armed struggle and established a cadre force that would impose its own settlement on Ireland through revolution.

Two Traditions

As a first step, the IRA seeks to drive the British out of Ulster. This is despite the fact that the British presence in Northern Ireland is a consequence of the wishes of the majority of the population there, which considers itself – and has always been – British. The vast majority of Protestants in Ulster, who make up two-thirds of the population, prefer to remain part of the United Kingdom, and polls show that as many as a third of Catholics share this view.[5] The people of Northern Ireland are British as well as Irish, just as residents of Cardiff are at once British and Welsh, and Glaswegians are both British and Scottish. That notwithstanding, the Provisionals have always portrayed the security forces in Northern Ireland, which are drawn from all four countries that make up the U.K., as an army of occupation, a force of repression, a foreign invader to be pushed out in the final act of the historic anti-colonial struggle between Ireland and her larger neighbor. Such rhetoric ignores the facts. Britain is no more holding on to Northern Ireland than it is to Scotland or Wales, where nationalist and separatist parties advocating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a break with London consistently run in elections. Like their counterparts across the Irish Sea, they are just as consistently defeated.

The reality is that the conflict in the six counties of Ulster is every bit as much an indigenous, home-grown, Irish one. For the antagonism is between two traditions, variously labeled Protestant and Catholic, Scotch Irish and Gaelic Irish, Unionist and Nationalist, Orange and Green. Just as there are two nations on the Iberian peninsula, Spanish and Portuguese, so there are two distinct cultures on the island of Hibernia. And like the two countries that occupy the Scandinavian peninsula – or the island of Hispaniola – Ireland proves, as one commentator has asserted, that there is not always a symmetry between geography and nationhood.[6] The Republican dream of becoming "A Nation Once Again" is as sentimental as it is misleading. The idea of an Irish nation is a recent one, first championed by a group of Presbyterians, of all people, at the end of the 18th century. For centuries before that, the north of Ireland had always maintained a sense of separateness from the rest of the island, while keeping close links with Scotland. Indeed, all the way back to pre-Gaelic times, Irish history is full of stories about the heroes of Ulster who resisted invasion from the south. And today's Ulster Protestants – Scots who arrived in Ireland before Europeans settled in America – are inheritors of this tradition, equally determined to preserve their ties "across the water." Scotland, barely a dozen miles away, was settled by an ancient people from the north of Ireland; the modern nation derives its name from the Latin term for Goidelic Celts.[7]

To outsiders, the differences between the Irish peoples may seem slight. So, too, appear the distinctions between Punjabi-speaking Pakistanis and Punjabi-speaking Indians, who may have more in common than they do with the Tamils from the other end of the sub-continent. And yet the two types of Punjabis, at their own insistence, live in different countries. The dangers of forcing different peoples together, Tito-style, are all too apparent in the carnage of today's splintered Yugoslavia.

Pluralism, Irish-Style

The existence of two distinct traditions in Ireland is enshrined in the green-and-orange flag of the Irish Republic. One complaint is that the tricolor is the only place where the Protestant tradition is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

officially recognized in the South. Most Northerners feel that the actions of successive Dublin governments have undermined any pretense at evenhandedness. They have been encouraged in their worst fears. Prime minister Eamon de Valera's 1937 constitution, for example, made no attempt at a separation of church – one particular church, that is – and state, enshrining in the law of the land Rome's teaching on the family, education, and property. Article 44 of the constitution signalled the church hierarchy's intention to involve itself in the civil life of the state.[8] Further, the 1950 Tilson case in Dublin's High Court seemed to give legal recognition to the Catholic church's controversial rule that Protestant partners in mixed marriages had to sign away their rights to bring up children in their own faith. And the actions of the Catholic Protection and Rescue Society in preventing adoptions by Irish Protestant parents added fuel to the already growing sectarian fears.[9] To many, the warnings of the past appeared well founded: Home Rule – government from Dublin – would always mean Rome Rule.

Changing demographics in the Republic also reinforced age-old Unionist fears of being swallowed up by a hostile and intolerant Catholic state: while one in ten of the South's population was Protestant in 1922, today the "non-Catholics" – for that is how they are now grouped – have fallen to around 3 percent. Threatened, the Protestants take shelter in a siege mentality as resolute as that of the besieged city of Derry before the Catholic army of James II in 1689.[10] "No Surrender" becomes a byword for survival.

Self-Determination and UDI

If the British were to leave Northern Ireland tomorrow, against the will of the people, then an ancient trust – a union sealed in blood – would have been betrayed. From the Crimea to the Somme to the U-boat-infested waters of the North Atlantic, Ulstermen have always heeded the call to the British flag. They have paid for the union with their lives; in the face of IRA terror, they and their families have done so for 25 years. Abandoned, forced toward what they see as a hostile Irish Republic, the Unionists might well strike out on their own.[11] Indeed, the attraction of UDI, a unilateral declaration of independence, has risen and fallen as the political situation in Northern Ireland has unfolded during the Troubles. Among the most important backers of independence at one time was the paramilitary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ulster Defense Association. Others that have floated the idea of an independent Northern Irish state have included the populist Ulster Vanguard Movement of William Craig and elements within the province's second-largest loyalist party, the Democratic Unionists.[12]

The IRA's One-Two Punch

Ignoring such political and historical realities, IRA fundraisers have long relied on an anti-colonial rhetoric to garner support and pull on the heartstrings of some sentimentally vulnerable Irish-Americans. While reminding potential supporters of the potato famine, the Black and Tans, and the 1916 Rising, they are careful to omit the more ideological elements in their present-day agenda. That agenda is only too well understood in the South. After defeat in elections in the 1920s, the IRA fought – and lost – a bitter guerrilla war against the democratically elected government for control of the state.[13] For the second step in the Provisionals' strategy is no less than to "demolish the Quisling Regime" in the Irish Republic, which they deem a "fascist state designed for privileged capitalist sycophants" and whose legitimacy they have never accepted.[14] According to the Provos, Ireland's problems stem not just from partition but also from capitalism, and Dublin's so-called Green Tories are just as much the enemy as those in London.[15]

"We must educate the workers to destabilize capitalism in the whole of Ireland through armed struggle," declared the IRA in 1978 to *Controlnformazione*, the publicity organ of Italy's Red Brigades. A year later another spokesman reaffirmed, "We want a general dismantling of the existing Establishments in the Irish Republic and Ulster both."[16] Once accomplished, into the ensuing power vacuum would step Sinn Fein, ready to implement its plans for a united Ireland.

Ideology

Despite such pronouncements, some commentators have argued that the IRA is unique among terrorist organizations in that it has virtually no middle-class support, no intellectual underpinnings, and no ideological agenda for the future. They maintain that the group is without a real social program, and that any leftist pronouncements it has made were merely attempts to legitimize its actions.[17] IRA behavior often seemed to bear this out. A minibus carrying workers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

home from a textile factory in South Armagh is flagged down by a group of masked and armed men; the gunmen ask the Catholics in the vehicle to step forward and allow them to leave; raising their automatic weapons, they shoot dead 10 of the remaining Protestants and severely wound an llth, who lies protected underneath the bodies of his slain colleagues. In the game of Russian roulette, Northern Ireland style, this was a Provo operation and the Protestant workers were just unlucky. So much for "Workers of the World Unite!"

But despite such sectarian outrages, which plant roots of hatred that go generations deep, the Provisionals have not been silent about their future political plans. Under the influence of Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein continued its move toward the hard left during the mid-seventies. According to party manifesto pronouncements, after an IRA victory the future all-island republic would impose state ownership on industry, set up farming cooperatives, and establish a decentralized government run by People's Committees. Further, Ireland would withdraw from the European Union and put a ban on all foreign ownership of land.[18] "We want a Democratic Socialist Republic," declared Ruairi O'Bradaigh, one of Mr. Adams's predecessors as Sinn Fein president.[19] Equally dogmatic was one-time chief of staff of military operations, English-born Sean MacStiofain. Unhappy with his British-sounding name of John Stevenson, he had changed it to the Gaelic form. Evidently MacStiofain thought that the whole island should follow his lead and declared his hopes of imposing Gaelic as the new unitary state's sole language.[20]

An Unpopular Prospect

The IRA's dictatorial instincts send shudders through democratic institutions all over Ireland. Reluctant Unionists, a Sinn Fein spokesman said, would have to "be educated" into accepting a united Ireland. When asked if this meant "by bomb," the answer was curt: "By bomb, if necessary."[21] Such intimidation tactics are clearly an effort to make up for lack of support. In national and local elections, Sinn Fein can muster only 10 percent of the popular vote in the North; in the South – where education by bomb, or the threat of it, will work just as well – Sinn Fein receives less than 2 percent.[22]

Supremely arrogant, the IRA is undaunted by such trifles. When the Troubles were at their most bloody during the early 1970s,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MacStiofain announced, "We must win. We can't afford to lose. We will keep the campaign going regardless of the cost to ourselves, regardless of the cost to anyone else."[23]

Enter Colonel Qadafi

To compensate for its unpopularity at home, the IRA has always looked for allies abroad. Not surprisingly, it found a sympathetic ear in the center of world terrorism, Libya, whose Voice of the Arab Homeland has broadcast Provo support for the "Arab-Irish struggle" and for their "companions in the Zionist internment camps." Muammar Qadafi, eager to foster any cause that could hurt the West, promised that the Libyans would help "with all the means we have." He was as good as his word.[24] In 1973 the British and Irish navies cooperated to intercept a coaster, the S.S. Claudia, loaded with supplies for the IRA.[25] Aboard were five tons of Libyan arms, including 250 Soviet-made automatic rifles, pistols, grenades, and explosives. Not all of the Arab supplies were tracked down, however. Proclamations from Tripoli following IRA attacks in London in 1976 described the explosives used as "the bombs of the Libyan people." A decade later came proof that Qadafi was still at it, when security forces in the Irish Republic uncovered one of the largest arms caches ever found there, much of it from Tripoli. Appreciative of his backing, the Provisionals praised the philosophy contained in the Libyan leader's little Green Book: "Like all great political thought," they affirmed, without blushing, "Qadafi's message relates to a much wider canvas than the desert societies of North Africa and Arabia."

The Terrorist Multinational

It was at desert training camps in Qadafi's North African republic that the IRA began to meet with other European revolutionaries, establishing firm links with the Baader-Meinhof Gang, who set up a West-German-Irish Solidarity Committee, and with the Basque group, ETA, its most important ally.[26] The ETA bomb that killed Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973 is believed to have been supplied by the Provos.[27] Encouraged by a formal Declaration of Support from George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, IRA members also traveled to Lebanon for training, among them the man convicted of the 1979 murder of Lord Mountbatten.[28] Others went to South Yemen, where they were drilled by East

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German and Cuban instructors. By the end of the 1970s the Provisionals' links to international revolutionary groups were clear. "We have concrete proof of ties between the IRA and other European terrorist organizations," said the Irish minister of the interior. "The Terrorist Multinational exists."

Fundraising

To add to the support received from the Islamic world – the most recent of which came from the mullahs of Iran – the IRA swelled its coffers with dollars raised in the United States by groups like the New York City-based Irish Northern Aid Committee, Noraid. In spite of claims that the money was used for relief purposes in Northern Ireland, Noraid funds quickly found their way into the pockets of the terrorists. Until his arrest for running guns to the Irish Republic, Joe Cahill, the Provisionals' quartermaster, was one of the chief recipients of the U.S. finances. Home-based fundraising became more important as the conflict in Ulster wore on, however, especially during periods when IRA killings so horrified the American public that the dollars started to dry up. The unambiguous denunciation of IRA terrorism by prominent Irish politicians also helped to cut off the flow of money. On St. Patrick's Day, 1976, the Republic's prime minister, Liam Cosgrove, told a joint session of Congress that such money was "helping to kill or maim Irish men and women of every religious persuasion" and condemned those who raised the funds as "people who support violence at a distance and who can sleep easy on the wounds of others."[29]

Blurring the division between terrorism and organized crime, the IRA has also turned to vice operations to pay for its war, running massage parlors, brothels, and protection rackets. Belfast has, in effect, been divided up into territories for the purposes of fraud; in addition to establishing agreements with other rival Republican groups, the Provisionals have also cooperated with Loyalist paramilitary organizations to better operate their money-making schemes. The arrest of four of its members in 1979 for possession of $2.3 million worth of marijuana was evidence of the IRA's growing involvement in the drug trade. More traditional sources of funds include bank robberies, illegal drinking clubs, and, of course, the collection of welfare checks from Her Majesty's government. A taxicab business in Belfast has also been a money earner. Not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surprisingly, the enterprise proved more lucrative once the Provos had eliminated the competition by burning much of the city's bus fleet. (The media were quick to portray – some would say excuse – the IRA's cynical destruction of the vehicles as an expression of the minority community's sense of alienation.)

A Well-Armed Force

Amply funded, the IRA has been able to buy the best weapons that the United States and the Eastern Bloc could offer. An early source of munitions was established after the Provos visited Omnipol, an arms factory in Prague run by the Czech security service. (For what it was worth, the IRA had endorsed the Soviet Union's invasion of the country back in 1968.) While the buyers made their way home by an established route – Prague, Havana, Shannon – the shipments themselves often passed through West Germany, handled there by old friends associated with the Baader-Meinhof Gang.[30]

Equipped with deadly Czech Semtex explosives, American AR-15 armalites, and sophisticated weapons like the Russian-made RPG-7 rocket launcher, the armed struggle – the IRA's term for killing people – was taken to new heights. As in most terrorist wars, the innocent were on the front lines. Whatever the motivations of the Provisionals at any particular time – nationalism, sectarianism, or Marxism – the result is the same for the people of Northern Ireland. The 19th-century Nationalist leader Daniel O'Connell fought long and hard for his ideals, too, but never believed that they were worth a single Irish life. Mr. Adams knows no such restraint.

An End to the Killing

A poll by an Irish newspaper earlier this year, just before the announced ceasefire, found that 90 percent of the people, North and South, wanted an end to IRA violence. In the past, the IRA has been unmoved by such calls for peace. "A revolutionary movement does not depend on a popular mandate as a basis for its action. Its mandate comes from the justness and correctness of its cause," the Provos have always maintained.[31]

So why the change now? Have the men of terror finally been sickened by their own deeds? Could it be that acts like the March 1993 bombing in Warrington, England – which killed two children and injured 56 other civilians, sparking peace rallies in Britain and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ireland – caused such revulsion that the IRA knew that it could not continue? It's hard to say. Some Protestant leaders see it more simply: a secret deal has been struck with the terrorists, in effect offering them what they want in return for peace.

In the light of political breakthroughs in other parts of the world, the press has been quick to draw international comparisons, comparing Mr. Adams with Nelson Mandela and with Yassir Arafat. After all, former so-called terrorists had been rehabilitated before and had become national leaders when the constitutional route was made open to them. But Mr. Adams has always had this option. What makes it unpalatable to him is that the democratic process, apparently, does not like him. While Nelson Mandela has become the most popular leader in South Africa, and Yassir Arafat appears to speak for most residents of Gaza and Jericho, Gerry Adams can make no such claims for himself in Ireland.[32] And if the analogy of South Africa that Mr. Adams likes so much is carried through, then the majority in Northern Ireland will determine its own future.

Peace ... or Else

The transformation of Mr. Adams from terrorist to statesman – or, to "teen idol," as the British press has dubbed him – may seem indecently fast to some. It will take more than a button-down shirt and tweed jacket – and a meeting with Rosa Parks – to make him a constitutional politician. Mr. Adams remains what he has always been, the leader of a murderous secret society.

In 1984 his organization came within a hair of blowing up prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet in Brighton; more recently, an IRA mortar attack on 10 Downing Street attempted to do the same thing to her successor, John Major. Now Mr. Adams – with the same aims, the same program, the same disregard for the will of the majority – wants to talk. The Anglo-Irish initiative of December 1993 declared that the question of Ulster's joining with the Republic would be left to a popular vote in the North. Mr. Adams has declared that this "veto" – an interesting word for the wishes of the majority – "must be ended." Or else what? What if at the end of the talking the people choose to remain as part of the United Kingdom? The IRA has not declared a final end to violence – and it still retains an arsenal estimated at up to 300 tons of weapons.[33] Mr. Adams now talks about reaching out to his Protestant brothers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and about "taking the gun out of Irish politics."[34] But it has been his use of the gun that has done more than anything else to alienate Protestants and Catholics, Northerners and Southerners. He has described the IRA ceasefire as a "courageous step" and bragged to supporters that the IRA was never defeated by the security forces in Northern Ireland. The last claim is true: short of imposing a police state, it is well-nigh impossible to defend against individuals prepared to plant bombs in cars parked in busy shopping areas. But the bombing campaign failed; the Provisionals were as far as ever from military victory. With 36,000 maimed and 3,169 dead – most at the hands of the IRA – it was the people of Northern Ireland who could not be defeated. It is they who have shown the courage.[35]

Notes

[1]*The Washington Post*, September 1, 1994, p. A24.
[2]*The Washington Post*, October 1, 1994, p. A3.
[3]*The Washington Post*, October 1, 1994, p. A3.
[4]*New York Times*, October 4, 1994, Op-Ed.
[5]"What Gerry Adams Didn't Say," *The Economist*, February 5, 1994, p. 13; *The Washington Post*, September 2, 1994, p. A27.
[6]Herb Greer, *Commentary*, January 1982, pp. 55-64.
[7]Michael Hall, *Ulster: The Hidden History*, Belfast: Pretani Press, 1986, pp. 16-17, 24-26; Edmund Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, pp. 2-3. The defensive "Great Wall of Ulster," already in place by the time St. Patrick arrived in Ireland in 432 AD, reaches from Newry to Lough Erne, the same area where exists the present border between Northern Ireland and the Republic.
[8]Article 44 reads, "The state recognizes the special position of the Holy Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens ..."
[9]John Whyte, *Church and State in Modern Ireland*, Dublin, 1971, pp. 163-193.
[10]The fusion of religious conviction and political notion runs deepest among the fanciful members of the British-Israelite movement, who believe that Ulster's Protestants are the descendants of the lost Tribe of Israel, and that the British monarchy is likewise directly descended from the Old Testament's King David through a Jewish princess who made her way to Carrickfergus, County Antrim.
[11]Jack Beatty, *New Republic*, November 15, 1980, pp. 17-21.
[12]Ed Moloney and Andy Pollak, *Paisley*, Swords, Co. Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd., 1986, pp. 292, 330, 337.
[13]Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, New York: Reader's Digest Press, p. 150; Joe McCarthy, *Life World Library: Ireland*, New York: Time Life Books, 1970, pp. 64-8.
[14]Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977, p. 323; Sterling, p. 157.
[15]Christopher Dobson & Ronald Payne, *The Never-Ending War*, New York: Facts on File, New York, 1987, p. 181.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[16]Sterling, p. 151.
[17]Demaris, p. 312.
[18]James Adams, *The Financing of Terror*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 164; Demaris, pp. 286, 311.
[19]Sterling, p. 168.
[20]Demaris, p. 334.
[21]Beatty, pp. 17-21.
[22]"What Gerry Adams Didn't Say," *The Economist*, February 5, 1994, p. 13.
[23]Demaris, p. 339.
[24]*Ibid.*, p.316.
[25]Dobson & Payne, p. 63; Sterling, p. 160.
[26]Demaris, p. 355.
[27]*Ibid.*, p.355; Dobson & Payne, p. 180; Sterling, p. 174.
[28]Adams, pp. 139-40; Sterling, pp. 155, 159.
[29]Demaris, p. 358.
[30]*Ibid.*, p. 354; Sterling, p. 153.
[31]Greer.
[32] Demaris, p. 298.
[33]*Newsweek*, September 12, 1994, p. 30.
[34]*The Washington Post*, October 1, 1994, p. A3.
[35]*Time*, September 12, 1994, p. 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minorities and Anxiety: Empirical Evidence From the Arab Fertile Crescent

Michel G. Nehme
American University of Beirut

This survey exhibits a high percentage of respondents from the Arab Fertile Crescent* who identify themselves as belonging to a minority, and as such, as having fears and anxieties. It is assumed that the individual's feelings of belonging are greatly affected by the perception of self. If in their own minds they feel that they belong to a minority group, they behave accordingly. The romantic flight toward a monolithic Arab nationalism might achieve assimilation in some regions of the Arab world because of the overwhelming Sunni majority. This can not be the case in the Arab Fertile Crescent because it is different in its population composition: the Sunnis do not constitute a dominant majority. Symbols and institutions of the state associated with the forces of modernization did not transfer individual allegiance from communal solidarity to identification with the nation. Clearly, culturally based community identification is an authentic reality that can exist and function independently of state institutions. The abandonment or blurring of the past is not a simple task. The memory of historical aversions is not easily erased. Perceptions of cultural incompatibility affect the deepest sentiments in the lives of the people of the Arab Fertile Crescent. Religion in these circumstances becomes an escapist route for collective emotional relief.

The Arab Fertile Crescent shelters various minorities in a confrontational situation. It is considered the responsibility of the state's decision-makers to reduce and if possible eliminate such a divisive and potentially dangerous situation through assimilation. Since the first fires of Arab nationalism and the propagation of the

*'The Arab Fertile Crescent' is a shorthand term used in this study to designate the historical Fertile Crescent of the Middle East from the perspective of select Arabic-speaking cultural communities: Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Jordanian. It carries no connotation of territorial claim, occupation or ownership. Ed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principle of self-determination, however, there has not been any significant viable scheme promoted by Arab Fertile Crescent leaders to assimilate the various minorities of the region. It seems that the task has been totally left to blind fate in the hope that the symbols and institutions of the state associated with the forces of modernization would transfer individual allegiance from community solidarity to the nation. The romantic flight toward a monolithic Arab nationalism might achieve assimilation in some regions of the Arab world because of the overwhelming Sunni majority.[1] However, the Arab Fertile Crescent differs in its population composition. The Arab Sunni Muslims do not constitute a dominant majority and thus other minorities find uninviting any move toward assimilation that would translate as Sunni cultural homogenization. Any attempt by the state to compel assimilation in order to reduce tensions among the different communities will definitely serve to exacerbate such tensions.[2]

Symbols and institutions of the state proved to be counterproductive in initiating assimilation among the various minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent. States have not accrued sufficient administrative resources, impartial distribution of wealth and moral legitimacy to earn the compliance of the various minorities.[3] Modernization, which is assumed to attenuate minority pluralism and eventually eliminate community conflict, to diminish parochial solidarity and transfer allegiance to modern structures, did not accomplish its task.[4] On the contrary, modernization and economic development have converted minority groups into antagonists competing for the control of the instrument of state and contending over the allocation of economic resources.[5] Despite limited success in some urban settlements, the lack of sufficient resources in the region impeded governments in their efforts to penetrate society with the services required in the promotion of assimilation.[6]

There is a tendency among scholars to blame the failure of assimilation on external intervention. Because of its military weakness, economic dependency and technological backwardness, the Arab Fertile Crescent is compelled to depend on the commercial and economic presence of the major powers. This dependency is disadvantageous. It allows for outside political influence in shaping public policy.[7] While acknowledging the importance, prominence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and persistence of the external factor, this paper does not tend in that direction. Its focus is on prevailing minority cleavages as a result of individuals' perception of their political and social environment, and of the absence of forces for assimilation.

Any attempt to force a fusion of minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent would be dangerous and would lead to bloodshed. This is no potential melting pot (the number and size of the minorities are obstructions) and efforts to amalgamate are stymied by deep-rooted cultural differences. The different minorities, recognizing that cleavages are permanent and foreseeing no future solution, experience a reinforcement of identity. This is leading to a struggle among them to arrogate the allocation of power in the state.[8] What is so peculiar about minorities? Why does the cultural community constitute the basic unit of political analysis in the Arab Fertile Crescent?

Definitionally, a minority is any group of people with a sense of cohesion who compose a significant proportion of the population of a political entity. A minority is a psycho-social group that synthesizes the general setting in which the individual develops and which determines directions in the perception of his self-identification. Whether integrated in the larger social setting or not, a minority maintains discrete characteristics that are labeled by its members and by non-members as dissimilar to the norm. In political studies the word minority is the specific and peculiar marker of particular groups living in plural societies – groups that are different in culture, faith, or ritual from other groups in these societies.[9] A basic characteristic of a minority, besides being a distinctive social group, is an inbred psychological anxiety informing their conduct that in pragmatic terms makes them feel abhorred and rejected by the others. Anxiety touches almost every aspect of the lives of minorities. It makes politics and society more complex and contributes to alienation, aggression and revolt. Its continuation is nurtured by the persistent efforts of its members to influence laws and public policy concerning discrimination, physical punishment, the undermining of social values, constraints on ritual and religious freedoms, marriage, divorce, and inheritance.[10]

From the social science perspective, minorities may include political factions, social or economic classes, religious or confessional communities, sex and age groups, occupational groups, language or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racial groups. In this article the concern is with only the basic identity individuals ascribe themselves in the Arab Fertile Crescent, viz., confessional, racial, and national.

Before the publication of Albert Hourani's *Minorities in the Arab World*, the study of minorities in the Middle East lacked focus and perspective. After its publication, essays started to appear, mainly by Middle Eastern scholars who provided fresh and authoritative data on communities, sects and minorities in the Middle East.[11] However, none of this literature addressed the particularities of the Arab Fertile Crescent. The wide scope of these studies illuminated such pertinent issues as the relationship between Islam and nationalism, economic development and modernization, religion and the state, and moral legitimacy. The design of the research was intended to make it applicable to the whole Middle East as well as other Third World countries. The efforts made by American social scientists, except for the work of Morroe Berger,[12] failed to recognize the central role of minority power in the political arena. The emphasis was more on institutionalization, mobilization and assimilation through political socialization.

Clearly, political socialization in the Arab Fertile Crescent has been an implacable force. It has fortified minority identity and provided the backbone of resistance to assimilation. Loyalty to one's distinctive minority is often more real than loyalty to the state. Aware of this, the state and especially minority-dominated states frequently make decisions with a view to retaining this or that group's conditional allegiance, and in the process perpetuate the minorities' identities and become hostage to specific minority interests.[13] In the presence of several communities, 'nationhood' has only a secondary resonance in the Arab Fertile Crescent. Despite manipulative propaganda, state nationalism never became more than a secondary trend in normal times but was promoted as a myth when there was a national conflict.[14] The manifestations and expressions of minority politics in the Arab Fertile Crescent are in some respects different from those observed in developing nations. The outstanding difference is twofold; the first element is the pattern by which the various minority groupings construct complexes of associations and institutions in nearly every sector of society. As a consequence, most of an individual's social, political and economic life is conducted within the limits of his own minority circle. The second element is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the greater prominence and salience of a religious definition of communal solidarity (Table II). This could be a legacy from the Islamic and Ottoman periods when communities and peoples were defined primarily in confessional terms. All attempts to secularize the state in the hope that confessional and minority solidarity would be de-politicized were unsuccessful; instead, they were perpetuated in political activism.[15]

Moreover, the minorities of the Arab Fertile Crescent have diverse bases. Using Arabism and the Sunni confession of Islam as the axis, minorities could be grouped as: Shiites, Alawis, Druze, Maronite, Orthodox and Catholics as non-Sunnis proclaiming Arab identity; the Kurds as Sunni non-Arabs; the Jews as non-Sunni semi-Arab; the Armenians as non-Arab non-Sunni. These minorities sometimes share anxieties with newly emerging identity groups that are considered alien in nationality or origin. That is, although Palestinians[16] are Arab Sunnis, they are considered aliens. There is substantial ill-feeling between them as temporary residents and the natives wherever Palestinians may be located, in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan or any other Arab state. The deliberate undermining of Palestinian political, social and economic influence in Lebanon after 1982, and the Gulf States' reaction to Palestinians after the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict of 1990 are good indicators in this respect. Confessional, ethnic and national diversity are especially thorny political problems in the Arab Fertile Crescent. In Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Israel, ethnic diversity along religious, confessional, linguistic, or national lines has resulted in long, bloody conflicts. After independence, the development of different political trends, some of which were sectarian, made it inevitable that minority groups remained in their established, particularistic consciousnesses.[17] Such groups experience real threats to their identity, cultural heritage and well-being. The minorities of the Arab Fertile Crescent have lived in anxiety for hundreds of years, inculcated by four centuries or more of Ottoman non-Arab Sunni rule. The Ottoman Turks were hegemonic, which compelled minorities to withdraw to their inner circles of social interaction, to establish their own institutions, and covertly to devise methods to resist all attempts at assimilation. The successors to the fragmented Ottoman polity – the Arab elites – aroused even more fear and sensitivity among minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent. They adopted the European model of nationalism and the sovereign state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

according to which the state should express the aspirations of a single people, in this instance, the Sunni aspiration. The deep-rooted suspicions of the various minorities undermined the legitimacy of the national state.[18]

What aggravated the matter was that the often-stated security concerns, and social and economic demands of minorities were dismissed by incumbent authorities as a cover for political ambitions. Minorities make no secret of the fear that permeates their political and social life, and of the profound influence that it exerts on their attitudes (Table II). Minorities in control of their state (Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq and until recently Maronites in Lebanon) have an even greater fear of any future reversal of political fortunes. They think it would mean the physical extinction of a large part of their population and the end of their political existence. The fear in whose shadow minorities live governs what they do and what they refrain from doing. It dictates their psychological reactions, which may appear incomprehensible and sometimes irrational to friends and foes.

Hundreds of years of persecution and the bloody conflicts among the various Arab Fertile Crescent minorities (irrespective of the internal and external factors that created them as minorities) have bequeathed a persecution obsession and a deep distrust of any non-member of their group. This has been perpetuated by the recent fifteen years of bloody civil war in Lebanon during which all minority groups of the Arab Fertile Crescent have directly or indirectly practiced violence against one another. This has had two main effects. Some minority members are seriously thinking of emigrating, while others have become more determined to stay and fight for what they consider their rights (Table VII).

Heterogeneity is still the hallmark of the Arab Fertile Crescent. Now more than ever, with the decay of Arab nationalism, it is religious, confessional, and territorial rights that are informing the concept of power. This has in no way eliminated lower levels of solidarity rooted in ethnic, tribal, or clan ties. The national idea that swept across the Arab Fertile Crescent earlier in this century was seated in the perceived logic of a nation as a group bound by linguistic affinity, ethnic sentiment, and collective security and solidarity. This conception was supposed to foster patriotic feelings based on national cohesion in which social, confessional and ethnic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diversities harmonized with the organization of political power, making it conducive to internal stability and national fulfillment. However, if nationalism ceases to represent collective aspiration, if aspirations are not collective, what can be said for national solidarity?[19]

The argument that the existence of minority groups is anomalous, anachronistic, dysfunctional and evanescent proved to be fallacious. Minority identity never succumbed to the forces of modernization and nationalism. Modernization was accompanied by improved communications. Minorities divided by borders could interact efficiently with their fellows in other states and learn immediately of the travails and triumphs of their brethren. The modernization that further consolidated the political and social bonds of minorities also laid the ground for renewed communal conflict.[20] The expansion of markets and improved mobility increased contact but also competition among community groups. As individuals aspire to the same political, social and economic rewards, competition intensifies; communal solidarity becomes an important apparatus for mutual support and promotion. This is well illustrated in government employment. The "primordialists", in their assessment of the deeply rooted historical experience and socialization of minority individuals, were closer to the reality of the Arab Fertile Crescent than the "instrumentalists" who asserted that peoplehood, identities and loyalties of minorities are transmitted from one generation to another and that when they appear to recede they can readily be rejuvenated. The former claim that communal solidarity represents historical continuity and should be considered a permanent given in all social and political studies. The instrumentalists argue that community solidarity can be adjusted to meet the material, security, and status needs of their members. When other collective identifiers such as class, occupation and place of residence better serve practical needs, community solidarity may vanish or slowly disappear.[21] The experience of the Arab Fertile Crescent disproves this argument. The solidarity of self-defined groups was not eroded by economic and status opportunities even if some individuals have advanced beyond the general level of their group. Economic competition is no different from political competition in this region. Economic and political elites are tradition-bound to rally to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support of their immediate communities' aspirations. Cohesion and mobilization are critical to minorities if they are to exert influence.

Another important factor is the group's relations with other factions or forces inside or outside the country. The Palestinians, Christians, Alawites, Shiites, Kurds and Druze, as self-proclaimed identity groups in the various countries of the Arab Fertile Crescent, are examples and forces to be reckoned with (Table VII). Most of these minorities have regional and international political connections. Once their fears and anxieties have been aroused, it is relatively easy for foreign powers to involve them in efforts toward political de-stabilization. They pose a potential but very real threat of secession, a threat to the stability of regimes and their political order, and a threat to the interest and values of dominant groups. These threats, although latent, should not to be underestimated.[22] Fear and anxiety are not necessarily derived from clear assessments of reality, but once established in the minds of individuals their consequences are real and effective.

Any situation, imaginary or not, that makes the individual feel that he/she is threatened in his/her well-being is assumed to produce anxiety. Conflicts and other types of frustration are one source. Threats of physical harm, threats to one's self-esteem, and pressure to conform beyond one's capabilities are other sources. Anxiety in this article means the unpleasant emotion characterized by terms such as "worry," "apprehension," "dread" and "fear" that minority individuals experience to varying degrees. Freud was the first to focus on the importance of anxiety. He differentiated between *objective anxiety* and *neurotic anxiety*.[23] Objective anxiety is a realistic response to perceived danger in the environment, synonymous with fear. Neurotic anxiety stems from an unconscious conflict within the individual; since the conflict is unconscious, the individual is not aware of a realistic reason for his or her anxiety. Objective anxiety can be detected through empirical research. Charting neurotic anxiety is the task of psychology and psychiatry.

Many psychologists propose a distinction between fear and anxiety, but since the two emotions can not be differentiated on the basis of the individual's descriptions of feelings, this article uses the terms anxiety and fear interchangeably. Just as there are varying degrees of anxiety – ranging from mild apprehension to panic – there are varying degrees of awareness of the causes of one's discomfort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Often the individual who is suffering from a conflict in the environment has some idea why this is so, even if he or she cannot specify clearly all the factors involved.

Objective anxiety is a learned response, associated with certain situations. The anxieties of minorities are deeply rooted in historical experience and part of the socialization of the individual. They are transferred between generations; even when they appear to subside, they can readily be revived. The anxieties of minority groups represent a historical continuity and should be considered a powerful factor in explaining the political and social violence associated with revolutions, dissidence and civil strife.

Survey

This survey intends to shift attention in the study of minorities from analysis of elites, their attitudes, statements and positions, and from the conceptual perspective in which social scientists emphasize modernization, institutionalization, the rise of a new middle class and nationalism. While earlier studies provided new insights, they neglected an important side of social and political reality. The statements of elites could be acts of information manipulation rather than accurate expressions of inner belief and perception of reality. Some scholars, working with historical and content analysis methods, failed to make contact with that reality. Arab intellectuals are reluctant to admit the neglected importance of communal loyalties. They prefer to project an image of their communities now conditioned by modernity, development and/or class consciousness. To date, there is a tendency among Arab scholars to view any study of minority anxieties as a hostile attempt to foster division and a scheme to undermine unity and cooperation (Esman and Rabinovich, "Introduction"). This survey is different because it approaches individual respondents with bold, straightforward questions related to inner political perceptions and feelings. The objective is to chart how individual inhabitants of the Arab Fertile Crescent distinguish themselves, how they think of other groups and how they perceive future cooperation among the various minorities in the region.[24]

Studying the attitudes or the communication of inner feelings of an individual towards his/her environment may adopt two approaches. One is the classification and analysis of situational attitudes: identifying oneself as belonging to a small group (minority) or larger group

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table I

Percentage breakdown of respondents by various groupings
N= 1430

	Sex	Nationality	Age	Education	Occupation		Sect	Residence	SES
Male	56					**Sunni**	31		
Female	44					**Shiite**	18		
Lebanese		60				**Druze**	11		
Syrian		16				**Maronite**	16		
Palestinian		14				**Orthodox**	9		
Jordanian		10				**Catholic**	8		
18-30			62			**Alawite**	7		
30-up			38			**City**		78	
College				79		**Village**		32	
No college				21		**Upper class**			5
Student					56	**Middle class**			79
Non-student					44	**Bottom class**			16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	**Total**	100	100	100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(state) and the perception of closeness to the divergent others. This permits us to recognize the significant types of attitude that influence the political situation. The second approach is through temperament, that is, the general background conditions or relatively permanent sets of attitudes which influence the perception of likely future political behavior. As this study is based on a random sampling survey (see the Appendix), the percentage breakdowns collected from respondents in the various groupings do not represent the absolute ratios of these groups in terms of numerical strength in the Arab Fertile Crescent (see Table I). However, since the objective is not to measure the power associated with size nor to correlate the political and social variables of more consciously politicized assertions, the data collected are adequate to indicate, on a proportional basis, the states of mind of the different minorities in the Arab Middle East.

Minority Disposition Attitudes

There are considerable differences between how scholars perceive individuals in the Arab Fertile Crescent and how the latter perceive themselves. Assimilation via state symbolism, nationalism and modernization – once thought capable of converting minority identification into national allegiance and thus of eliminating all feelings of anxiety and alienation – has proved disappointing. Respondents in this survey exhibited a direct relationship between belonging to a minority and having anxieties and fears both in their own countries and even more in the Arab Fertile Crescent as a region. Table II indicates that 62% of all respondents who consider themselves members of minorities in their own countries described themselves as having fears. Over half of these respondents exhibited a combination of fears based in feelings rather than rational analysis. They fear physical harm, the lessening of their self-esteem, undermining of their social values, discrimination, religious constraints, and treatment as second class citizens. Almost three quarters of respondents considered themselves part of minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent, yet each group displays a similar proportion of members subject to the same combination of fears. It is evident in Table II that this proportion of the respondents consider themselves minorities because of their religious confession; however, a modest ratio among them relates feelings to ethnicity, nationality and ideology. Palestinian respondents contributed to this difference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table II
N= 1430

Percentage of respondents that consider themselves minorities and their fears

Are you a minority in your own country			Are you a minority in the AFC*		
Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total
62	38	100	74	26	100

I am a minority in my country because of		I am a minority in the AFC because of	
Confession	48	Confession	55
Ethnicity	2	Ethnicity	3
Nationality	5	Nationality	8
Ideology	7	Ideology	8
Total	62	Total	74

Being minority in your country do you have fears			Being minority in the AFC do you have fears		
Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total
62	-	62	73	1	74

Being minority in your country what do you fear		Being minority in the AFC what do you fear	
Physical harm	4	Physical harm	7
Self esteem undermined	1	Self esteem undermined	1
Social values undermined	3	Social values undermined	4
Discriminated	7	Discriminated	9
Confessional constriction	5	Confessional constrictions	5
Second class citizen	9	Second class citizen	11
Combination of above	33	Combination of above	35
Total	62	Total	72

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table II furthermore indicates that an additional 12% of the same 1430 respondents consider themselves members of minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent. The explanation is both simple and complex. A proportion of Lebanese Shiites and Maronites may feel themselves members of minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent but have a different outlook with regard to their country of residence. On the other hand, a proportion of Sunnis consider themselves a minority only in Lebanon but not in the Arab Fertile Crescent.

Minority Dispositions towards the Other

It seems that attitudes of one minority toward others vary according to historical and more recent conflicts and according the immediate political alliances; they cannot be explained monocausally. For any resident in the Arab Fertile Crescent the issue of intra--minority group friendship at the individual or family level is a normal phenomenon. An individual member of a minority may have a close relationship with individual members of different minority groups, but his perception of the other groups is not necessarily affected by his personal friendship (Table III). A little less than two thirds of the Muslim respondents feel distant from Christians and feel more detached from Maronites than from other Christian sects. The Druze are the furthest (71%) and the Alawites are the least distant (52%). The historical and recent confrontation between the Druze and Christians is definitely an influencing factor. Probably, the heat of Syrian-Christian antagonism in Lebanon is mitigated by the minorities' coalition in Syria, which includes Alawites and Christians. Surprisingly, 38% of Muslims expressed indifference to Palestinians despite the latter being Muslims. Half of the Shiite respondents were negative toward Palestinians; only 16% of the Druze shared this feeling. The repeated bloody clashes in the Palestinian camps of Lebanon between the Shiites and the Palestinians during the last decade explain this ill feeling and the Druze-Palestinian alliance against the Christians in the 1976 Lebanese war explains the closeness between these two. Remarkably, 85% of Alawites expressed distance in relation to Palestinians. The former, as the dominant group in Syria, feel betrayed by the Sunni Palestinian Arafat, who defected from Arab solidarity in peace negotiations with Israel.

Respondents in the survey observed a difference between Judaism and Zionism (Table VI). The feelings of Jews as a minority in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table III

N= 1430 subtracted by the respondents of the same group (check Table I)

Minorities were not asked to respond to questions related to their own groups.

How do you see the relationship among these various minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent

Figures by percent

	Muslims			Christians			Jews			Palestinians		
	very close	close	dist-ant	very close	close	dist-ant	very close	close	dist-ant	very close	close	dist-ant
Sunnis				18	26	56	7	9	84	37	42	21
Shiite				17	24	59	6	7	87	21	28	51
Druze				11	18	71	13	35	52	39	45	16
Alawite				21	27	52	12	33	55	9	12	79
Maronites	8	23	69				16	37	47	6	9	85
Orthodox	14	30	56				9	31	60	20	27	53
Catholics	11	24	65				11	33	54	19	25	56
Christians	12	27	61				11	34	55			
Muslims							3	6	91			
Palestinian	29	33	38	7	14	79	0.5	1.5	98			

table IV

N= 1430

How the respondents perceive of the future relationship among the different minorities in their own countries and in the Arab Fertile Crescent.

Figures by percent

How do you see future relationships among the various minorities in your country		How do you see future relationships among the various minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent	
Highly conflicting	14	Highly conflicting	13
Conflicting	41	Conflicting	47
I don't know	18	I don't Know	26
cooperative	24	cooperative	13
Highly cooperative	3	Highly cooperative	1
Total	100	Total	100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arab Fertile Crescent are well known and do not need verification. The respondents expressed attitudes toward Jews that are close in ratio to those expressed towards other minorities. Among Muslim respondents, 87% of the Shiites felt distant; only 52% of the Druze expressed antipathy. As for Christians, the Maronites are the least distant (4-7%) and the Orthodox the farthest from Jews (60%).

To test whether feelings among the different minorities were mutual, cross tabulations were made; results indicate concurrence between the feelings of two minorities toward one another (see Table III). To avoid statistical complication, respondents from various sects within the same religion were not asked to express their feelings toward each other. However, it is apparent from Table III that Sunnis are not a special minority group possessed of distinctive and attractive characteristics for other minorities. The general feeling towards them and their feelings toward others is mutual. This counters the assertion that Sunnis have greater potential for assimilating other minorities into a homogeneous culture under their aegis.

Temperament and Future Conflict

How one reads the future relationship between the various minorities is a manifestation of his/her historical and present perception of the issue. Fear is prominent in the consciousness of most respondents. Table IV reveals that 55% anticipate conflict among minorities in their own country and 60% foresee similar future conflicts in the Arab Fertile Crescent. The perception of cooperation among minorities is very low because, if the 20% that did not respond for this indicator are excluded from the total responses, only 27% expect future cooperation in their own countries and 14% in the region.

The task of future assimilation in the Arab Fertile Crescent region, as proposed by academics, calls for the abandonment or blurring of the past. Yet historical aversion is not easily erased. Cultural incompatibility is a deeply felt reality in the lives of the people of the Arab Fertile Crescent. A minority's experience of deprivation can easily become a permanent 'law of history' in the eyes of the senior generation and be transmitted to generations to come. Religion in these circumstances becomes a route for collective emotional relief. There is an obvious need for some effective principle or mode of conflict resolution in this region. If new ideological and institutional solutions are not soon found, the withering of Arab nationalism and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table V
N= 1430

Tendency toward religious fundamentalism
Figures by percent

What is your reaction to religious fundamentalism in your country		What is your reaction to religious fundamentalism in the Arab Fertile Crescent	
Highly encouraged	3	Highly encouraged	3
Encouraged	9	Encouraged	9
Left alone	23	Left alone	22
Restrained	65	Restrained	66
Total	100	Total	100

Table VI
N= 1430

Is there a difference between the below "Isms"
Figures by percent

	Great difference	Some difference	No difference	Total
Judaism versus Zionism	23	49	28	100
Arab Nationalism versus Islamism	35	47	18	100
Islamism versus Islamic fundamentalism	40	43	17	100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ineffectiveness of modernization to advance assimilation will bring the Arab Fertile Crescent close to what Karl Deutsch recognized as "the very serious difficulties of different peoples to live together in a common state under the conditions of enforced closeness of contacts" (*Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 186). The solution that Deutsch arrives at is to deconstitute the multicultural state. The possibility of minority secession in the Arab Fertile Crescent seems slim on *prima facie* political evidence, but the potential for minority reaction is like a ticking time-bomb.

Extremism

Some scholars' assertion of a tendency among Arab Fertile Crescent minorities to shift toward religious extremism is tested in Table V. Only 12% of respondents expressed support for religious extremism in their own countries and simultaneously in the Arab Fertile Crescent. The overwhelming majority was for restraining the activities of religious fundamentalists. The significance of this finding is the extent to which it supports the assertion that religion is an identity and culture bond, and not an ideology with an objective of its own. It is possible that the 12% of respondents who support religious fundamentalism are fundamentalists themselves. The percentage is low considering the enormous propaganda and financial support that fundamentalists receive from different regional and international sources.

To examine the intellectual background of the respondents and verify whether they differ between religion as culture and religion as ideology, they were asked to express their views concerning the difference between Judaism and Zionism, Arab Nationalism and Islamism, and Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims. Table VI reveals that the majority of respondents affirmed a difference and less than 18% denied it. The exceptional 28% that saw no difference between Zionism and Judaism can be explained by the political conflict between the state of Israel and the Arabs during which official and non-official Arab media have long propagated the notion that Israeli Jews are Zionists.

Cross-tabulation of Attitudes of the Various Groups

To test whether there is discrepancy among and variation within religious minorities at the levels of socio-economic condition, sex, age,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table VII

Crosstabulation of the various groupings with status and Anxiety

N= 1430

Percentages of this table are best understood when compared to corresponding percentages in table II

	Minority in your country		Minority in the AFC*		Accept to emigrate		Fears in AFC	
	Total of each group is 100%		Total of each group is 100%		Total of each group is 100%		Total of each group is 100%	
	Total 62%	Total 38%	Total 74%	Total 26%	Total 42%	Total 58%	73%	27%
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	59	41	70	30	44	56	72	28
female	65	35	78	22	46	54	74	26
Lebanese	66	34	80	20	34	66	78	22
Syrian	53	47	61	39	46	54	61	39
Palestinian	78	22	77	23	58	42	77	23
Jordanian	51	49	78	22	42	58	76	24
18-30 age	59	41	71	29	49	51	74	26
30-up age	65	35	77	23	41	59	72	28
Sunni	69	31	33	67	41	59	32	68
Shiite	21	79	59	41	46	54	58	42
Druze	85	15	84	16	44	56	83	17
Maronite	58	42	89	11	33	67	88	12
Orthodox	54	46	76	24	36	64	75	25
Catholic	80	20	85	15	54	46	84	16
Alawite	67	33	92	8	61	39	91	9
City	54	46	66	34	52	48	72	28
Village	70	30	82	18	38	62	74	26
Upper class	63	37	75	25	41	59	77	23
Middle class	47	53	70	30	43	57	67	33
Bottom class	76	24	77	23	50	50	75	25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sect, residence and nationality, respondents were cross-tabulated against four questions. Do you consider yourself a member of a minority in your own country? Do you consider yourself in a minority in the Arab Fertile Crescent? Are you considering emigrating? Do you have fears over being in a minority in the Arab Fertile Crescent?

Table VII reveals that females are slightly more worried about their status than males. The difference is less than 8% across all four questions. Respondents from among the various nationalities exhibited similar ratios in their consideration of themselves as minorities in their own countries. Palestinians are an exception. They scored the highest (78%) and (77%) as minorities in the country where they reside and in the Arab Fertile Crescent, respectively.

Again, respondents from the different nationalities showed similar ratios in self-perception as minorities in the region (average of 79%), except for Syrians who scored 61%. Palestinians have a higher than average percentage of respondents wishing to emigrate. This indicates the intensity of their anxieties and desperation, and probably their poor economic status. With their defeat in the Lebanese strife and their support of the regionally and internationally isolated Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Palestinians feel alienated and rejected in Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese are less interested in emigrating (34%) than the other respondents. This means that they have more attachment to their land, and the intensity of their anxieties is less than that of their neighbors in the Arab Fertile Crescent. However, they have the highest percentage of individuals reporting fear in the region. Syrian respondents displayed the lowest individual fear score (61%). The elevated number of Sunni respondents among Syrians explains the difference.

The age grouping exhibited an average of 6% difference between those that are below 30 years of age and those that are above. Older people have more respondents who identify themselves as minorities locally and in the Arab East. They scored 2% less fear and 8% less willingness to emigrate.

Sixty-nine percent of the Sunnis consider themselves minorities locally and 36% of them consider themselves non-minorities in the region. This is explained by the Lebanese Sunni who tend to feel lessened after 16 years of strife. Their political power has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weakened by the rising political influence of the Shiites. The latter population has rapidly exceeded that of the Sunnis. Furthermore, Palestinian and Syrian Sunnis may feel alienated locally but derive strength from their majority status in the Arab world at large. In contrast to the Sunnis, the majority of Shiites consider themselves a non-minority (79%) in Lebanon but over 58% of this cohort have fears as a minority in the region. A little less than half of Shiite respondents are interested in emigrating.

The Druze have the highest percentage of respondents with feelings of fear as a minority: an average of 84% locally and regionally. Their communal solidarity strengthens their attachment to their land and explains why only 44% expressed interest in emigrating. Despite their defeat at the end of the Lebanese strife, surprisingly the Maronites, whose concentration is in Lebanon, scored the second lowest score (58%) in identifying themselves as a minority locally. However, over 88% of their respondents – the second highest figure – have fears as a minority in the region. Matching the Druze, the percentage of Maronites interested in emigrating is low (33%). Ninety-two percent of Alawite respondents expressed fears in regional terms. They feel relatively more secure in Syria under the present Alawite regime. One third of respondents consider themselves a non-minority. Orthodox respondents feel more secure locally than Catholics, 54% and 80% respectively. However, they have proportional and similar anxieties regionally. City respondents scored less anxiety in three questions compared to village respondents but indicated more interest in emigrating. The respondents of the upper and under classes expressed more anxiety than the middle class in response to the four questions. However, in the matter of emigration, upper class respondents indicated less interest.

Variations in attitude among the various groupings within a confessional group are not significant, as shown in Table VII. This means that cultural bonds among the individuals of the Arab Fertile Crescent, although mildly affected by the general status of respondents, create the decisive cleavages in the society. Confessional groups are basic actors in Arab Fertile Crescent politics. Any political analysis that denies their influence as identity units is superficial. The class analyses that are currently fashionable among intellectuals and social scientists deliberately depart from the fundamental problem of communal identity and solidarity. The 'class

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consciousness' and 'false consciousness' configuration used in class analysis faces a dilemma in the presence of the permanent phenomena of cultural autonomy. For this reason the analysts disregard the latter. Some blame Capitalism as the root of communal conflict; in doing so, they gainsay the theories of nationalism and the rise of the middle class as factors toward assimilation. It is well known that capitalism is an effect and concomitant of the rise of nationalism and economic and social development. The findings in Table VII reveal that individuals identify themselves with their confession regardless of socio-economic stratification. Culturally based solidarity is an authentic reality that functions independently of class. Conflict among communities is not necessarily the product of class struggle or exploitation. Relative power determines the relationship among competing community groups. The specific configurations depend on the economic, technological, organizational, and political resources they command and on their cohesion and skill in using these resources. Such conflicts have existed at all historical periods in the Arab Fertile Crescent and persist, coincident, in the rise and decline of socialist states.

Conclusion

Individuals' feelings of belonging are greatly affected by self-perception. If in their own minds they feel that they belong to a minority group, they behave accordingly. In this survey most respondents, regardless of how they are grouped, identified themselves as a minority in their own country and in the Arab Fertile Crescent. The percentage figures for these respondents project an image of cohesive and mobilized minorities. Palestinians and Druze, although neither ever exceeded 10% of the population of Lebanon, became major players in decision-making through their cohesiveness and mobilization. They proved that they could pose political and security problems.

A general question that needs further investigation is the degree of cohesiveness and mobilization that other communal groups have. These two factors are critical if minorities are to exert influence. Community mobilization may be precipitated by the emergence of a collective, culturally defined sense of absolute or relative deprivation of historical rights in comparison with the situation of others. Similarly, perceived threats or challenges to established cultural,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic, or political interests of the group strengthen minority solidarity. Neither of these precludes competition and conflict within the communal group. In other words, inter-group solidarity and conflict are products of the same pressures. At issues are the kind of demands the group should express, who should be the group's interlocutors to outsiders, and what tactics should be pursued. Cleavage within a minority group is likely to become evident when it comes to the question of tactics. These vary from working within the rules of the political system to the use of violence, terrorism, and revolutionary warfare.[25] Inter-group conflicts weaken the status and power of some minorities to the advantage of others and result in further alienation by increasing fears and anxieties. The Lebanese Maronites and Palestinians in the late 80's and early 90's are good examples.

Another important factor is the group's relations with other factions or forces inside or outside the country. What engenders an alliance between two minorities is their common relative deprivation in the state and society at large. When a coalition of this nature among a number of communal groups becomes strong, societal distinctions become sharper and society is prone to strife. Lebanon's sixteen years of internal conflict among minority coalitions and the recent Iraqi Kurdish-Shiite coalition are vivid illustrations.

Finally, the basic obstacle to assimilation and, in most cases, to peaceful coexistence in the Arab Fertile Crescent is the state of mind of individuals. In the Arab Fertile Crescent markers of political identity are problematic. On the one hand the elites propagate for Arab political identity (Arab nationalism) similar to that found elsewhere in the Arab world. On the other hand these same elites are political products of their own minority groups. Arab nationalism is based in an ethnic dimension fortified by Arabic language and culture, and in a religious dimension that is exclusive to Sunni Islam. But the Arab Fertile Crescent is different in its minority and community composition from other regions of the Arab world that are already under Sunni cultural hegemony. In short, additional strong barriers to the assimilation of political minorities in the Arab Fertile Crescent are the lack of a dominant majority (the Sunnis cannot impose cultural homogeneity) and the superficial attention to secular trends on the part of present regimes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Appendix

Research Technique

This survey was organized during the first half of 1994. Graduate and undergraduate students of the American University of Beirut from the various countries of the Arab Fertile Crescent assisted in conducting the survey in their own countries. For political reasons, Iraqi students were not able to carry out the task; other non-Lebanese students brought back a little less than 20% of the total questionnaires intended for their countries. The number of respondents that we were able to allocate was nevertheless adequate, with the exception of Iraqis. The latter are not included in the survey.

Respondents were selected randomly. After screening more than 1600 answered questionnaires, 1430 met the required validity standard. Two reliabilty checks were applied; internal consistency and response bias tests. All inconsistent responses were deleted prior to tabulation. The breakdown of respondents (Table I) does not represent the ratio of demographic distribution of population in the Arab Fertile Crescent. However, this survey is not intended to measure precise comparative minority attitudes among the different countries, nor to quantify power by size. The objective is to inquire about the inner feelings of the various minorities in the region, feelings of their present and likely future anxieties.

Notes

[1]For an assessment of the assimilation of minorities by cultivating Arab feelings consonant with those of Sunni Muslims, see A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World*, London: Oxford University Press, 1947. pp. 109, 118, 122.

[2]On the issue of the majority threatened by aggressive minorities, see Edward W. Said, *The Question of Palestine*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 146.

[3]On the role of the state in assimilating minorities, see Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, 21: 2, January 1969, 207-225.

[4]On the effect of modernization on assimilation, see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry ito the Foundation of Nationality*, 2nd. ed., Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 1966.

[5]Anthony H. Birch, "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration," *World Politics* 30:3, April, 1978, 334-337.

[6]On the assessment of state roles in assimilation, see D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola, eds., *Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, Boulder: Westview, 1983, and Paul Brass, ed. *Ethnic Groups and the State*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1985, Chapter 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[7]Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, London: Croom-Helm, 1985, pp. 333-49.
[8]Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 569-678.
[9]Elie Kedouri, "Ethnicity, Majority and Minority in the Middle East," in Milton J. Esman and Itmar Rabinovisch, eds., *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 25-26.
[10]Marvin G. Weinbaum, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflict in the Middle East," *Middle East Review*, 20: 1, Fall 1987, [10]2211
31-42.
[11]Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, R. D. MacLaurin, ed., *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East*, Praeger, New York, 1979, and Esman and Rabinovisch, *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State*.
[12]Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962.
[13]Yves Besson, "Identity Crises as a Paradigm of Middle Eastern Conflictuality," *International Social Science Journal*, 43:1, Feb. 1991, 133-45.
[14]Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression*, McFarland and Company: North Carolina, 1991, pp. 5-18.
[15]Briefs of discussion in three panel workshops at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30, 1990, in San Francisco, organized by Dr. Contori, "Democratization in the Middle East" *American Arab Affairs*, No. 36, Spring, 1991, 13-14.
[16]Palestinians are considered political nationalist minorities because they aspire to autonomy for their community within a definable geographic territory outside the countries of present residence.
[17]Michael Hudson, "The Lebanese Crises: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Palestinian Studies*, 5: 3/4, Spring/Summer, 1976, 109-122.
[18]Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
[19]On this notion of nationhood, see Rothchild and Olrunsola, "State vs Ethnic Claims", in *African Policy Dilemmas*.
[20]The paradigm of modernization leading to assimilation is challenged by Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics Communalism: A Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, 64, Dec. 1970, 1112-30.
[21]For an assessment of the debate between primordialists and instrumentalists, see James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizational Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," *Ethnic and Race Relations*, 5, October, 1982, 395-420.
[22]Eric Moldlinger, "Conflict Regulations in Divided Societies," *Papers in International Affairs*, No. 29, January 1972, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.
[23]Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Joan Reviere, trans., Garden City, New York, 1938.
[24]The technique of asking the same question in different ways of the same respondent was used to verify the consistency and accountability of answers.
[25]For assessment of the goals and tactics of minorities, see Milton J. Esman, "Two Dimensions of Ethnic Politics: Defense of Homeland, Immigrant Rights," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, July, 1985, 438-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Relevance of Group Membership for Personnel Selection: A Demonstration Using Bayes' Theorem

Edward M. Miller
University of New Orleans

Groups such as races, sexes, ethnic groups, and age classes are shown to be in general relevant to problems of selection for school and employment. A Bayesian approach to problems of selection is developed. The mean and standard deviation of the distribution of abilities in the candidate's group (race, sex, age etc.) constitute prior information. Additional information is provided by the candidate's test scores. These two can be combined with the aid of Bayes' theorem to obtain a posterior estimate. It is shown that group membership will normally be relevant to selection, with a higher test score being required of those belonging to the lower scoring groups. This implies a fundamental conflict between non-discrimination (not using group membership for selection) and merit selection. The framework developed is then used to show the circumstances in which use of group membership is relevant to selection. Evidence is presented that groups do differ in various attributes relevant to vocational success, including intelligence, literacy, personality, and criminality.

Bayes' Theorem

This journal has repeatedly discussed the technical and ethical issues raised by the existence of groups (races, sexes, ethnic groups) that frequently differ in abilities and other job-related characteristics (Eysenck 1991, Jensen, 1992; Levin, 1990, 1991). This paper is meant to add to that discussion by providing mathematical proof that consideration of such groups is, in general, necessary in selecting the best employees or students.

It is almost an article of faith that race, sex, religion, national origin, or similar classifications (which will be referred to here as groups) are irrelevant for hiring, given a goal of selecting the best candidates. The standard wisdom is that those selecting for school admission or employment should devise an unbiased (in the statistical sense) procedure which predicts individual performance, evaluate individuals with this, and then select the highest ranked individuals. However, analysis shows that even with statistically unbiased evaluation procedures, group membership may still be relevant. If the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goal is to pick the best individuals for jobs or training, membership in the group with the lower average performance (the disadvantaged group) should properly be held against the individual. In general, not considering group membership and selecting the best candidates are mutually exclusive.

Three definitions will be used:

(1) "Non-discrimination" is selection which does not take into account a particular characteristic of the individual being considered (such as race, sex, age, national origin, etc.).
(2) "Merit Selection" is an endeavor to select the best qualified individual. In the terminology introduced by Hunter and Schmidt (1976), merit selection corresponds to unqualified individualism and non-discrimination to qualified individualism.
(3) "Ability" here refers to the characteristics sought by the selecting employers or schools, or to the characteristics and interests used in advising. It includes not only ability narrowly defined, but also characteristics such as motivation, honesty, etc.

One of the implications of this paper is that common statements taking the form of "Hiring shall be based on ability irrespective of race (or sex, national origin, religion, handicapped status, marital status, sexual preference, etc.)" are at best ambiguous, and at worst illogical. Logically proper statements are, "The best qualified candidates shall be selected without preference for any group (but taking into account group membership to the extent it is relevant)." or "No consideration of group membership shall be permitted (even when it is necessary to select the best candidate)." In practice, antidiscrimination rules appear to have been sold to the public on the basis of the first statement, but administered on the basis of the second statement. Indeed, not only has consideration of group membership been forbidden even when relevant, but there appears to be a tendency to forbid consideration of any characteristics that might be a surrogate for group membership, or even correlated with it (such as test scores). Rational discussion would be greatly facilitated if participants would state which policy they are advocating.

Proof by Bayes' Theorem

The relevance of group membership is clearly shown by an application of Bayes' Theorem. If f(t) is the probability density function for the ability distribution among the candidates, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distribution of estimated ability (here referred to as e) given the true ability (symbolized by t) is f(e/t), the distribution of ability given the estimated ability f(t/e) is the product of these two probability density functions divided by the density function for the estimated abilities. The proof is by direct substitution into Bayes' theorem (for Bayes' theorem, see Dyckman et al. [1968, pp. 484-489] or any standard statistics text):

$$f(t/e) = f(t)\ f(e/t) / f(e) \qquad \textit{Equation 1}$$

Note that f(t) enters into this equation. In general, the probability distribution of abilities among the candidates selected depends on the probability distribution among the candidates being considered. In particular, the mean of the distribution or the final estimate (what is referred to in statistics as the posterior estimate) of the candidate's ability depends on which group the candidate belongs to, and the distribution of abilities within that group. Group membership matters if there are differences in the ability distribution among the different groups. The same argument applies to other characteristics such as personality.

While the above argument clearly leads to a controversial conclusion, it is merely an application of an argument that had been developed for the selection of capital projects (Miller, 1978, 1985), and then extended to personnel selection (Miller, 1980) but without mention of groups. In these contexts it occasioned little controversy. Surprisingly, the above simple point has been missed outside of the technical psychometric literature (which will be discussed later), although several models have been developed in which rational behavior results in different standards for different groups (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1972; Borjas and Goldberg, 1978; Darity, 1989; Phelps, 1972; Schwarb, 1986, Smith, 1978). Also, Epstein (1992, pp. 40 and 240) briefly mentions Bayes' Theorem.

The Special Case of the Normal Distribution

A particularly interesting case occurs if the errors in evaluation of candidates from a particular group are normally distributed, and the distribution of abilities among this group is normal. Human abilities appear normally distributed. It is plausible (from the law of large numbers) that the errors are also normally distributed. Under these conditions, the distribution of true abilities given the estimated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abilities (test results) will also be normally distributed with the parameters of the normal distribution easily calculated (see Dyckman, Smidt, & McAdams [1968, p. 486] or other Bayesian texts.)

Let Mp = the mean ability of the group of candidates (the prior mean),
Me = the mean of the distribution of the ability of the candidate given the data about him (excluding information about the group he is a member of)
Mt = the expected value for the ability of the candidate given the estimate (the posterior mean)
sp = the standard deviation of true ability for the population of candidates (the prior estimate)
se = the standard deviation of the estimated ability
st = the standard deviation of the ability of the candidate given the estimate

With this notation,

$$Mt = ((Mp/sp2) + Me/se2)/(1/sp2+1/se2) \quad \textit{Equation 1}$$

$$Mt = (Mpse2 + Mesp2) / (se2+ sp2) \quad \textit{Equation 2}$$

And

$$1/st2 = 1/sp2+1/se2 \quad \textit{Equation 3}$$

The above shows the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution of the ability of the candidate given his estimated ability. The expected ability is of course the mean of the posterior distribution. Equation 2 gives the posterior distribution mean. It is a weighted average of the population mean for a particular group (the prior distribution) and the candidate's estimated ability. The candidate's estimated ability will be referred to as the test score. The evaluation procedure may not involve a written test. Instead, it may be an interview, review of previous performance, or a reference check. The reciprocal of the square of the expected standard deviation of the test error will be referred to as the precision.

In plain English, once a test score has been obtained, the best ability estimate will depend on the average ability of the candidate's group. Thus, if the goal is to select the best candidates, it will be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessary to consider group membership, and the mean ability of the candidate's group. The general effect is to move the ability estimate for each candidate towards his group's mean ability. When trying to select the best candidates (who will usually have evaluations above the mean for their group), the estimate for each candidate should be lowered by an amount that depends on mean and standard deviation for his group, and the estimate's precision.

While this is a conclusion that will bother many, it is one derived by straightforward mathematics. In general, only under special conditions will seeking the best candidates be consistent with disregarding group membership.

If the candidate comes from a "low scoring" group (remembering that what is relevant is the characteristics of the candidates being considered), he should have a higher estimated ability (test score, if the estimates are quantitative) than that required of a member of a "high scoring" group. The above presumes the cut-off score (the minimum score of those hired) is above the group mean. The adjustment towards the group mean lowers the candidate's score. In the cases where the cut-off score is below the group mean (such as where the goal is merely to screen out a small percentage who will prove inadequate), adjustment towards the group mean will raise the estimated score of the individual.

In advising, the logic is the same, although the ethical objections may not be as strong. Presumably candidates' best interests are served if they are given advice based on the best possible estimates of their abilities and interests. If group membership helps in doing this, many might accept using it even though they otherwise oppose its use for hiring or admission purposes.

Groups Differing Only in Score

As a warm-up on a non-controversial topic to see how Bayes' theorem provides new insights, consider the case where groups differ only in ability. Imagine the goal is to hire the workers who will make the fewest errors. Errors are random, but workers differ in their error rates. Work samples (revealing the number of errors made in a one hour test) have been obtained. It is desired to use these samples to estimate how the candidates will do if employed. The work sample appears to be an unbiased measure of the candidates' long-term performance. Naturally, it is only a sample, but the distribution of the sample, given the true performance, is known. What prediction can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be made about his performance? For discussion imagine the applicant's score is far above average. Suppose also, the distribution of job performance in the applicant population is also known. What job performance can be predicted?

One might just take the known relationship between test (work sample) performance and job performance, and then argue that the predicted job performance would be that obtained by solving (for job performance) the equation relating test performance to long-term job performance. For instance, suppose the number of errors in a one hour work sample is known to be an unbiased estimate of the workers' error rates during their employment. One would be tempted to estimate the average long-run error rate for a worker with a score of x on the sample as being x.

However, the above procedure would be wrong. It ignores the information about the distribution of the applicants' abilities. Some applicants benefit from good luck, and their scores overstate their true long-run performance. Others suffer from poor luck, and their score understates their true long-run performance. At first glance, it might appear that the two effects would cancel each other out, and it could be presumed that any given candidate was as likely to have benefited from luck as to have suffered from it.

However, as is implied by Bayes' theorem, such canceling frequently won't happen. Even if the expected value of the errors (luck) is zero for the set of all candidates, the expected value of the errors conditional on a candidate having been selected is not zero. The set of those obtaining any given score will include some for whom the score accurately reflects long-run performance, some who benefited from luck (and hence who did better on the test than their long-run performance would justify), and some who did worse. Among those with above average test scores, there will be more who benefited from luck than who suffered from it. For our candidate with the above average score, the best estimate of his long-run performance is obtained by adjusting his score downwards. The predicted mean can be calculated from Bayes' theorem. In more general terms, the application of Bayes' theorem calls for reducing the estimated performance of the high scoring, and raising that of the low scoring. The scores are regressed to the mean.

To understand intuitively the direction of the effect being discussed, consider Figure 1. The distribution of applicants' true abilities is shown. However, these are measured only with an error.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 1
Effect of errors
on estimates

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The error corresponds to the small curve shown (presumed to be a symmetrical distribution). Imagine the score reported for a candidate is T. This true value is above the distribution's mean, suggesting the individual is of unusually high ability. However, his ability is measured with error. Consider the error of magnitude AB. An equal error on the high side is BC. With a symmetrical error distribution, the two errors are equal, one high and one low. With a score of T, one realizes the true score could be S (T - AB) or V (T + AB). From the shape of the true value distribution, the probability of the value S must be greater than the probability of the value V. Thus, if an error of absolute value equal to AB or BC has been made, the probability that the true value is S must exceed the probability that the true value is V. The effect of errors of this magnitude is to cause an overestimation of true value.

The argument can be repeated for all possible values for the magnitude of the error. In each case, the conclusion is that the probability of the error causing an overestimate is positive. The conclusion is that the errors lead to an overestimate of the true value. If desired, the magnitude of this overestimate could be calculated, although the above heuristic argument should show why it can be presumed to be positive when one is selecting candidates whose abilities are estimated to be above the average for their group. (The argument is symmetrical for candidates testing below the group mean).

A Work-Sampling Example

Consider the widespread academic goal of selecting professors who will produce many papers. The major source of information about a candidate is the average number of papers per year produced in the previous dozen years. This can be taken as providing information about the number to be produced in the future, but one that contains considerable sampling error (but the distribution of the errors will be presumed known). There is also information about the average number of papers produced by the group the person belongs to, say males or females. The best estimate of the candidate's future productivity is an optimally weighted average of his or her historical productivity and the average productivity of each group.

The weights for the two productivities depend on their relative precision. The general effect will be to adjust the observed rate of paper production for the candidates towards the mean for their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

groups. The relative weights depend on how much information about future productivity there is in the candidate's historical productivity, and how much is in the group data.

Unless the rate of historical productivity provided perfect predictions of the candidate's future productivity, the group averages would be relevant. Of course, if by some accident, the two groups' means were the same, knowing group membership would add no information. Even in this case, the best estimates for the posterior mean requires adjusting the observed means towards the group mean.

This example can be applied to the case of men and women scientists. Cole (1979, p. 63) reports that after twelve years the average male scientist has produced eight papers, while the average female scientist has produced only three. More recently, Broder (1993) showed that, even after controlling for other relevant variables, female economists have published fewer papers in top journals. Similar results have been found for psychology (Cohen & Gutek, 1991) and academic psychiatry (Reiser, Sledge, Fenton, & Leaf, 1993). During a short period, the observed output of any single scientist is a very imprecise measure of the long-run output of that scientist. Thus, it is necessary to adjust the observed output towards the average for the scientist's group. This adjustment will normally raise the estimated future output of male scientists relative to that of female ones. Thus, where the observed output is only a poor estimate of future output, group membership can significantly improve the precision of estimates.

Related Psychometric Discussions

How does the conclusion reached above about the relevance of groups membership relate to discussions in the technical psychometric literature?

At least some psychometricians have been aware of the relevance of group membership. Hunter and Schmidt (1976) point out that differences in group means will typically lead to differences in intercepts. Jensen (1980, p. 94) points out that the best estimate of true scores is obtained by regressing observed scores towards the mean, and that if there are two groups with different means, the downwards correction for the high scoring individuals will be greater for those from the low scoring group. Kelley (1947, p. 409) put it as follows: "This is an interesting equation in that it expresses the estimate of true ability as a weighted sum of two separate estimates,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one based upon the individual's observed score, X1, and the other based upon the mean of the group to which he belongs, M1. If the test is highly reliable, much weight is given to the test score and little to the group mean, and vice versa", although he may not have been thinking of demographic groups. Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, and Rajaratnam (1972) discuss the problem of deducing universe scores (essentially true scores in traditional terminology) from test data, recognizing that group means will be relevant. They even display an awareness that, since blacks normally score lower than whites, the logic of their reasoning calls for the use of higher cut-off scores for blacks than for whites (see p. 385). Mislevy (1993) also displays an awareness that group means are relevant, although he feels it would be unfair to use them.

In general, the relevance of group membership has been known to the specialist psychometric community, although few outside the community are aware of the effect. Thus, the contribution of Bayes' theorem is to provide another demonstration, one that those outside the psychometric community may be more comfortable with.

When are Group Means Relevant?

For identical standards to be appropriate, the two groups' means and standard deviations must be identical, and the distribution of errors in the "test" must have the same mean and standard deviation for both groups (i.e., abilities must be equally well estimated for both groups).

There are several reasons why the ability distribution of groups may differ, including:

1. There is a real difference within the total population between the two groups. Since this is a very controversial proposition, it will be discussed later.
2. Within the total population, there are no differences between the groups, but for some reason there are differences among those choosing to apply. Several mechanisms can produce this.
   a. The abilities of the members of the groups who apply for certain jobs may differ because of differences in the other opportunities open to them. For instance, if there is affirmative action in favor of blacks by some employers, the pool of high ability blacks will be depleted, and an employer who does not care about race per se will find that there is a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lower percentage of high quality blacks among those blacks applying to him, than there is of high quality whites among those whites applying.

b. Differences in tastes may exist. Members of some groups may simply prefer different attributes in their jobs. This is very likely for males versus females. A job involving child care may appeal more to women than to men. A low paying child care job may attract only men who can't get other jobs, but may attract some females who simply prefer taking care of children to other, better paying jobs open to them. Women are known to give more weight in their job search to considerations such as opportunity to serve others, and pleasant co-workers, while men give more weight to status and pay. For certain jobs (especially some with a strong public service component), the only male applicants may be those who can't get jobs with higher status or pay, while some female applicants simply wanted the opportunity to serve, or the work environment. In these cases there will be a sex difference in the applicants' ability distributions, even if population-wide sex differences are lacking.

c. For some reason, the members of one group who apply for a certain job may be less talented than the members of the other group, even though group means do not differ. Suppose there was truly no discrimination, but there was a widespread belief that there was discrimination such that only an exceptionally qualified black could get certain jobs. In this case, the black applicants would be in general better qualified than the white ones.

Notice that in any of these cases, the group means would be relevant information. This of course implies that group membership is relevant. Notice that in the last case, the groups may have equal ability in the whole population, but if a belief in discrimination exists, group means are likely to be relevant. Thus, laws against discrimination (in the sense of considering group means) are likely to be consistent with merit selection only in the case where there is believed to be no discrimination. Of course, if there is believed to be no discrimination, one may ask what the purpose of anti-discrimination laws is?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Role of Precision in Estimates

Equation 2 shows that the weight given to the group mean in predicting a candidate's performance depends on the reciprocal of the standard deviation squared (a quality referred to as the precision) of the initial estimates about the true value. Often, one is trying to select candidates whose performance is superior to that of their group. Typically, only a minority of candidates will be selected. In such a case, candidates from groups for which precise estimates can be made should have an advantage. In plain English, preference should be shown to candidates whose future performance can most easily be predicted.

This result should not prove surprising. To take the extreme example, the best that can be done in the absence of suitable test data is to assume that candidates have their group's average ability (or the average for the whole population if nothing is known about their group). In general, the best scoring members of a group will be better than the average applicant from other groups. Thus, one would expect to do better by taking the best of the candidates about whom there is knowledge than by picking randomly from a group about whom there is no knowledge (other than a group mean).

It is very likely that much of what is called "'prejudice' results from nothing more than the intuitive application of Bayes' Theorem. An employer tries a few members of a particular group. He finds their average performance to be much worse than members of other groups. He recognizes that a few members of the poor performing group perform well. But with no method to discover who these are, the optimal solution is simply to hire no one from the poor performing group. Until after World War I, there were no standardized intelligence tests to discover cheaply the most intelligent members of a poor performing group. Even today, good standardized tests are lacking for many important characteristics.

Imagine two groups of candidates, one consisting of five candidates with whom one has had personal experience, and a hundred believed to be similar in ability, for whom there are only resumes. Picking the highest ranked from those personally known is likely to succeed better than picking the best of the hundred on much lower quality information. Certainly, hiring from within and selecting from professional acquaintances are common.

One often has better information about members of one ethnic or religious group than another. Very often the group the hiring

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

officer is from is better known to him. The hiring officer may believe the mean abilities of the various groups are equal. However, if he is looking to hire only a few from the applicants in each group, he will adjust downwards more the estimates from the group whose candidates he has less information about. In this case, group membership is relevant because of differences in the precision of the "test" data, rather than because of any differences in the group means. It should be noted that a belief that one group is inferior is not logically necessary for an employer to use higher criteria for members of a particular group. In popular terms, discrimination need not be justified by prejudice.

Experience in similar jobs will usually improve the quality of information about an individual. Such previous experience will usually be greatest for older candidates, increasing the precision of the evaluation. This should give some advantage to the well qualified aged. Of course, those not well qualified will just have their deficiencies made more apparent. Here is a case where precision may depend on what is a prohibited item of information under U.S. law (being over 40). Here age enters into optimal decision-making not because it is correlated with ability, but because it is a surrogate for the precision of estimates.

Tests of ability for different groups often differ in precision. It is widely believed that many written mental tests are culturally biased. Certainly many informal procedures are. Often the most useful questions vary with group membership, and, for reasons of administrative feasibility, only one or a few sets of questions can be used. The most useful set will be that which works best for the majority group. It is plausible that these tests will be less precise for other groups. Notice that in the typical case where only a minority of the candidates are being selected, this implies that the adjustment towards the mean should be less for members of the majority group. The above argument implies that members of minority groups will (and should) be at a disadvantage in competing for most jobs.
However, if selection is by minority group members skilled at evaluating other group members, it may happen that superior members of that group find themselves at an advantage in competing for such positions. Thus, members of ethnic communities should have an advantage within that community. This advantage holds only if they are above average. If the candidates are below the group mean, greater precision in estimating their true ability merely highlights

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their inferiority, and makes it harder for them to find employment within the group.

When Group Membership is Unimportant, Repetitive Tasks

So far, this paper has merely shown that group membership will usually be relevant. There remains the question of how important it actually is. This is a big question which can only be touched on here (and is certainly an important topic for research). Theory can give some guidance as to the circumstances in which group membership is relevant.

Theory shows (see Equation 2) that the mean of the posterior distribution will be a weighted average of the means of the prior distribution (i.e., the group mean) and the mean for the test, with the weights being the relative precisions. If individual performance can be accurately predicted from test data, group membership will be of only minor importance (although it will be of no importance only if there is no uncertainty about future performance).

In particular, if the attribute of importance can be accurately measured at low cost, group membership will add little information and should be given little weight. For instance, women may be superior to men in clerical speed and accuracy, and hence make better typists. There could also be racial differences in typing ability. However, typing speed and accuracy are easy to measure. Thus, the optimal weight for sex or race in selection is small (although probably not zero).

In general, if a job consists of a small number of easily learned tasks repeated throughout a day, it will be possible to sample these tasks. Such measurements will have high precision. The optimal weight for group membership will be small. Performance in many (perhaps even most) occupations depends on such easily sampled tasks. Unfortunately, these occupations are often the lower paying ones.

In many such cases it will not be thought worth the trouble (and political heat) of computing the correct weighted average of the test score and the group mean. The test score will just be used. In these cases it should be remembered that if a tie-breaker is needed, the best guess is normally that the candidate from the best scoring group is the best choice (except when hiring from below average candidates). This is opposed to the frequently used procedure of breaking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties by taking the candidate from the lower scoring group (which is typically the underrepresented group).

Group Membership in Conjunction with Non-Repetitive Tasks

Where full performance on a job is achieved only after extensive training (or on the job experience), performance cannot be established by sampling. The ability of an applicant for admission to a school to learn is hard to sample directly, although measuring (by sampling) what has already been learned is possible. Tests do exist which measure the ability to learn (intelligence tests). These are normally imperfect guides to job or school performance, and hence the weight that should be appropriately given to group membership decreases as the tests become better predictors of true job or school performance.

Estimating Low Probability Events

It is hard to measure precisely the probability of making a very bad mistake or causing an accident. Observation of performance during a short test, or performance in a previous job, may not be of much use. This is because the relevant events occur too infrequently for the probability to be estimated from historical data. Group membership may be the best information available. This is likely in evaluating probabilities such as that of giving secrets to a foreign power, committing another serious crime, causing a serious accident (such as an oil spill), or defaulting on a loan. A controversial example of making decisions affecting national security on the basis of national origin, which has been discussed in this journal, was the internment of many Japanese in World War II (Murphey, 1993).

Where candidates have the ability to impose very high costs by single actions (e.g., raping a fellow student), estimating the probability of such infrequent actions from past experience will be impossible. The only source of useful information may be group membership. Certain forms of handicap may have this property. One way to avoid having a tanker captain drink too much alcohol and run aground in Alaska, causing a major spill, may be to avoid hiring those with a history of alcoholism, even "recovered" alcoholics. However, in the US, alcoholism is considered a disease (which it may be), and it is illegal to discriminate against those with a disease. Unfortunately, the percentage of ex-alcoholics who again take up drinking is much greater than the percentage of those who have never been alcoholics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is currently no way of telling which ex-alcoholics will again take up drinking and which won't. Thus starting with a strong "prior" about alcoholics and ex-alcoholics appears correct.

A particularly important case occurs in selecting faculty members or scientists to do highly original research. It is not known how to predict the probability of a Nobel prize-winning insight. Clearly this event is too infrequent to predict from its previous occurrence in the same individual. (If this were the requirement, no junior faculty would ever be hired.) The best rule is to utilize prior information about the groups from which such discoveries have previously come, such as being from a prestigious graduate school, possession of a graduate degree, previous discoveries, etc. A characteristic known to be associated with a low probability of making major discoveries (Lehman, 1953), being past middle age, is one that cannot legally be considered in hiring in the United States. It is possible that other characteristics on the forbidden list may be useful predictors (especially sex, or attributes related to culture, such as religion or national origin). The example given earlier of the large differences in production of scientific papers between men and women suggests sex will frequently prove a useful predictor for scientific productivity. Weyl (1989) has shown that the level of accomplishment in many fields varies with national origin, making it likely that national origin provides relevant information for estimating the probability of accomplishment.

A frequent problem in selection is to screen out dishonest or criminally inclined applicants. It is plausible that honesty will be more likely in candidates that believe that dishonesty is punished after death (i.e., certain religious beliefs) than in candidates whose religious views present no obstacle to dishonesty. Refusing to consider religion can make avoiding dishonesty much harder. Similar effects could occur with other forms of group membership relevant to dishonesty. Consider strength of community ties, or ability to leave the country to avoid prosecution (i.e., nationality or national origin). It is also known that blacks have very high arrest rates and imprisonment rates (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1986; Jaynes and Williams, 1989, pp. 458-461; Levin, 1990, 1991; Rushton, 1994), a fact which might lead a reasonable man to believe that dishonesty was more common in that group. According to mothers' reports (3,049 children) of black ten-and eleven year-old boys, 30.7% were not truthful or told lies (Tuddenham, Brooks, & Milkovich, 1974, as reported by Vernon,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1982). Corresponding figures were 23.9% of the Chicano, 10.8% of the whites, and 8.8% of the Orientals. It is likely that ethnic differences were understated since mother's probably compared their children with other children they knew, who would tend come from the same ethnic group. It is also known that males are much more likely to commit crimes than females are (Rutter & Rutter, 1993, pp. 178-185; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1986). Given the difficulty of getting information about honesty and criminal inclinations, this group information should carry some weight.

Personality Measurements are Typically Low Precision

Much of the problem in predicting low probability events is not measuring ability, but measuring personality. In many selection situations, the key question is not ability to do the job (i.e., what performance will be done when the candidate is motivated) but questions of personality and character. Will the candidate try? Will he consistently show up for school or work? Will she antagonize customers or fellow students? Will he be honest? Does the student's personality match the job she is training for? Personality tests may lack precision in a selection application (partially because candidates can deduce how to answer questions, and answer appropriately), although studies show they can be useful (Schmitt, Gooding, Noe, & Kirsch, 1984; Baehr & Orban, 1989; Barrick & Mount,1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991; Furnham 1992). With low precision tests, group membership is likely to be useful. In such cases, a higher weight for group membership will be appropriate. In many cases, no attempt is made to measure personality variables at all, even though they are relevant to job and school performance. Group membership then becomes the best guide to personality variables. Of course, if personality can not be measured very precisely, with or without group membership, it should have only limited weight in hiring decisions.

There are differences between various ethnic groups in personality (although it is debated the extent to which they are genetic). Vernon (1982) documents the greater introversion in Oriental peoples. Some difference in behavior are observed at birth (white babies were more excitable while Chinese were more immutable) showing there is some genetic component (Freedman, 1974). The Tuddenham study of mothers' reports mentioned above stated that 41.3% of Chicano boys flare up and get mad easily, versus 28.7% of the blacks, 25.6% of the whites, and only 13.2% of the Orientals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Assuming differences in such traits carry on into adulthood, as they appear to, one would give high weight to group membership, since reliable individual information about the tendency to flare up is unlikely to be available (candidates are unlikely to admit to this on applications and the behavior is less likely to be exhibited in a brief interview).

The sexes differ in personality (Gilligan, 1982; Moir & Jessel, 1992; Wilson 1989). Sociobiology predicts that because of the different roles in reproduction played by the different sexes there will be real sex differences in behavior (Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994; Ridley, 1993). A prediction of sociobiology is that males will be more oriented toward achieving status, because extra status helps them gain access to more mates, while females benefit relatively little from status because they cannot appreciably increase their number of offspring just by obtaining high status. This greater male desire for status has been argued to explain why men usually achieve the highest status positions in any profession or society (Goldberg, 1973). Given the difficulties in accurate personality assessment, the use of sex is very likely to improve the accuracy of predictions for jobs for which personality is important.

Perhaps the case where the optimal inclusion of a forbidden variable would make the biggest difference would be sex. Females have a greater interest in child care. This could justify a "prior" that a female applicant would do a better job in child care, or in teaching the young. Most women have very strong maternal instincts, and give top priority to caring for their children. This results in many women dropping out of the labor force for a few years after the birth of children. Attempting to forecast who will drop out of the labor force for child care purposes, or who will reduce their work effort, without using sex will likely be less successful than using forecasts that include sex as a direct variable. It is likely that much of the difference in number of publications between male and female academics reflects female decisions to give priority to child care over publishing. Much of the remainder probably results from the males' greater drive for status. Since this decision is a direct result of sex, it is logical that better estimates of future publications will be obtained by making use of a sex variable than without one. Likewise, if the goal of an admissions program for graduate school is to train those most likely to contribute a number of years of work in a professional field, it can be predicted that more of the women will drop out, at least for a few

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years, for child care, than will the men. The inclusion of a sex variable will pick up this effect.

Sex differences may be relevant in advising. There is evidence that males and females differ in their occupational goals. Indeed, Levin (1987) argues that most of the difference in occupational distribution between men and women is explainable by men and women having different goals. If this is true, when using instruments given to both males and females, it would be desirable to adjust the estimates towards the means for each sexual group to get the best possible estimate of the true value for their interests. For this reason alone, two individuals who answered a questionnaire identically might be given somewhat different advice depending on their sex. This is a result of the mathematics and does not involve unjustified stereotyping.

Evidence that Group Differences Exist

The literature on group differences is too large for a comprehensive survey to be attempted here. This paper will present just enough evidence that differences in group means, or in group standard deviations, exist (or can be are argued to exist) often enough to make the Bayesian mathematics presented above more than an intellectual curiosity. Unfortunately, there have been extreme efforts to keep the evidence about group differences from becoming known (Pearson, 1991; Eysenck, 1991).

A standard finding is that average intelligence does differ by ethnic group and race. Orientals appear more intelligent than Caucasians (Lynn, 1987, 1991a; Vernon,1982: Rushton, 1994). To avoid the charge that members of one's own ethnic group are normally evaluated as more intelligent than members of other groups, note that the researchers here were Caucasian. Black performance is normally about one standard deviation below white performance (Jensen, 1980; see also Gottfredson, 1986a, 1986b; Herrnstein, 1990; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Levin, 1990, 1991; Lynn, 1991a; Osborne & McGurk, 1982; Seligman, 1992; Shuey, 1966). More precisely, the best estimates place the average U.S. black IQ at 82 (Jensen, 1993), with a standard deviation of 12 (which is below the white standard deviation). Incidentally, the fact that the black standard deviation is less than the white one increases the weight to be given to the group mean when estimating the intelligence of a black.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While it is commonly contended that this is because tests are biased against blacks, the evidence is that the major written admission tests and employment tests (especially those that test intelligence or aptitude) are not biased against blacks, and probably not against other English-speaking groups. This conclusion is based on the work of Jensen (1980) and others (Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989; Reynolds & Brown, 1984; Wigdor & Garner 1982; Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; including the Scheuneman, 1987, and Shepard, 1987, dissents). For instance, evidence is that tests of cognitive ability predict as well for blacks as for whites (Schmidt, 1988). While I find Jensen convincing, a poll of expert opinion showed a belief that intelligence tests were "somewhat biased" against American blacks (Synderman & Rothman, 1988, p. 117).

While it is commonly presumed that the sexes are equal in intelligence, Lynn (1994) has recently assembled evidence that adult males have about a 4 IQ point advantage over adult females. Of course, given the precision with which IQ can be estimated, adjustment for this difference would have relatively little impact.

Although there is some evidence that college grade point averages of women are underpredicted, much, if not all, of the underprediction appears to be due to women disproportionately taking the easier courses (i.e., avoiding math-based courses) (see McCornack & McLod, 1988; Elliot & Strenta, 1988; Young, 1991).

Those who are not convinced by these authors' work (perhaps because of arguments by Kamin [1974], Flynn, [1980]; or Ceci, [1990]) can treat the discussion in this paper as purely a logical exercise on the implications of differences should they exist. Perhaps the exercise will be applicable to another case where the reader does believe group differences exist.

Intelligence is closely related to literacy and performance on the types of tasks taught in school. There appear to be large differences between whites and blacks in their ability to read with comprehension, manipulate documents, and engage in mathematical reasoning. An Educational Testing Service study (Kirsch and Jungeblut, 1986) reported on a standardized literacy test administered to a large sample of black and white adults. A high level of performance (375 points) that 10.8% of the whites reached, was reached by only .7% of the blacks. For the quantitative test, 11.5% of the whites reached the equivalent level, versus .8% of the blacks. Given the importance of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these "literacy" skills in high status occupations, the proper "prior" is that blacks would perform much worse than whites.

However, if legally allowed (see Epstein,1992; Gottfredson & Sharf, 1988; Gottfredson, 1988; Hartigan and Wigdor, 1989; Welch, 1989; Wigdor and Garner, 1982 for a discussion of American legal restrictions prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and that act for the current law), testing for such skills would be relatively cheap, and the level of precision high. Thus, there is likely to be considerable information from testing available. In such cases, the additional information on literacy from considering race would be small, although inclusion of race should still improve predictions.

Similar results appear on achievement tests in schools, and on entrance to college and graduate schools (Humphreys, 1988). At the University of California's Medical School (over admission to which the famous Bakke case was fought) there was a very large gap in the Medical College Admission Test scores of those admitted in the regular program, and those admitted in a special program designed to give minorities a share roughly proportional to their percentage in the population (thus implying that selection was from similar percentiles of the population). "The average percentile in which the regularly admitted scored on the verbal section of the MCAT was 81, the specially admitted, 46; the average on the quantitative section for the regularly admitted was 76, the specially admitted, 24; the average on the science section for the regularly admitted was 83; the specially admitted, 35; the average was on the general information section for the regularly admitted was 69, the specially admitted, 33" (Eastland & Bennett, 1979, p. 8). Given the absence of information available to the general public on the competence of individual physicians, rational behavior would give considerable weight to race in choosing a physician. Incidentally, such use of race by an individual purchasing a service appears to be legal, as well as prudent.

Specific employment tests routinely show lower performance by blacks. Epstein (1992, 218-222) describes how in the first test developed by the New York City Police Department for entry-level officers blacks got 7.8% of the passing grades although they were 16.7% of the applicants. This was thrown out on disparate impact grounds (i.e., it failed blacks at a higher rate, and was presumed discriminatory). After a revision of the test was prepared at a high cost, and again thrown out by the courts, a third version was prepared which had a passing rate of 1.6% for blacks (4.4% for Hispanics), but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

11% for whites. In spite of such extreme differences in passing rates, (which prevented New York from accepting the outcome of this test), the above logic implies that the appropriate passing scores for blacks should have been higher than for whites, to correct for the possibility that blacks were merely benefitting from chance.

Wynter (1994) reported that in a study of supervisors' ratings of 3600 white managers and 500 black ones, the black managers tended to get lower grades. If blacks are indeed performing more poorly, the above logic calls for reducing supervisors' ratings downwards to allow for their inaccuracies. Notice here that arguing that ratings are inaccurate, which black exponents would likely do, would actually increase the strength of the case for giving more weight to group membership. Of course, a showing of anti-black bias would call for adding points to the blacks, but such a showing has not been made.

There are known to be racial and ethnic differences in disease resistance (Brues, 1990). The mechanism is known in a few cases (the sickle cell trait protects against malaria). Group membership may be the only guide to disease resistance. One could easily imagine conditions, especially in military operations, where it might be desirable to assign individuals on the basis of group affiliation so as to minimize their chances of being killed or injured. For instance, blacks are more vulnerable to frostbite (Brues, 1990, p. 180), but are better able to resist malaria, yellow fever, and other tropical diseases.

The Case for Merit Selection

It may be useful to make the case for merit selection here. Those affected by a personnel decision are the applicants and their employers. Suppose applicants are from two different racial groups. While the members of one race would be made happier if their representative were selected, the opposite would be true if the other were selected. For a non-racist there is no reason to presume that one race should be preferred over the other. Here, a non-racist is considered someone who believes that members of one racial group are not to be preferred over another just because of race. In general, there is no way to know how getting the job will affect the happiness of particular individuals (but see below), or for preferring one race over another on this basis. Thus, in general, a non-racist cannot base decisions on the candidate's welfare.

However, an employer does have a basis for choosing. He will be better off if the candidate selected does the job better. Frequently, of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, the employer will be a public agency. In this case the benefit of having the job better done will extend to the public. Even if one does not care about private profits, better employees serve the public better. Also, lower prices are likely since fewer man-hours are required when the employees are of higher quality. Thus, with the welfare of the candidates providing no basis for choice, choice should be based on which candidate is expected to do the better job. The same reasoning applies to admission decisions, since giving the training to the best qualified applicants eventually should result in better job performance. For instance, society probably benefits from having the best qualified individuals trained to be doctors, since that should result in more patients correctly diagnosed and treated.

Actually, it may be an overstatement to assume that the utility an individual finds in a job does not depend on ability. A certain percentage of those who get jobs come to regret it. Such regret is especially likely for those who, after getting the job, are fired for incompetence. Among those who do the job well enough to retain it, the pleasure they experience from the job may depend on how well they do it. Those who do a job well generally enjoy it more than those who do it poorly, and experience less of the anxiety that results from poor performance.

Likewise, students who flunk out may regret ever having been accepted. Sowell (1991, p. 110), for instance, has pointed out that affirmative action programs can set black students up for failure at high-prestige universities, even though they could have been successful students at the typical state university. Such failure could affect them for life. At the author's school, when admission was available for all high school graduates, virtually all students who needed remedial work in both English and mathematics failed to graduate. Now minimal standards eliminate most such individuals. Admitting such individuals through affirmative action probably does them no favor. Thus, even from the perspective of applicants, minimizing failure through merit selection is often desirable. As noted above, this requires consideration of group membership.

In general, the question of whom to select depends on the utility function of the selector, and if this includes a forbidden variable such as race, sex, age, or surrogates for the same such as minority status, diversity, previous disadvantage, etc., a strong case can be made for using a selection model with a utility function that makes these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

variables explicit (Gross & Su, 1975; Peterson, & Novick, 1976). Group membership enters into most such models.

Admittedly, the idea of using group membership may offend some people's idea of justice, but if that is the case they should make that argument explicitly, and not merely assert that group membership is irrelevant. That considering group membership is immoral is a proposition that can be, and has been, debated. Levin (1992, 1994) has made some interesting arguments that it is proper for the police to consider group membership, even when used to investigate differentially black individuals for criminal activity, although of course that proposition has been disputed (Adler, 1993; Corlett, 1993; Cox, 1993; Pojman, 1993; Thomas, 1992).

In considering these questions of whether using group membership improves selection, the key question is whether there are differences in group means and variances, not what causes these differences. The argument is equally strong whether the differences are of environmental origin or genetic origin. However, it is likely that many of the differences between sexes, age classes, and races do have a genetic origin, and plausible evolutionary accounts are made for why these differences exist. The evolutionary origins of racial differences in intelligences has been discussed elsewhere by the author (Miller, 1991) and others (Lynn, 1991b; Rushton, 1994). The author has set out in detail an evolutionary theory of racial differences which depends on offspring survival in northern climates requiring male provisioning, and on populations in those climates having evolved traits conducive to such provisioning (Miller, 1994). Many personality and behavioral differences between the races are explained by the theory. In warm climates, where Negroids emerged, male traits conducive to male success in competition for mates emerged. The ability and willingness to fight were among these traits. In modern industrial societies a willingness to fight, and to take risks, produces higher crime rates. Also, in cold climates it was necessary to plan ahead to survive winter, and the ability to defer gratification was selected for. Many criminals act as if they had difficulty in deferring gratification. An alternative theory to explain race differences has been proposed by Rushton (1994). However, the evolutionary mechanism proposed appears implausible (Miller 1993), although Rushton & Ankney (1993) disagree.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Implications for Test Theory

Predicting a Criterion from Test Scores

Suppose measures of performance are known for a large sample of individuals whose test scores are also known. The distribution of test scores given performance can be determined, perhaps by regressing the test score on the criterion. (Notice the contrast with the usual procedure.)

By solving this equation for performance as a function of test scores, a prediction for performance can be obtained. Should this prediction be used? No. In general it will overpredict the performance of those with high scores, and underpredict the performance of those with low scores. The set of those with high (i.e., above average) scores includes more whose scores were raised by luck than whose scores were lowered by luck. Thus, it overpredicts performance.

There is a better procedure. Given a knowledge (or estimate) of the distribution of abilities (performance) in the applicant population, Bayes' theorem can be used to compute the expected performance given the test score.

Using the regression of the test score on the criterion plus Bayes' theorem is not standard procedure. Indeed, Thorndike (1971, p. 64), in referring to the regression of the test score on the criterion, states: "Generally, this second regression is not of practical value, though it may be of theoretical interest in some contexts." As will be argued, this regression is of practical value whenever the candidates' ability distribution differs from that of the validation population.

The standard procedure is the computationally simpler one of regressing the job performance on the test scores. Then when an estimated score is obtained, one reads off the regression line the estimated long-run performance that corresponds to that score.
If the applicant's distribution is the same as the validation population, this procedure is correct. The regression of the criterion on the test score gives (by definition) the best fitting line.

If the set of applicants with a particular score includes more individuals whose long-run performance has probably been overestimated than applicants whose long-run performance has probably been underestimated, the standard procedure adequately corrects for this, but only if the set of applicants has the same distribution as the set of subjects for which the test is validated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Applicant Distribution Differs from the Distribution in the Validation Sample

However, there is a big qualification to the above which has been given inadequate emphasis. In most applications, a tacit assumption is that the distribution of ability among the applicants is the same as in the validation sample (the sample which was used to show the test worked).

Usually, only the best of the applicants for a job or for school entrance have been accepted. It is only the accepted ones for which criterion data is available. In these cases the distribution of true abilities in the validation sample will differ from the distribution in the pool of applicants on which decisions must be made. (This is the well known restriction of range problem. Procedures exist for estimating validities for a whole population. These will not be discussed here.)

The critical point to note is that in most cases the sample used to validate the test has different statistical properties from those of the population the test will be used for. In these circumstances, standard test theory fails to provide a good rationale for regressing the criterion on the test score. At best, this appears a reasonable, but ad hoc procedure.

It seems much more reasonable to explicitly use Bayes' theorem. An estimate of the candidate's performance conditional on his test score is needed. Bayes' theorem can provide this if the distribution of abilities among the candidates can be obtained, and if the distribution of the test scores given the candidate's ability can be obtained. The latter can be obtained by regressing the test score on the criterion. Where the test is an actual work sample, statistical theory will likely provide the distribution for the sample conditional on the criterion.

The harder problem is knowing the candidates' ability distribution. Typically, only data for the candidates actually hired exists. If the distribution of ability is known, this data can be used to reconstruct the full distribution. For instance, the means and standard deviation for the applicant pool could be estimated from the average ability of those hired, the minimum ability found acceptable, and the knowledge that the top x% of the applicants were hired. This would permit the calculation of a table for the expected performance given the test score. If candidates are drawn from different groups, this can be done separately for each. In general, this will result in a different table for each group.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Use of Bayes' theorem provides an explicit role for the distribution of abilities among the set of candidates. One can alter the selection rules as the distribution of applicants changes, or as one estimates it to have changed. Recruiting campaigns may draw better or worse applicants, for instance. One at least has a conceptual framework in which to discuss this problem.

However, in the most common applications of test scores, the outcome is not altered by the assumption that the candidates' ability is distributed as in the validation sample. Typically a test is used to rank applicants. The top applicants are then selected. Fortunately, for a single population or group, adjustments for differing distributions of abilities among the candidates merely changes the estimated abilities for particular candidates, without changing the candidates' rankings. Thus, there is no need for the full Bayesian apparatus where the only need is to rank candidates, and all candidates come from a single group.

As can be seen from the examples discussed here, where candidates are drawn from two different populations, improved results are obtained by using Bayes' theorem to adjust candidates' scores.

Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, and Rajaratnam (1972, p. 384) have pointed out that many test applications involve content or criterion referenced measurement, such as determining whether a student has mastered the material well enough to proceed to the next instructional unit. For these purposes, the problem is to estimate the student's true mastery, and the best estimate is a weighted average of the subpopulation mean and the test score, as shown above with Bayes' theorem.

Group Membership in Traditional Test Theory

The analysis also indicates the typical conditions in which group membership is useful. Traditional test theory at most provides for empirically adding group membership as a parameter in estimates, possibly as a dummy variable. Alternatively, separate regression coefficients can be estimated for each group. Traditional theory would use statistical tests to decide whether to include group membership as a dummy, or to fit a separate regression line for each group. Unless the probability is less than some traditional amount (often .05), the dummy is set equal to zero, or a single regression line

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is used. The procedure appears somewhat ad hoc, and an impression is left that the procedure is rather undesirable.

The above analysis suggests that whenever groups differ in average ability, a group effect is to be expected. The value of a group dummy should not be arbitrarily set at zero just because the coefficient is not statistically significant. If the two groups have different means, group membership will in general be relevant, and a term for group membership should appear in the equations.

Using the apparent criterion of whether differing regression coefficients exist, Hunter, et al. (1984, p. 79) concluded, "Given the cumulative research findings available today, there is no longer any separation between qualified and unqualified individualism that is empirically relevant. That is, although the positions can be separated philosophically, the empirical situations that would result in a difference in outcome do not occur." As long as it is assumed that the major reason for differing regression coefficients is that group membership is serving as a surrogate for some uncontrolled characteristic (which it may be doing), whether there is a difference between qualified and unqualified individualism is an empirical issue, refutable by showing that regression coefficients statistically differ no more than they would by chance. The Bayesian analysis shows that a difference in regression lines is to be expected whenever the statistical distribution of abilities differs between groups. The empirical evidence shows that such differences in means between groups occur regularly, creating a presumption that the regression lines will differ.

This makes the philosophical issue a real one, even if today the issue is less important than whether or not certain groups should be given affirmative action preference. If for some reason the lines do not differ when the groups are known to differ (perhaps from other tests), the logical presumption is that the tests are biased at the item level. This can happen through a careful effort to select items a particular group does well on.

A major use of the analysis given here is in showing the fundamental conflict between merit selection and non-discrimination. This would logically lead one who believed in merit normally to oppose anti-discrimination laws. Economists (such as the author), with their traditional professional bias towards rationality, would be expected to choose merit selection.

Of course, one who was in favor of merit selection still might rationally support laws against considering group membership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps real life people are so blinded by prejudice that they fail to make optimal decisions, even though such decisions are in their own interest. Such a person (possibly a psychologist with a knowledge of how frequently irrationality, including irrational prejudice, is actually observed) might choose to forego the gains from optimal consideration of group membership for the gains of avoiding sub-optimal use of group membership. Since the arguments about sub-optimal use of group membership information have been frequently made, this paper has concentrated on pointing out that use of group membership will normally be necessary for optimal decisions.

Conclusions

Only under highly unusual conditions should a firm or school seeking the best candidates have the same requirements for members of different groups. These necessary conditions include (1) identical average abilities and distribution of abilities, (2) identical precision of the evaluation procedure (test) in predicting future performance, (3) no tendency for the better qualified members of one group to apply for either the job being offered or for jobs that might compete for the same candidates. The last condition normally requires that the tastes of the different groups be identical with regard to the desirability of different jobs or schools, that selection for schooling and employment not be based on group membership (if it is, there will be depletion effects regardless of whether the use of group membership is rational), and that returns to human capital investment be the same in all groups.

For laws forbidding the consideration of group membership to be consistent with seeking the best qualified applicants, a universal belief that discrimination does not occur is necessary. (Otherwise, self-selection by candidates is likely to make group membership relevant.) Of course, if it is agreed that there is no discrimination, it is hard to imagine why it should be forbidden. It appears that an interest group cannot logically argue both that there is a problem with discrimination, and that outlawing consideration of group membership is consistent with seeking the best candidates.

Of course, rules against consideration of group membership may be justified on other grounds than the irrelevance of group membership. It may be that selection procedures using group membership involve externalities (such as promoting social strife) that justify forbidding their use. It may be believed that a certain group should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be given a greater share of the available jobs or school places, and that forbidding consideration of group membership facilitates this goal. Finally, there is the second best argument that decision makers do not know how to make optimal use of group membership data, and that better decisions result from forbidding use of such data than from permitting it to be incorrectly used.

Of course, if support for rules forbidding consideration of group membership is based on the above considerations, proponents should make these arguments. They should not use the logically incorrect argument that ignoring group membership is necessary for seeking the best qualified candidates. It is not even consistent with that goal. Likewise, if the goal is to help people make the best vocational choices for themselves given imperfect instruments for measuring their interests and aptitudes, group membership is likely to be relevant. Vague comments about "stereotyping" do not alter this mathematical fact.

In general, hiring decisions affect those hired and their employer. If the ethical decision is made that there is no reason for preferring the welfare of one individual over that of another because of his race or other group membership (which seems to be a widely shared belief), it appears that the only basis for hiring will be the benefits to the employer and the general public. This normally requires seeking the best qualified candidates. Since seeking the best qualified candidates is in general inconsistent with equality of opportunity, it follows that the absence of group consideration is inconsistent with equality of opportunity. Hard choices must be made.

References

Adler, J.
1993 Crime rates by race and causal relevance: A reply to Levin. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIV, 176-184.

Aigner, D. J., & Cain, G. G.
1977 Statistical theories of discrimination in labor markets. Industrial Labor Relations Review, 30, 175-187.

Arrow, H. J.
1972 Some mathematical models of race discrimination in the labor market. In A. H. Pascal, (ed.), Racial Discrimination in Economic Life, Lexington.

Baehr, M. E., & Orban J. A.
1989 The role of intellectual abilities and personality characteristics in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determining success in higher-level positions. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 35, 270-287.

Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K.,
1991 The big personality dimensions and job performance: a meta--analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44 (1), 1-26.

Borjas, G. J., & Golberg, M. S.
1978 Biased screening and discrimination in the labor market. American Economic Review, 68(5), 918-922.

Broder, I.
1993 Professional achievement and gender differences among academic economists. Economic Inquiry, XXXI, 116-127.

Brues, Alice M.
1990 People and Races. Prospect Heights: Waveland.

Buss, David M.
1994 The Evolution of Desire. New York: Basic Books.

Ceci, S. J.
1990 On Intelligence ... More or Less, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

Cohen, A. G., & Gutek, B. A.
1991 Sex differences in the career experiences of members of two APA divisions. American Psychologist, 46, 1292-1298.

Cole, J. R.
1979 Fair Science: Women in the Science Community, New York: The Free Press. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIV, 155-162.

Corlett, J. A.
1993 Racism and affirmative action. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIV, 163-175.

Cox, C. B.
1993 On Michael Levin's 'responses to race differences in crime'. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIV, 155-162.

Cronbach, L. J., Gleser, G. C., Nanda, H., & Rajaratnam, N.
1972 The Dependability of Behavioral Measurements, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Darity, W., Jr.
1989 What's left of the economic theory of discrimination? in S. Shulman, & W. Darity, Jr, (Eds), Question of Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U. S. Labor Market Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 335-376.

Dyckman, T. R., Smidt, S., & McAdams, A. K.
1969 Management Decision Making Under Uncertainty, London, MacMillan.

Eastland, T., & Bennett, W. J.
1979 Counting by Race. New York: Basic Books.

Epstein, Richard A.
1992 Forbidden Grounds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Elliot, R., & Strenta, A. C.
1988 Effects of improving the reliability of the GPA on prediction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generally and on comparative predictions for gender and race particularly. Journal of Educational Measurement 25, 333-347.

Eysenck, Hans J.
1991 Science, Racism, and Sexism. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 16(2), 218-250.

Flynn, James R.
1980 Race, I. Q. and Jensen, New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.

Freedman, D. G.
1974 Human Infancy: An Evolutionary Perspective. New York: Wiley.

Furnham, A.
1992 Personality at Work. London: Routledge.

Gilligan, C.
1982 In a Different Voice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Goldberg, S.
1973 The Inevitability of Patriarchy. New York: Morrow.

Gottfredson, L. S.
1986a The g Factor in employment: A Special Issue of the Journal of Vocational Behavior, 29 (3).
1986b Societal consequences of the g factor in employment. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 29, 379-410.
1988 Reconsidering fairness: A matter of social and ethical priorities. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 33, 293-319.

Gottfredson, L. S., & Sharf, J. C.
1988 Fairness in Employment Testing: A Special Issue of the Journal of Vocational Behavior,33 (3).

Gross, A. L., & Su, W.
1975 Defining a "fair" or "unbiased" selection model: a question of utilities. Journal of Applied Psychology 60, 345-351.

Hartigan, J. A., & Wigdor, A. K.
1989 Fairness in Employment Testing. Washington, National Academy Press.

Herrnstein, R. J.
1990 Still an American dilemma. The Public Interest, 98, 3-17.

Humphreys, L. G.
1988 Trends in levels of academic achievement of blacks and other minorities. Intelligence, 12, 231-260.

Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L.
1976 A critical analysis of the statistical and ethical implications of five definitions of test fairness. Psychological Bulletin, 83(6), 1053-1071.
1982 Ability tests: economic benefits vs. the issue of fairness. Industrial Relations, 21(3), 293-308.

Hunter, J. E., Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, R.
1979 Differential validity of employment tests by race: a comprehensive review and analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86(4), 721-735.

Jaynes, G. D., & Williams, R. M., Jr.
1989 A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society, Washington:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Academy Press.

Jensen, A. R.
1980 Bias in Mental Testing, New York: The Free Press.
1981 Straight Talk About Mental Tests, New York: The Free Press.
1992 Mental Ability: Critical Thresholds and Social Policy. Journalo f Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 17(2), 171-181.
1993 Black intelligence. In Sternberg, R., Ed. Encyclopedia of Intelligence. New York: Macmillan.

Kamin, L. J.
1974 The Science and Politics of IQ, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Kelley, T. L.
1947 Fundamentals of Statistics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kirsch, I. S., & Jungeblut, A.
1986 Literacy: Profiles of America's Young Adults, Princeton: Educational Testing Service.

Lehman, H. C.
1953 Age and Achievement, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levin, M.
1987 Feminism and Freedom. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
1990 Implications of Race and Sex Differences for Compensatory Affirmative Action and the Concept of Discrimination. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 15(2), 175-212.
1991 Race Differences: An Overview. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 16(2), 195-216.
1992 Responses to race differences in crime. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIII, 5-29.
1994 Reply to Adler, Cox, and Corlett. Journal of Social Philosophy, 25, 5-19.

Lynn, R.
1978 Ethnic and racial differences in intelligence: international comparisons. in R. Travis Osborne, Clyde E. Noble, & Nathaniel Weyl (Eds.) Human Variation: The Biopsychology of Age, Race, and Sex, (261-283) New York: Academic Press.
1987 The Intelligence of the Mongoloids. Personality and Individual Differences, 8, 813-844.
1991a Race differences in intelligence: a global perspective. Mankind Quarterly, 31, 254-296.
1991b The evolution of racial differences in intelligence, Mankind Quarterly, 32, 99-121.
1994 Sex differences in intelligence and brain size: A paradox resolved. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 257-271,

McCornack, R., & McLod, M.
1988 Gender bias in the prediction of college course performance. Journal of Educational Measurement 25, 321-331.

Miller, E. M.
1978 Uncertainty Induced Bias in Capital Budgeting, Financial Man-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agement, 7, 12-18.
1980 Personnel Selection in the Presence of Uncertainty, Personnel, September-October, 67-76.
1981 Inconsistency of Non-Discrimination with Merit Selection, Resources in Education, (micro-fiche), September.
1985 Decision-Making under Uncertainty for Capital Budgeting and Hiring, Managerial and Decision Economics, 6, 11-18.
1991 Climate and intelligence. Mankind Quarterly, 32, 127-132.
1993 Could r Selection Account for the African Personality and Life Cycle. Personality and Individual Differences, 15, 665-676.
1994 Paternal Provisioning versus Mate Seeking in Human Populations, Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 227-255.

Mislevy, R. J.
1993 Some formulas for use with Bayesian ability estimates. Educational and Psychological Measurement 53, 315-328.

Moir, A., & Jessel, D.
1992 Brain Sex, New York: Dell Publishing.

Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C.
1994 The Bell Shaped Curve. New York: The Free Press.

Murphey, Dwight D.
1993 The World War II Relocation of Japanese-Americans. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 18(1), 93-118.

Osborne, R. T., & McGurk, F. C. J.
1982 The Testing of Negro Intelligence, Volume 2, Athens, Ga.: The Foundation for Human Understanding.

Pearson, R.
1991 Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe. Washington: Scott Townsend.

Peterson, N. S., & Novick, M. R.
1976 An evaluation of some models for culture-fair selection. Journal of Educational Measurement, 13, 3-29.

Phelps, E. S.
1972 The statistical theory of racism and sexism. American Economic Review, 62, 659-661.

Pojman, L.
1993 Responses to crime: A response to Michael Levin and Laurence Thomas. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIV, 152-154.

Reiser, L. W., Sledge, W. H., Fenton, W., & Leaf, P.
1993 Beginning careers in academic psychiatry for women-"Bermuda Triangle"? American Journal of Psychiatry 150, 1392-

Reynolds, C. R., & Brown, R. T.
1984 Perspectives on Bias in Mental Testing, New York: Plenum.

Ridley, Matt
1993 The Red Queen. New York: MacMillian.

Rushton, J. P.
1994 Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective. New

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Rushton, J. P., & Ankney, C. D.
1993 The evolutionary selection of human races: a response to Miller, Personality and Individual Differences, 15(6), 677-680.
Rutter, M., & Rutter, M.
1993 Developing Minds. New York: Basic Books.
Scheuneman, J. D.
1987 An argument opposing Jensen on test bias: the psychological aspects. in Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (Eds.) Arthur Jensen: Consensus and Controversy, New York: Falmer, 155-170.
Schmidt, F. L.
1988 The problem of group differences in ability test scores in employment selection. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 33, 272-292.
Schmidt, F. L., & Shepard, L. A.
1987 The case for bias in tests of achievement and scholastic aptitude. in Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (Eds.) Arthur Jensen: Consensus and Controversy, New York: Falmer, 177-190.
Schmitt, N., Gooding, R., Noe, R., & Kirsch, Michael
1984 Meta-analyses of validity studies published between 1964 and 1982 and the investigation of study characteristics. Personnel Psychology, 37, 407-422.
Schwarb, S.
1986 Is statistical discrimination efficient. American Economic Review, 76, 228-234.
Seligman, Daniel
1992 A Question of Intelligence. New York: Birch Lane Press.
Shuey, A.
1966 The Testing of Negro Intelligence, New York: Social Science Press.
Smith, M. M.
1978 Towards a general equilibrium theory of racial wage discrimination. Southern Economic Journal, 45(2), 458-468.
Sowell, T.
1991 Preferential Policies. New York, William Morrow.
Symons, D.
1979 The Evolution of Human Sexuality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Synderman, M., & Rothman, S.
1988 The IQ Controversy, the Media and Public Policy. New York: Transaction Publishers.
Tett, R. P., Jackson, D. N., & Rothstein, M.
1991 Personality Measures as predictors of job performance: a meta-analytic review. Personnel Psychology, 44,, 703-742.
Thomas, L.
1992 Statistical badness. Journal of Social Philosophy, XXIII, 30-41.
Thorndike, R. L.
1971 Concepts of culture-fairness. Journal of Educational Measurement,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8, 63-70.

Tuddenham, R. D., Brooks, J., & Milkovich, L.
1974 Mothers reports of the behavior of ten-year-olds and relationships with sex, ethnicity, and mother's education. Developmental Psychology, 10, 959-995.

Vernon, P. E.
1982 The Abilities and Achievements of Oriental in North America. New York: Academic Press.

Welch, F.
1989 Affirmative action and discrimination. in S. Shulman & W. Darity, Jr. (Eds.) Question of Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U. S. Labor Market. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 153-189.

Weyl, N.
1989 The Geography of American Achievement. Washington: Scott-Townsend.

Wigdor, A. K., & Garner, W. R. (Eds)
1982 Ability Testing: Uses, Consequences, and Controversies, Washington: National Academy Press.

Wilson, Glenn
1989 The Great Sex Divide. Washington: Scott Townsend.

Wilson, J. Q., & Herrnstein, R. J.
1986 Crime and Human Nature, New York: Touchstone Books.

Wynter, L. E.
1994 Black managers reject white bosses criticism. Wall Street Journal, February 2), p. B1.

Young, J. W.
1991 Gender bias in predicting college academic performance: a new approach using item response theory. Journal of Educational Measurement 28, 37-47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress, The Presidency and World Order: The Interplay of International and Domestic Politics

Anthony Eksterowicz
Glenn Hastedt
James Madison University

A disturbing focus exists in efforts to gauge the significance of the many changes that are taking place in the post-cold war world. The focus of attention has been largely devoted to investigations of how these changes will effect the basic nature of international relations and the conduct of foreign policy. Will the structure of the international community be bipolar, multipolar, unipolar and hegemonic, multilevel interdependent or comprised of three economic blocs?[1] Will there be a balance of powers or a concert of powers?[2] Will the United States face predominately economic or military threats in this "new world"? Missing in this analysis is an investigation of how these changes may affect the nature of domestic politics and institutional arrangements such as executive/legislative relations.

This blind-spot is not new. It harks back to the long employed distinction between domestic and international politics. In large part, due to the work of the interdependence theorists, the artificiality of this domestic-world politics dichotomy is now well recognized.[3] Moreover, some observers have recognized that interdependent trends and factors linking foreign to domestic politics have always existed.[4] Indeed, the upheavals inside the separate European nations during the period of 1848 contributed, in part, to the end of the Concert of Europe thus establishing that domestic factors can play a crucial role in changing international paradigms.[5]

What is still missing is a balanced understanding of the nature of domestic/institutional-international political linkages: a concern for international system variables as crucial factors influencing the character of domestic political processes and institutions. Focusing primarily on regime type and coalition patterns, Peter Gourevitch points out such linkages do exist.[6] He notes that with varying degrees of rigor and plausibility many strands of writing within the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fields of international political economy and international systems theory support the conclusion that "political development is shaped by war and trade." Shifting the level of analysis downward to political parties, social groups, and organizations, Miles Kahler makes a similar point in his study of the domestic consequences of decolonialization on France and Great Britain.[7]

An appreciation of the potential magnitude of domestic political change confronting the United States today as it enters into the post-cold war era only can be developed by analyzing past trends in international and domestic politics. What was the distinguishing characteristics of other periods of change in the international arena? Were there any consequent domestic changes and what did they portend for the nation?

Of particular relevance for understanding the condition today are two recent periods of international transformation. In each period profound changes in the international environment have inevitably led to profound alterations in domestic institutional arrangements and politics. For both periods the linkage between the international events and the domestic reforms came in the form of budget politics. Both periods had profound effects upon the nature of executive/legislative relations. The first period encompasses the massive transformations in domestic and international politics at the turn of the century. It includes the Progressive Reform Movement domestically and the shift from colonialism towards mass democracy internationally. It culminates in a new executive legislative relationship as exemplified by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The second period of profound international change was initiated by the Vietnam War with its effects manifested in the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and it continues today.

Our purpose is to first illustrate that grand periods of international change also coincide with profound domestic reforms, each heavily influencing the other. Budget reforms link international and domestic politics and transform domestic institutional balances of power and policy environments. Second, we shall analyze the effect of these interdependent influences upon the nature of the executive/legislative balance of power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Budget Linkages

In order for domestic politics and international politics to be linked there must be a linkage mechanism.[8] That is, there must be some way in which political activity in one arena enters into the other. No shortage of potential linking mechanisms exist. Modern transportation, military and communication technologies plus an interdependent world economy have made world's political boundaries far more porous then in the past. Not all linkage mechanisms, however, are equally capable of transmitting international events in such a way that they have a lasting impact on domestic politics. For this to happen the linkage mechanism must possess three characteristics.

First, it must be direct as opposed to indirect. In the former case international events are linked directly with the governing political institutions while in the later case they are placed more generally in the political system as a whole. International events transmitted directly into governing political institutions hold the potential for moving straight away on to the political agenda. Those travelling via an indirect linkage system must first be picked up by political parties, elites, or interest groups. The mass media serves as just such an indirect linkage mechanism. The images of suffering, destruction, hatred, or violence they transmit into a political system generally have a political impact only after they become part of the society's political consciousness. For example, it was only after an aid to Senator Carl Levin read a moving account of the suffering in Somalia that the US political system began to respond.

Second, the linkage mechanism must be broadly structured in its coverage. The most effective linkage mechanism in this regard is one that "deposits" the event at many points along the political system. Least effective are those whose point of impact is narrow and specialized. Because political change is costly and disruptive it is not undertaken without a great deal of prompting. The less widely recognized are the domestic ramifications of an international event the less likely is there to exist the necessary level of support for making a change. Broadly structured linkages are especially important in a system of institutional checks and balances and divided government such as exists in the United States today. With virtually any action of significance requiring the acquiescence of multiple institutions an international event which is transmitted only to one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

branch of government is unlikely to mobilize the needed level of political support for change to take place.

Third, for reasons similar to those outlined above, the ideal linkage mechanism must possess the ability to shock the political system out of relying upon standard operating procedures or a business as usual approach to problem solving. Without being able to convey a sense of urgency the public is unlikely to endorse far-reaching changes and political leaders can be expected to succumb to the temptation of adopting incremental or largely symbolic changes.

One linkage mechanism that possesses all of the traits is the budgetary process. It specifically and overarchingly links international politics to domestic politics by depositing international events directly into the national policy making process and does so at multiple points in both the executive and legislative branches. Large and unmanageable budget deficits convey an extraordinarily strong sense of urgency and system failure. Where problems with the environment, health care, education, or transportation can be solved by spending more money and designing new programs, a budget deficit can not. Because established political solutions offer little hope of solving this problem the range of options considered on the political agenda expands and so too does the potential for far-reaching domestic political change.

This potential is inherent in the dual nature of the budgetary politics. On the one hand budgetary politics is a method of allocating resources and prioritizing goals. Not only is it an ongoing process without a firm ending point but it is one that is always marked by a certain degree of tension. Many years ago Walter Lippmann spoke of the existence of a gap between foreign policy goals and resources. Where Lippmann was not convinced that resources and goals could not be balanced more recent writers have spoken of the inevitability of the "Lippmann Gap."[9] The difficulty of reallocating resources as well as the need to do so need also lies at the heart of Paul Kennedy's argument concerning the cyclical rise and fall of Great Powers.[10]

There also exists a second dimension to budgetary politics. Not only do budgetary politics allocate resources they also allocate political power within a government. By empowering certain officials and offices with the authority to authorize spending, allocate funds, or oversee their expenditure the budgetary process determines who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the players are in the game of policy making and how much power they bring to the table. Some policy makers arrive with a virtual veto over what can be done in a wide array of issue areas while others can only influence policy intermittently and at the margins.

Under normal conditions the politics of the budgetary process is dominated by the first dimension. Proceeding within the context of the political status quo, changes in spending patterns leave fundamental political power relationships largely unchanged. However, under times of high stress and urgency the second dimension of the budgetary process comes into prominence. Choices are now required which go beyond the boundaries of ongoing political arrangements. At some point theses choices may come to include reforming the basic nature of the budgetary process itself and in the process restructuring the domestic institutional and political balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.

While the first dimension has been long recognized by writers on international affairs the second has not. And, it is this failure to appreciate the power reallocating potential of the budgetary process that has blocked recognition of the way in which the budgetary process can act as a linkage mechanism for international politics and domestic politics. Not all types of international events or issues hold the same potential for transforming domestic politics. The likelihood of an international event or issue doing so is dependent upon its perceived salience. International events become salient through their ability to make demands upon societal resources. To the extent that a society feels that it can "pay the bill", whether that bill is financial, physical, or emotional, that international event will have little impact on the domestic scene.

However, once that bill reaches unacceptable proportions the potential exists for significant domestic change to occur if it can be effectively transmitted back to the political system. It is for this reason that war, and in particular lengthy wars, are ideal candidates for being the culminating point for change in domestic politics in ways that neither routine events nor periodic and short-lived ones can never hope to be. We examine two periods in which a lengthy war set in motion far reaching domestic change through the perceived need to reform the budgetary process. The first is the period immediately after World War I and the initiation of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The second is the period immediately after

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Vietnam War and the initiation of the Budget Impoundment Control Act of 1974. As a prelude to this analysis it is important to set the stage by considering the international and domestic political changes underway shortly after the turn of the century.

Domestic and International Change at the Turn of the Century

Profound domestic reform was initiated by the assassination of President Garfield in 1881. Congress passed the Pendleton Act which established the American Civil service. As a result of this act, over time, political patronage declined the bureaucracy became more specialized, less partisan and more hierarchial. The bureaucracy recruited technocratic experts largely due to the increasing use of technology by industry. This reform affected the United States Congress.

The Congress had become an institution perceived to be in the grip of corrupt political party officials. Indeed, Progressive candidates campaigned against the corrupt city political party machines in the key industrial cities like Chicago. This eventually led to the revolt against Speaker of the House Joe Cannon and a reform of Congress from a party ruled organization to a committee ruled one. The new committee rule in the Congress was one of decentralization with powers vested in committee chairmen. It coincided with the decentralized and specialized nature of the bureaucracy and of industry. If the bureaucracy was decentralized and staffed by experts the Congress would also assume a decentralized and more specialized role for oversight, regulation and public policy.[11]

During this era the Progressive Reform movement championed the necessity of a regulated state as a result of profit minded industrialism which in turn gave rise to interest group activity. Other Progressive reforms like the citizen initiative, direct primary, referendum and recall all combined to give citizens more power in governmental affairs much to the chagrin of political party leaders.

The massive reforms of this period can be characterized as a movement away from representative democracy based upon party rule and a movement towards (however slowly) a form of participatory democracy based upon interest group rule. This paradigmatic domestic change coincides with an equally paradigmatic change internationally.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As Geoffrey Barraclough has noted, scientific, technological and industrial changes ushered in paradigmatic changes in international affairs.[12] Industry needed resources and these resources were to be found in areas apart from Europe. Thus an international policy of imperialism fit the new domestic changes. In other words, the very same changes leading to domestic reforms led to international policy transformations.

The world was no longer Euro-centered. The paradigmatic change in international politics can be characterized as a movement away from the European balance of power model in international affairs towards a world politics model.[13] When European powers began to look towards China they found that their interests would inevitably conflict with those Pacific powers of Japan, Russia and the United States. In fact the beginning of the United States and Russian rivalry can be traced to the conflict over China. This rivalry would only intensify with the Russian Revolution and the aftermath of World War II. While World War I was fought largely in Europe the seeds of the conflict were international in scope.

> It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the entry of the United States into the war in 1917 was a turning point in history; it marked the decisive stage in the transition from the European age to the new age of world politics. It is a turning point in another way also. After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November 1917 the division of the world into two great rival power blocs, inspired by apparently irreconcilable ideologies, took tangible shape.[14]

The movement towards democracy both domestically and internationally would affect domestic institutions and relationships. The reformed Congress was decentralized and weak. The transformed international environment was dangerous and unpredictable. The presidency marched into the vacuum of leadership and assumed heightened responsibilities. World War I and the Congressional Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 herald the arrival of an age of Presidential dominance and Congressional subservience.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World War I and the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

American leaders recognized the threat that Bolsehvism presented to America's national security. Colonel House reported to Wilson from Paris that "I pointed out [to Lloyd George and Clemenceau] the danger of bringing about a state of Bolsehivism in Germany if the terms of the armistice were made too stiff, and the consequent danger to England, France, and Italy."[15] Wilson, himself, was aware of the danger that Bolshevism represented to his dream of spreading liberal democracy throughout the world. According to Chace and Carr the Siberian intervention was the "purest example of Wilson's preoccupation with the threat of hostile ideologies to liberal democracy both home and abroad."[16] Though Wilson endorsed the use of force to protect democracy he rejected the politics of the balance of power as the primary basis of US foreign policy. Instead, he directed his foreign policy to the people of the world through his endorsement of the idea of national self determination. This sentiment is directly traceable to that of Progressivism with its emphasis on the extension of the franchise domestically.

The primary mechanism by which the dangers inherent in this altered international system were transmitted on to the domestic political scene was the budget. As argued earlier, the budgetary process is more than a passive conduit of statistics and figures. It has very important symbolic and political dimensions. The message carried by the budgetary figures of WWI was that America's entry into world politics had an inescapable economic dimension that would require reallocating resources and political power. The recognition that such changes were necessary found institutional and legal embodiment in the Budget and Accouting Act of 1921. This act for the first time made the President responsible for organizing and submitting a national budget to Congress on an annual basis. To help him in this task it established the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget, and gave it the power to "assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the estimates of the several departments". An independent Comptroller General's Office was created to oversee the spending of funds by executive branch departments and agencies. Finally, it revised the budgetary procedures of Congress by establishing a single committee with jurisdiction over the entire appropriation process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prior to this time the only element of unity to the national budget was that it was transmitted to Congress by the Secretary of Treasury in a single volume known as the *Letter of Estimates*. The President was largely a passive participant in the formulation of his own government's budget. He lacked direct control over departmental spending and did not possess any type of institutional means for managing the budgetary process. As a result departmental requests were not compiled on the basis of shared principles or priorities nor were they coordinated with the programs and activities of other departments.

The conventional explanation for why the above changes came about focuses almost exculsively on the appearance of the progressive movement on the American political scene at the turn of the century. Unlike the radical reformers of the late 1800's, progressives sought to work within the political system and unlike their populist contemporaries the progressive's roots were in the middle class and not with workers or farmers. It was an article of faith among most members of the progressive movement that the economy was a proper area of government concern and that private power had to be regulated if popular democracy was to flourish. Moreover, it was believed that if government were to serve the people it had to be staffed by professionals and run on the basis of sound business principles. Since central to the operation of any system of financial management is a sound budgetary system, it is not surprising to find that the debate over the adoption of a national budgetary system was couched in the language of "good government."[17]

However, there was nothing foreordained or inevitable about the passage of the reform legislation. The legislative process moved forward in incremental steps that, as always, were easily blocked or reversed. Significant political hurdles stood in the way of its passage. In 1916 both political parties included proposals for a national budget system in their platforms. In 1917 bills were introduced calling for studies of a national budget system. Congress adjourned without taking any action and the first bills calling for the actual establishment of such a system were introduced in 1918 but they never made it out of committee. In 1919 President Wilson called a special session of Congress to take up the matter. At that time Senator McCormick and Representative Good introduced bills to reform the budgetary process. These two bills became the focal point of the ensuing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legislative and public debate over how best to establish a national budgetary system.

In May 1920 a House-Senate Committee authored a compromise bill which President Wilson vetoed. Once again, Congress adjourned without taking any action. Efforts to modify the bill and gain Wilson's signature on the last day of the second session of the Sixty-Sixth Congress failed due to the opposition of several members of the Senate to the proposed changes. Senator McCormick and Representative Good reintroduced their bills in 1921. Competing bills once again emerged from the legislative process necessitating a conference committee. President Harding signed the legislation on June 10, 1921.

By that time legislation authorizing the establishment of a Bureau of the Budget had passed the House five times and the Senate three times. In order to understand why this legislation finally passed it is necessary to look beyond the political influence of the progressive movement to the impact which World War I had on the budgetary process. Its impact can be seen by examining the thoughts of three participants in the reform effort.

In a 1919 article in *Harper's Magazine* Joseph Cannon, who by then had already served for forty five years in the House of Representatives, thirty years on the Committee Appropriations with ten as its chair, and eight as the Speaker of the House, wrote that "the American people do not yet appreciate the cost of the war with Germany."[18] He noted that the Sixty-fifth Congress appropriated $42 billion for the war effort and that when combined with the monies appropriated by the Sixty-Sixth Congress the total price tag rises to $45 billion. This sum is larger then the total spending of the government from the first inauguration of George Washington to the second inauguration of Woodrow Wilson. In order to finance the war effort Congress authorized loans totaling $31 billion.

Cannon continued that one of war's principal legacies was the fact that executive departments were continuing to estimate peace-time expenditures on a war-time basis or "just as though gold grew like mushrooms in the Treasury cellar and bank-notes budded like leaves in springtime. He was particularly disturbed by the whole-scale effort of government bodies created specifically to help in the war effort to redefine themselves into government agencies whose permanent existence – and funding – was necessary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To combat these twin evils of a large government debt and a war-driven expansion of the national government which threatened to become permanent Cannon argued for the establishment of a single committee in the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over all appropriations. He strongly opposed the notion that any part of a budget committee might reside within the executive branch as he felt those favoring the British budgetary system were endorsing.

Similar observations were made by R.C. Leffingwell in an address before an April 30, 1920 meeting of the Academy of Political Science in New York.[19] Leffingwell, a banker and an original member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served both as Counsel to the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to floating the first war loan and as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury during World War I. He noted that from the declaration of war through March 31, 1920, a period six days short of three years, US government expenditures amounted to some $37.455 billion and that this had produced a public debt of more then $23 billion. While the bulk of his comments were devoted to a review of how the United States financed its war effort, Leffingwell concluded with a series of remarks regarding the state of government finances in the post war era. His principal argument was that not only had the world failed to make progress toward reestablishing healthy economies but that backward steps had been taken.

In the United States he was particularly disturbed by the prevalence of unsound economic ideas and the prejudicial practices of the government. Leffingwell singled out government policy concerning railroads and ships. In each case he argued that the government involved itself in these industries in order to better prosecute the war by ensuring cheap rates but that it had not left once the war ended. As a result over $5 billion had been spent on ships and railroads after the war was over with the railroads being run at a loss. Leffingwell conceded that government involvement in the railroad industry preceded America's entry into the war but maintained that such policies were no longer tolerable and that government expenditures growing out of the war must be cut.

Adoption of a national budget system "with teeth in it" was held to be a critical element in bringing about this reduction in government expenditures. Leffingwell saw divided government as an immediate impediment standing in the way of the adoption of such a system:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> ...[for] probably the most crucial two years and a half in the world's history, the Government of the United States is deadlocked against itself, a Government by obstruction...and therefore incapable of effective leadership in national or international affairs.

President Warren Harding wasted little time in identifying the linkage between wartime expenditures and the current problems facing the United States. In his inaugural address Harding emphasized that the war was the main cause of the country's problems and that returning to normal times would require dealing with its legacy of debt and excessive expenditures.[20] An essential first step in this direction was restoring efficiency in government.

In an April address to Congress Harding returned to his inaugural theme that many of the country's problems were due to the war and called for the passage of such measures as lower taxes, lower railroad rates, and improved highways. He went onto propose reducing government expenditures, instituting a tax relief program and establishing a national budgetary system as essential for lifting the "burdens of war taxation from the shoulders of the American people".

Harding had one other particularly cogent set of observations about the adoption of a national budgetary system. He noted that "pressure for the adoption of an orderly procedure in the expenditure of public money was essentially not political." And, he continued, politicians embraced it because of the heavy deficit spending during the war but "without full devotion or understanding".

Of course budget reform was indeed political for it involved a transfer of authority from the legislative to the executive branch. Former Speaker of the House Cannon was alarmingly aware of this development. The problem of the budget brought about by the foreign policy crisis of World War I led directly to the executive's acquiring new and significant centralized budget powers which seemed to mesh with emerging domestic and international realities. Executive centralization fit the emerging world order which would shortly see the international economic devastation of the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War and Korea. During this modern period executives argued for their "prerogatives" and the Congress acquiesced until anomalies developed in the post World War I international paradigm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Both World War II and the Korean War took place within that paradigm. As many commentators have noted World War II can be seen as an extension and conclusion of the unfinished peace of World War I. It thus did not signal a major transformation in the nature of world politics. Similarly, while unexpected in its timing the Korean War did not produce a fundamental reorientation in thinking about international relations because a consensus had already formed on the nature of America's role in the world in the form of Kennan's containment doctrine and its reformulation and elaboration by NSC-68. Moreover, in neither of these instances were the economic consequences of America's global roles such that they could not be accomodated within the existing budgetary order. Not only did the increase in government spending necessiated by World War II not overload the US budgetary process it was actually beneficial to a US economy that was still struggling to escape the grips of the depression. Overload after the Korean War was avoided through a twofold strategy. First, (cheaper) modern technology was substituted for (relatively more expensive) manpower as the basis of US defense strategies under Eisenhower's "New Look." Second, the Truman administration's policy of symmetrical containment which committed US forces to the global containment of communism was replaced by a less expensive policy of asymmetrical containment.[21] It would be the Vietnam War which would mark the beginning of a new era in international and domestic politics.

Vietnam, Watergate and the Budget

It is currently fashionable to fix the end of the Cold War period with the rise of Gorbachev's glasnost and peristroika policies in the Soviet Union. The beginning of the end of the Cold war actually occurs many years before Gorbachev assumes power. In assessing contemporary history Geoffrey Barraclough has suggested:

> ...Contemporary history begins when the problems which are actual in the world today first take visible shape; it begins with the changes which enable, or rather which compel us to say that we have moved into a new era.... it indicates that there was a long period of transition before the *ethos* of one period was superseded by the *ethos* of the other...[22]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That long period of transition occurs between the end of the Vietnam War and the ascendancy of Gorbachev.

The world begins to change immediately after the end of the Vietnam War. The foreign policy consensus built around the doctrine of containment begins to unravel. Rosenau and Holsti noted the emergence of conflicting foreign policy belief systems after the War.[23] Support of containment in a bipolar world with its emphasis upon military instrumentalities was the position of the Cold War Internationalists. This group was challenged by the Post-Cold War Internationalists who believed that international interaction revolved around primarily economic issues in a multipolar world structure. These two groups were, in turn, challenged by isolationists or as we would call them today, America firsters. Their voice was notable during the 1992 primary campaign season. They would have America withdraw from the leadership role in international affairs in order to solve domestic problems.

America's loss in the Vietnam War sparked new thinking about the world and international politics. But inevitably, advocates of the predominant positions in foreign policy, those of Containment or Cold war Internationalism fought to preserve their pre-eminent role in foreign policy. Nowhere was this the case more than in the arms control policies that the United States pursued between 1973 and 1986.[24] The difference between the Carter Administration's approach to arms control and the Reagan Administration's approach reflected the differences between the Cold War and the Post Cold War Internationalists.

The struggle between these conflicting belief systems affected the Nixon Administration in an ironic way. President Nixon initialed the first SALT agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. He, along with his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, initiated a policy of Detente between the two superpowers. He became the first American President to travel to China. On the other hand, the policies related to the pursuit of the Vietnam War ultimately caused him domestic harm. Watergate is historically viewed as a domestic crisis but this is conventional wisdom for Nixon's conduct of the Vietnam War led him to believe that all who opposed him were wrong and even traitors to the American cause for victory. Increasingly this siege mentality led to the establishment of "enemies lists" and secret tapes and an us versus them mentality that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

became part of the raison d'etre of Watergate. Foreign policy considerations were linked to domestic actions.

The Vietnam War and Watergate crises led to the resignation of President Nixon and ushered in a host of reforms that altered the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Thus a great period of reflection and nascent change in foreign policy and world politics coincides or is inexorably linked to profound domestic reforms. Congress alters its own internal structures partly as a response to an executive's conduct of the Vietnam War. Committee government gives way to subcommittee government. Younger members acquire more power in the Congress.[25] Distrust develops between the executive and Congress over the conduct of foreign affairs. The Case Act is proposed to limit the executive's propensity to utilize executive agreements. The War Powers Act is passed over a President Nixon's veto to temper executive war-making powers. Intelligence reforms are proposed by various members of Congress.[26] Co-determination of foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches of government begins especially with respect to foreign arms sales.[27]

Domestic reforms were also pursued. The financing of presidential campaigns underwent significant reform which ultimately resulted in the proliferation of PACs and the increase in the intensity of lobbying. Of all the reforms, perhaps the most hopeful was the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. This act was specifically passed to limit an executive's power to impound funds without the authorization of Congress. It established the CBO for the purposes of providing the Congress with an analysis of the President's budget.[28]

There are parallels between the 1974 act and the 1921 act. As we have noted, the 1921 act was not merely a good government reform as conventional wisdom would have us believe. It was prompted, in large part, by the huge deficits after World War I and changes in the international environment. Many observers thought that it centralized power in the White House to the detriment of Congress. As the United States pursued world order in the 1940's through the 1970's this budgetary system appeared to fit the foreign policy considerations of Containment nicely. It gave the executive leeway during a crisis and throughout the Cold War period. Ironically the budget prerogatives of the president became a constitutional issue due to President

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nixon's impoundment of environmental funds. Thus Congress' actions, imbedded in the 1974 act, have historically been viewed as a realignment of executive/congressional budget power. While the 1921 act centralized power for budget making in the White House, the 1974 act aimed to share the budget power more equitably with the Congress.

This is not quite the whole story for foreign policy considerations also prompted the 1974 act. Howard E. Shuman notes these similarities between the acts.

* Both were preceded by many years of deficit spending.
* In both eras there was concern for a rise in the general level of spending.
* In both eras the nation perceived a budget crises and decided to do something about it.
* Each budget crisis was brought to a head by a war which greatly expanded expenditures, increased deficits, and set off inflationary pressures.
* Consensus existed between Democrats and Republicans and liberals and conservatives in Congress.
* In both eras there was a shift of power in Congressional committees.[29]

Economic spending for the Vietnam War led to stagflation, e.g., inflation and slow economic growth simultaneously. As Shuman notes, consumer prices rose to 8.8 and 12.2% by 1973 and 74. The producer price index rose from 2 to 4% during the period from 1965 to 1972 but rose to 11.8% and 18.3% in 1973 and 1974. The budget deficit was over 23 billion in 1971 and 1972 and it was considered massive for its time.[30]

In addition to the constitutional crisis over impoundment of congressionally authorized monies for environmental cleanup there was a distinct foreign policy connection to the argument for budget reform. The Nixon Administration authorized the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969. Records were falsified and monies were transferred for the bombing without the knowledge and consent of Congress. The Congress was seriously concerned about the budgetary conduct of the Nixon Administration in its pursuance of the Vietnam War.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus in both periods foreign policy considerations, specifically those derived from wartime expenditures played a role in budget reform. The difference was that in 1921 the President acquired power and in 1974 the President lost some power. The other difference is that the 1974 act was the product of a constitutional crisis but as we have argued that crisis itself had foreign policy roots.

Both times the world was in the throes of change. In the 1920's it was assumed that the President needed more power to centralize an unruly budget process. It instituted a process that would be in synch with a war time economy led by an invigorated executive. In the 1970's Congress understood exactly what invigorated executive centralization could bring and moved to share budget authority with the executive. This ushered in a period of co-determination of budget politics with a host of new problems.

Perhaps the most pressing problem was divided government. With the exception of the Carter Administration, the Congress and the executive have pursued different budgetary agendas.Throughout the 1980's the Congress , controlled by the Democratic Party, favored a spending agenda concentrated upon social problems, commonly referred to as domestic spending. The White House, controlled by the Republican Party, preferred to cut domestic spending in favor of military spending. This "Mexican standoff" has effectively diminished the opportunities for real budget agreement and has led to the inability of the executive and the Congress to reduce the massive budget deficits.

This, in turn, leads to problems in international affairs. With the decline of the dollar, the increase of imports into America, the huge debt burden and the decline in exports, the United States faces a diminishing leadership role in this "New World Order." The US/Iraq War and the paltry sums of money lent to former communist nations for economic development are but an indication of the problem. As international politics effects our budgetary politics our budgetary politics effects international politics. We cannot resurrect the executive/congressional budget politics of a bygone era. They do not fit the current economic, political or international environment. Furthermore, greater centralization in the executive branch via, for example, a line item veto will simply not work. Too much of the budget, i.e., entitlements, would be out of the reach of such cuts. The answer lies in exploring congressional/executive collaborative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

devices that may hold the key to future budget success.

Conclusion

In both of the periods examined here the international system was in the throes of fundamental change and intruded into the domestic political arena via the budgetary process to alter the distribution of political power within the national government. In 1921 the President acquired power and in 1974 the President lost power. The differences in outcomes does not negate the influence of changes in the international system on domestic political arrangements. It points to the complexity of the process of fundamental political change in an interdependent world. Moreover, it speaks to the need to lengthen one's perspective in analyzing political phenomena and to be leery of explanations that focus only on near term causal factors.

The executive/congressional budget politics of a bygone era cannot be resurrected. They do not fit the current economic, political or international environment. Legislative/executive relations in the post Cold War era will be dominated by a different if not totally new conception of the separation of powers doctrine as separate institutions which share powers. The world has become economically interdependent and our governmental institutions have changed in the last twenty years. The conventional wisdom exhibited in presidential studies literature that the President has more room to maneuver in foreign policy as opposed to domestic policy does not ring true any longer. As Louis Fisher warns:

> [I]nstead of periodic and idiosyncratic interventions, Congress now has the institutional capacity to monitor foreign policy on an informed, sustained basis. Congress is better prepared to challenge assertions and premises from the administration and less willing to show deference to claims of expertise and authority.[31]

In this new era an administration that seeks to practice executive dominance will be doomed to failure. We should note that this is not only true for times of divided government but unified government as well. Many of the problems associated with the Clinton Administration, at least early in its term, stem from its lack of understanding and collaboration with the Congress.[32]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Multiple lines of communication need to be established and nurtured between the President and Congress. Institutional interaction needs to be encouraged. Such interaction and communication needs to be viewed positively as an element of strength reinforcing presidential leadership not detracting from it. Information must be shared between the branches on a more equitable basis.[33] Our analysis indicates a link between era defining international events and budget policy. This linkage has effected the nature of executive/legislative relations and possesses domestic consequences. Executive/legislative relations in the new emerging era will be defined by competition between the branches and this competition will manifest itself in budget decisions. There are two roads to the future. One road is fraught with bitter and divisive struggles between the branches. It ends in deadlocked government and lost opportunities which may be particularly dangerous in this new world. The second road is one of managed competition and inter-branch collaboration for the production of consensus policy-making and policies within our nation to serve us better in our competitive quest abroad.

Notes

[1]Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* 71 (1992): 83-96.
[2]Richard Rosencrance, "A New Concert Of Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (1992): 64-82.
[3]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Seyom Brown, *New Forces In World Politics* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Richard A. Falk, "Toward A New World Order; Modest Methods And Drastic Visions." in Saul Mendlovitz (ed.), *On The Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1975); and Richard A. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," *Foreign Policy* 24 (1976): 65-113.
[4]Richard Rosencrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth Or Reality ?" *World Politics* 26 (1973): 3-21; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle For The Mastery In Europe 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Mira Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad From The Colonial Era to 1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
[5]Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967) and F. H. Hinsley, *Power And The Pursuit Of Peace* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
[6]Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32 (1978): 881-912.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[7]Miles Kahler, *Decolonialization in Britain and France* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
[8]James Rosenau (ed.), *Linkage Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1969).
[9]Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (1988): 453-77.
[10]Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
[11]Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State* (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 1-16.
[12]Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction To Contemporary History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 43-68.
[13]Ibid., pp. 93-120.
[14]*Ibid.*, p. 118.
[15]Quoted in Lionel Kochan *The Struggle for Germany 1914-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 9.
[16]James Chace and Caleb Carr, *America Invulnerable* (New York: Summit Books, 1988).
[17]Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).
[18]Joseph Cannon, "The National Budget," *Harper's Magazine* 139 (1919): 617-628.
[19]R.C. Leffingwell, "The Treasury's War Problem," an address before The Academy of Political Science, reprinted as Senate Document #301, 60th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920).
[20]Eugene Trani and David Wilson, *The Presidency of Warren G. Harding* (Lawrence, Kansas: The Regent Press of Kansas, 1977).
[21]John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
[22]Barraclough, p. 20.
[23]James N. Rosenau and Ole Holsti, "U. S. Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdown of Consensus and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems," *World Politics* 35 (1983): 368-92.
[24]Anthony J. Eksterowicz, "The Balance of Power Foundation for Contemporary Arms Control," *The Journal Of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 13 (1988): 315-32.
[25]Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1981).
[26]Thomas E. Cronin, *The State Of The Presidency* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1980), pp.187-22.
[27]James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1987), pp. 150-52.
[28]Aaron Wildavsky, *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 150-58.
[29]Howard E. Shuman, *Politics and the Budget: The Struggle between the President and Congress* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 213-14.
[30]*Ibid.*, p. 188.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[31]Louis Fisher, *The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive*, 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), pp. 175-76.
[32]William Mullen, "Perceptions of Carter's Legislative Successes and Failures: Views From the Hill and the Liaison Staff," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (1982): 522-33.
[33]Michael L. Mezey, *Congress, the President & Public Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 206-10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal
Andrew Hacker
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992

To begin this review, one can only say that the author must be extremely competent to have written such a powerfully biased book. If you wish to solve a serious problem, one should address the concerns of those with whom one disagrees. There is a strong inference in the preface that this is not his intent.

Instead it would seem that his prime purpose is to blame Americans of European descent for the failures of other races in North America. Any reluctance of whites to interbreed with the minority races is condemned, and research scholars of the greatest ability and integrity, such psychologist Arthur Jensen of Berkeley, whose prolific research has been published in the most respected scientific journals, and Nobel Prize winner William Shockley who was concerned about declining intelligence as the demographic content of America steadily changed, are accused of "sifting through research reports for evidence of racial superiority." Indeed, the author complains, "most white Americans still share Thomas Jefferson's belief that in terms of evolution and genetics theirs is the most developed race." This, he argues, is because "even Nobel Prize winners can end up seeing not what is actually there, but what they want to see." Some readers might suggest that the author clearly sees what is there, but deliberately misrepresents reality to his readers in order to remake the world in a pattern which he personally considers to be morally superior to reality.

A comparison of this book with a similar work of deception, *In the Name of Eugenics* by Kevles, makes the latter work look like a shining example of probity and fairness. Even though the latter work abounds in snide remarks, innuendos, and outright distortion and biased selection of data, it does contain a wealth of information that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is scarcely otherwise available.

In Part One of the work under review, the author follows a line of reasoning dear to Karl Marx, namely that theory that the sole or major cause of the statistical bias in income and other measures of success between the black and white population is due solely to environmental causes. In Part Two, he takes his thesis of total environmentalism as proved, and on the basis of this assumption proceeds to blame the whites for the picture of black and white separateness, hostility and inequality which he finds in America today.

Chapter II, "Race and Racism: Inferiority and Inequality", states the underlying thesis upon which discussion throughout the book is based, and that thesis seems to be that, since one cannot mathematically prove that there are significant racial differences in intellectual ability, we should assume that they are equal. Unfortunately, there are very few, if any, realities in the social sciences that are subject to mathematical proof. Were we to base public policy decisions only on views of reality that were so proven, public policy decisions would be based upon nothing. The absence of mathematic proof also applies to claims of equality. From page 24: "Most whites who call themselves conservatives hold this view [that Afro-Americans differ significantly in average intellectual capability from the white average], and proclaim it when they are sure of their company. Most liberals and those further to the left deny that present disparities are based upon genetic inheritance. If they harbor doubts, they keep it to themselves." In this quote the author indirectly levels a charge that whites are either through fear of social rejection or lack of concern "faking it" in the market place of ideas: conservatives through silence, and liberals through rationalization (else why harbor doubts?). Surprisingly, however, it is the politically correct that seem to believe that human worth and dignity are measured with an IQ thermometer, and therefore infer that such statements are racist and unethical.

If whites had the courage to honestly and openly address the above issue, as Shockley and Jensen did, or if blacks faulted whites for patronizing them by their failure to examine the data concerning racial differences fearlessly and frankly – thus removing the social stigma associated with such behavior – we might get some rational effort started for win-win solutions. One might think, as Shockley urged us to think, in terms of a major enquiry into the extent of racial differences to determine the causes for once and for all. The only serious objection to that approach would come from those who had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little confidence in what they desperately wished to believe. However, one should not expect that the number of those who so wish to believe is at all negligible. The thesis seems to be that nature was capable and motivated to assure that evolution, which allows physical characteristics to differ, would not allow differences in intellectual ability. This, of course, because they are a very hurtful problem to our society. This argument perhaps convinces believers, but falls far short of reaching those not so persuaded.

After an introductory background wherein the above thesis is defined, the author compares black and white outcomes in eight chapters or areas: family structure, income, equity in employment, education (1. ethnicity; 2. segregated schooling; 3. what is best for black children?), crime, and politics. These comparisons and interpretations are interestingly stated, although they may be familiar topics to a well-read person. In these chapters, he justifies the title "black and white: Separate, hostile, unequal." For many readers, however, the insistent inference of white guilt and black impotence does begin to be counterproductive, as well as flattering to no one, regardless of the author's intent. This includes the purpose to explain "why so much behavior regarding race remains so obdurate and ingrained," as stated in the preface.

In order to give some notion of the factual material covered in the above topics, an extremely brief summary of the "Racial Income Gap, How Much Is Due to bias?" chapter is provided.

The first issue addressed was the proportion of various ethnic groups that were self-employed. Koreans were in the lead, at 16.5 percent. whites, about a third of the way down the list came in at 7.4 percent, and blacks at 3.0 percent. But it seemed difficult to sort out the meaning behind the data. For instance, being self-employed may be a necessity for someone new to this country who is not familiar with the language and customs here. Thus this may represent a temporary situation.

The next significant topic is black proportionate representation in various occupations, with a black total participation of 10.1 percent. Needless to say, blacks were generally poorly represented in the better paying occupations. The total range provided extended from 31.7 for nurses aid and orderlies, to 0.9 percent for architects. Apart from the fact that bias could be explained either by environmental or genetic factors or a combination of the two, the very small rate of participation of dental hygienists suggests that whites have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concern, appropriate or not, about the race of their dental technicians. The last item is illustrated by a small table that shows that more black women are found in several higher categories of employment, as compared to black males, and more so the higher the status category. This general topic is also dealt with under the "income" discussion.

The other chapters also detail differences in outcomes over a wide range of measures of white and black expectations in income, social status, educational success, and similar variables. The differences are so patent as to need no argument. The strong implications that none of these discrepancies have any basis except white culpability, however, as implied in Chapter II, are discussed as if the basic thesis were proven or, alternatively, assumed for the purpose of exposition. It is difficult to characterize the bias in the book by a sample, as the characteristic feature is consistency, and that cannot be shown by a sample. An example, however, may help in this regard. On page 81 the author states "As noted earlier, black birthrates are not rising relative to those for whites, so it is not as if the black population is getting out of hand." Earlier, page 71, he shows in a table that black fertility rates have been consistently in the range of 1.35 relative to whites, although gradually increasing from 1940 to 1988. This means that the doubling time for black population relative to whites is about 66 years, which, assuming constancy of that value, means that in 200 years blacks would outnumber whites by 33%. Given that whites are human just as blacks are, the unusual thing about that is that so little is made of it by the white community.

In summary, it is unquestionably a potent book, and one that those who wish to be "au courant" should read. Unfortunately, however, it is not a bridge-builder, in conformity with the author's stated intent. Nor does it "explain" root causes of the problem, at least not in terms that connect with those who do not accept the author's major thesis. This book thus rationalizes the opinions of those who share the author's prejudices, while never addressing the concerns of those the author has chosen to ignore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations
Arnold H. Leibowitz
London: Martinus Nijhoff

The United States, along with its role as a major world power economically, possesses territories in the Pacific as well as the Caribbean. It is uncertain whether some of these areas, some hundreds and others thousands of miles from the continental United States, will ever become states. The U.S. made exceptions for two areas not part of the mainland, the admission of Hawaii and Alaska in the 1950s, and Puerto Rico is under serious consideration for statehood.

The position and role of the United States insular areas have growing significance for the U.S. government. Arnold Leibowitz is an attorney who has worked with the governments of most of the U.S. insular areas and brings both scholarship and practical legal experience to this compendium of U. S. insular areas. The title accurately reveals the approach: many of these questions and issues are examined from the perceptive of a lawyer and some chapter section read like legal briefing papers. The book is full of thorough analysis of very complicated policy questions.

The author examines the whole history of U.S. territorial status (from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to the present), alternatives for the insular areas (commonwealth status, statehood, freely associated status), and special considerations regarding issues of race, geography, and size. The author provides interesting insights in the Caribbean areas of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico and the Pacific possessions of Guam, American Samoa, and the former Trust Territories of the Pacific – the Freely Associated States of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the only remaining trust territory, the Republic of Palau.

Mr. Leibowitz expresses his candid opinions on deficiencies in the federal policies regarding the insular areas and what avenues the United States should pursue for the future. One does not have to agree with his conclusions to respect his scholarship and analysis. The book is a comprehensive study of U.S. policy in the Pacific, one often overlooked in examining the U.S. government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New: Just Published!

The American Revolution Resurgent

Dr. Raphael G. Kazmann

Paperback, 186 pages

CONTENTS

Moral Principles: Where They Come From
Democratic Organization
Democracy - The Competence Factor
History, Government and Democratic Method
The Democratic Purpose and its Achievement
Democratic Governments: Internal Problems
Foreign Policy
Now What?

An in-depth study of the history of American democracy, its history, its present-day problems, and possible future.

ISBN 1-878465-06-6 • Price: $17.50

VISA AND MASTERCARD ACCEPTED

Scott Townsend Publishers
P.O. Box 34070, N.W. Washington D.C., 20043
Tel: (703) 442-8010 • Fax: (703) 847-9524

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New: Just Published!

How Good is Your Country? What You Should Know

Raymond B. Cattell, Ph.D., D.Sc.

Paperback, 144 pages

With Charts, Diagrams and Tables

CONTENTS

The Aims and Methods of Our Enquiry
A Scientific Basis for Comparing Countries
Reflections on What Syntality One Would Desire
Locating Family Types among Nations
Developmental Change
Some Change Factors Mapped in America, Australia and Britain
Desirability of Various Racio-Cultural Experiments
Comparison of Developmental Trends
Interpreting Family Values
The Mystery of Cultural Pressure
A Plan for Proceeding

A unique experiment in determining the relative cultural and biological competence of nations developed by one of the world's leading psychologists.

ISBN 0-941694-44-5 • Price: $25.00
VISA AND MASTERCARD ACCEPTED

The Mankind Quarterly Monograph Series No. 5
P.O. Box 34070, N.W. Washington D.C., 20043
Tel: (202) 371-2700 • Fax: (202) 371-1523

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED